Shaping Strategic Information Systems Security Initiatives in Organizations by Tejay, Gurvirender
Virginia Commonwealth University
VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
2008
Shaping Strategic Information Systems Security
Initiatives in Organizations
Gurvirender Tejay
Virginia Commonwealth University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Management Information Systems Commons
© The Author
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass. For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.
Downloaded from
http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1576
i 
 
© Gurvirender Pal Singh Tejay 2008 
All Rights Reserved 
 
ii 
 
SHAPING STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS  
SECURITY INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
 
by 
 
GURVIRENDER PAL SINGH TEJAY 
Master of Science in Computer Science, University of Chicago, 2003 
Master of Arts in Economics, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2002  
Bachelor of Arts in Economics, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2000 
 
 
 
Director: DR. GURPREET S DHILLON 
PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Richmond, Virginia 
August 2008 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgment 
 
After grueling five years of pursuing my dissertation, which saw the high of 
early doctoral day’s optimism and lows of hunting for free food even if it meant sitting 
in on Dean’s research seminar on a beautiful Friday afternoon, I am tempted to wrap up 
this acknowledgment with one line - The life looks beautiful outside. However, the 
unforgiving lords of the doctoral program require one to pay homage to the life spent 
inside getting tanned by the glare of computer screen. So, the following is keeping with 
the sacred doctoral tradition.  
 I thank with all sincerity to my family for the faith and trust they reposed in me. 
My father and mother have been a source of inspiration and light in my life. I thank 
them for everything. I am grateful to my sister and wife for all the love, support and 
encouragement that helped me through the difficult stages of last few years. I am 
thankful to two bundles of joy - my nieces Ashriya and Ishrat. You have touched me in 
your own special way.  
 I recall with gratitude the guidance and support I have received from Dr. 
Gurpreet Dhillon, Dr. Allen Lee, and Dr. Richard Redmond. To my mentor and advisor, 
Dr Gurpreet Dhillon, I thank you for your patience and unwavering commitment to 
bring out the best in me. You have pushed me to work hard and achieve excellence by 
setting personal example. I have learned so much from you. I also sincerely 
acknowledge Dr. Allen Lee. I am grateful for your words of wisdom. I thank you for 
asking the hard questions and helping me crystallize my thoughts. You have a 
iv 
 
wonderful ability to bring out the best in my work. Special thanks are in order for Dr. 
Richard Redmond. I thank you for having faith in my capabilities. You have supported 
me in different ways throughout the dissertation process. You have given me help and 
provided solution to every major problem I faced. I thank you for being there for me.  
 Thanks to my committee members for agreeing to take part in my dissertation 
journey. I thank Dr. Carolyn Strand Norman for discussing my dissertation, reading the 
chapters and providing useful comments. I appreciate your help and kindness. To Dr. 
Rajiv Kohli and Dr. Ramesh Shukla, I am grateful for your patience with my 
dissertation. You have stood with me and provided support when I needed it. I thank 
you with all sincerity.  
 Thanks are due to Dr. Edward Lieblein and Dr Sumitra Mukherjee. I thank you 
for having faith in my work and trusting me to complete the journey. I am grateful for 
your support without which the last part of my dissertation phase would have been very 
difficult. I also thank all my colleagues at the Nova Southeastern University.  
 To all my research participants, I thank you for your perspectives and time. Few 
individuals need special mention: Peggy Ward, Cathie Brown, Benny Ambler, Dr. 
Easton Rhodd, Robert Borter, Steve Kelliher and Jim Austin. This dissertation would 
not have been possible without your strong support.  
 I thank Stephen Pepper, Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens for leaving 
behind an intellectual legacy. This rich tradition is a source of inspiration and has 
helped me in my intellectual development.  
v 
 
 To all my friends - the few and special, I thank you for tolerating me these last 
five years and listening to me. I promise to match your generosity and warmth with 
kind. I hope you all are proud of me.  
 This dissertation is dedicated to all those who thought I would not make it.  
“Deh shiva var mohe hai shubh karman te kabhun na daroon, 
na daroon ersoh jab chahe laroon, nishche kar apni jeet karoon.” 
Guru Gobind Singh (1666 – 1708) 
(Translation: With the blessings of the Almighty, I am not afraid to do good deeds and 
fight for them and I will ensure that I achieve victory) 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
Page 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................xii 
List of Figures ..............................................................................................................xiii 
Abstract........................................................................................................................xiv 
Chapter 
1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................1 
1.1 Introduction .........................................................................................1 
1.2 Nature of the research ..........................................................................2 
1.3 Scope of the research ...........................................................................4 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation .................................................................5 
2 A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS SECURITY ...........................................................................7 
2.1 Introduction .........................................................................................7 
2.2 The intellectual map.............................................................................8 
2.3 Research in information systems security ...........................................12 
 Formism as world hypothesis .............................................................12 
 Mechanism as world hypothesis ........................................................19 
 Organicism as world hypothesis .........................................................28 
 Contextualism as world hypothesis.....................................................33 
2.4 Discussion..........................................................................................37 
2.5 Conclusion.........................................................................................42 
vii 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ..............................................................44 
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................44 
3.2 Philosophical considerations ..............................................................44 
3.3 Theoretical considerations..................................................................47 
 Research argument and questions.......................................................48 
 Theoretical perspective ......................................................................49 
 Theoretical framework to conduct argument.......................................52 
3.4 Research design .................................................................................54 
 Research strategy ...............................................................................54 
 Unit of analysis ..................................................................................55 
 Data collection ...................................................................................58 
 Data analysis......................................................................................59 
3.5 Conclusion.........................................................................................59 
4 A CONTEXTUALIST INTERPRETATION OF STRATEGIC 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY INITIATIVES .......................61 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................61 
4.2 Information Technology Agency .......................................................61 
 Context .............................................................................................63 
 Content .............................................................................................74 
 Process ..............................................................................................91 
4.3 Department of Transportation ..........................................................100 
 Context ............................................................................................100 
viii 
 
 Content ...........................................................................................107 
 Process ............................................................................................111 
4.4 Discussion .......................................................................................118 
4.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................120 
5 DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SECURITY INITIATIVES AT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
AGENCY..................................................................................................121 
5.1 Introduction .....................................................................................121 
5.2 Bourdieu’s cultural theory................................................................122 
5.3 Constructing the field map ...............................................................126 
 Understanding position of the security department ...........................127 
 Doxa ...............................................................................................137 
 Characteristics of fields....................................................................143 
 Summary .........................................................................................150 
5.4 Understanding habitus peculiarities ..................................................152 
5.5 Appropriating power through forms of capital .................................163 
 Economic capital..............................................................................163 
 Social capital ...................................................................................164 
 Cultural capital ................................................................................167 
 Symbolic capital ..............................................................................169 
 The field of power ...........................................................................170 
5.6 Strategizing about action .................................................................174 
ix 
 
5.7 Attaining dominance through symbolic value...................................183 
5.8 Discussion .......................................................................................195 
5.9 Conclusion.......................................................................................202 
6 IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SECURITY INITIATIVES AT DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION ..............................................................................204 
6.1 Introduction .....................................................................................204 
6.2 Gidden’s structuration theory ..........................................................205 
6.3 Shaping information systems security initiatives at Department of 
Transportation .................................................................................209 
 Designing information systems security initiative.............................210 
 Instituting information systems security initiative.............................220 
 Discussion and summary .................................................................233 
6.4 Social transformation at the Department of Transportation...............236 
 Evaluating globalizing tendencies at DOT........................................238 
 Understanding self-identity at DOT..................................................244 
 Discussion and summary .................................................................248 
6.5 Discussion .......................................................................................251 
6.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................258 
7 INTERPRETING STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SECURITY INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATIONS ..............................260 
7.1 Introduction .....................................................................................260 
x 
 
7.2 Understanding Schutz’s concept of first-level constructs and second 
level constructs for social theory formation ......................................261 
7.3 Strategic information systems security initiatives at ITA ..................263 
 First-level findings ...........................................................................263 
 Second-level findings.......................................................................268 
7.4 Strategic information systems security initiatives at DOT.................283 
 First-level findings ...........................................................................283 
 Second-level findings.......................................................................288 
7.5 Discussion .......................................................................................298 
7.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................305 
8 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................306 
8.1 Recapitulating the doctrine...............................................................306 
 The nature of strategic information systems security ........................306 
 Shaping the strategic information systems security initiatives...........308 
 The issue of technology governance ................................................309 
 Summary of contributions of this research .......................................312 
8.2 Limitations and future research direction .........................................315 
 Theoretical concerns .......................................................................315 
 Methodological issues .....................................................................317 
References .......................................................................................................320 
Appendices ......................................................................................................334 
A. Information Technology Agency Case Study: Interviews Conducted 
xi 
 
.............................................................................................................334 
B. Department of Transportation: Interviews Conducted......................337 
C. Topic Guide ....................................................................................340 
Vita...................................................................................................................344 
 
 
xii 
 
List of Tables 
Page 
Table 2.1: Summary of formistic world-view.................................................................15 
Table 2.2: Summary of mechanistic world-view ............................................................22 
Table 2.3: Summary of organicistic world-view.............................................................30 
Table 2.4: Summary of contextualistic world-view. .......................................................35 
Table 3.1: Analytic categories of contextualist security change......................................53 
Table 3.2: Evaluative criteria for interpretive case study. ...............................................56 
Table 5.1: Position of ITA security department in various fields..................................134 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of fields...............................................................................143 
Table 5.3: Types of capital...........................................................................................163 
Table 5.4: Constitution of capital for field of power.....................................................172 
Table 5.5: Types of strategy.........................................................................................175 
Table 6.1: IS security implications from structurational analysis..................................252 
Table 7.1: Unilateral control model for security development at ITA...........................270 
Table 7.2: Unilateral control model for security implementation DOT.........................290 
Table 7.3: Normative model for information systems security .....................................299 
Table 8.1: Evaluation of the dissertation ......................................................................319 
 
xiii 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 2.1: Scheme of world hypotheses........................................................................10 
Figure 2.2: Information systems security literature.........................................................38 
Figure 3.1: Contextualist model of strategic change.......................................................52 
Figure 4.1: Organizational structure of the Information Technology Agency .................70 
Figure 4.2: IT security directorate of the Information Technology Agency ....................72 
Figure 4.3: Organizational structure of the Department of Transportation....................105 
Figure 4.4: Information security department of the Department of Transportation........106 
Figure 5.1: Bourdieu’s cultural theory .........................................................................123 
Figure 5.2: Dominance through symbolic value...........................................................190 
Figure 6.1: Structuration theory by Giddens ................................................................208 
Figure 6.2: Model of strategic transformation .............................................................253 
Figure 6.3: Model of strategic security organizational transformation .........................254 
Figure 7.1: Theory-in-use model..................................................................................269 
Figure 8.1: Classification of theories and future research directions .............................316 
 
 
xiv 
Abstract 
 
 
 
SHAPING STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS  
SECURITY INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
By Gurvirender Pal Singh Tejay, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2008 
 
Major Director:  Dr. Gurpreet S. Dhillon 
Professor, Department of Information Systems 
 
 
Strategic information systems security initiatives have seldom been successful. 
The increasing complexity of the business environment in which organizational security 
must be operationalized presents challenges. There has also been a problem with 
understanding the patterns of interactions among stakeholders that lead to instituting 
such an initiative. The overall aim of this research is to enhance understanding of the 
issues and concerns in shaping strategic information systems security initiative. To be 
successful, a proper undertaking of the content, context and process of the formulation 
and institutionalization of a security initiative is essential. It is also important to align 
the interconnections between these three key components. In conducting the argument, 
this dissertation analyzes information systems security initiatives in two large 
government organizations – Information Technology Agency and Department of 
xv 
 
Transportation. The research methodology adopts an interpretive approach of inquiry. 
Findings from the case studies show that the strategic security initiative should be 
harmonious with the cultural continuity of an organization rather than significantly 
changing the existing opportunity and constraint structures. The development of 
security cultural resources like security policy may be used as a tool for propagating a 
secure view of the social world. For secure organizational transformation, one must 
consider the organizational security structure, knowledgeability of agents in perceiving 
secure organizational posture, and global security catalysts (such as establishing trust 
relations and security related institutional reflexivity). The inquiry indicates that 
strategic security change would be successful in an organization if developed and 
implemented in a brief yet quantum leap adopting an emergent security strategy in 
congruence with organizational security values.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This research is concerned with strategic information systems security 
initiatives. In particular, the interest is in understanding how strategic security initiatives 
become instituted in an organization. The changes related to information systems 
security are seldom successful. These changes may relate to technical systems 
implementations or reconfigurations of business processes. The failure of such 
initiatives results in security gaps which can be detrimental to the well-being of an 
organization. It therefore becomes imperative to know what would make these security 
initiatives succeed in an organizational setting. 
 There is about a general lack of understanding regarding the patterns and 
relationships that have an impact on establishing strategic information systems security 
initiatives in an organization. This dissertation contends that strategic security initiatives 
need to be understood from a contextualist perspective. The overall aim of this research 
is to enhance understanding about the issues and concerns associated with instituting 
strategic information systems security initiatives in organizations. In pursuing this aim, 
this dissertation investigates the security related changes initiated in two large 
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organizations to address the dynamic requirements of the environment in which they 
operate.  
 The rest of this chapter describes the nature and scope of this research. Section 
1.2 argues the importance of investigating the research problem. Section 1.3 outlines the 
scope of the research problem. Section 1.4 presents the definitions adopted in this 
research for the purposes of clarity and consistency of terms. Section 1.5 outlines the 
structure of chapters for the dissertation.  
 
1.2. Nature of the Research  
The need for strategic vision for information systems security is being felt by 
various organizations.  According to David Burrill, Head of Group Security British 
American Tobacco, “what we're doing is lurching from challenge to challenge, from 
crisis to crisis” (as quoted in Scalet, 2005).  “If you have no security plan, how will you 
know if you're doing it right? You will be reacting to every little thing that bumps in the 
night," says Stan Gatewood, CISO of the University of Georgia (as quoted in Scalet, 
2005). The emerging direction in information systems security practice is to consolidate 
various security functions. This trend in security practice has reaped initial success in 
some cases. But it might not work for every organization. “In the rapidly changing 
information security field…the strategic planning process is crucial if you want to get 
your organization out of crisis mode,” claims Sarah Scalet (Scalet, 2005). Organizations 
have embarked on rationalistic planning approaches that are prescriptive in nature to 
develop security programs, but these strategic efforts are not as effective as they could 
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be due to a lack of proper understanding of the problem at hand. In the absence of 
appropriate attention to the context, such efforts have a lower success rate.  
The argument of this dissertation is that in order for strategic information 
systems security initiatives to be successful a proper understanding of the content, 
context and process of formulation and implementation is essential. The business world 
is comprised of events with disorder and change as its key features. To achieve a 
successful security program, the dynamics of security change under different contexts 
must be accounted for and properly understood. The contextual analysis of a security 
initiative involves investigation at various levels – issues at outer and inner context, 
historical influences and their interplay.  
Based on the argument, this dissertation addresses the general research 
question about how to institute strategic information systems security change 
initiatives in an organization. The further sub research questions are: 
• What aspects of information systems security goals, policies and 
programs should be included in a strategic information systems security 
initiative? 
• How should strategic information systems security initiatives be 
formulated and implemented in an organization?  
• Why and in what manner does the inner and outer environment of an 
organization impact the strategic information systems security initiative?  
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1.3 Scope of the Research 
 The purpose of this research is to develop theory. Information systems security 
research literature has witnessed limited efforts at theoretical development (Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh, 2006; Benbasat, 2001). The focus so far has been to address issues pertinent 
to security practitioners. These studies approach the security problem from a practical 
perspective and generally lack an appropriate theoretical underpinning. There are few 
research studies involving adequate empirical findings from a substantial research 
process. Further, there are a limited number of studies that investigate the security 
change efforts in its organizational setting. It is important to engage in theoretical 
debates to more substantively develop the field of information systems security. 
In conducting the argument, the dissertation analyzes and studies the 
information systems security initiatives embarked upon in two large federated 
organizations – the Information Technology Agency and the Department of 
Transportation. The issues associated with the context, content and processes of the 
information security initiatives in the two case study organizations have consequences 
for the success of the strategic security programs in both these organizations. 
Three classes of definitions are required to establish the conceptual boundaries 
of this research. For the purposes of this dissertation, an information system is 
considered as an aggregate of information handling activities at a technical, formal and 
informal level of an organization (Liebenau and Backhouse, 1990). This definition is 
also consistent with the view of an information system as advocated by Wetherbe and 
Whitehead (1977). Information systems security has traditionally been concerned with 
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securing the technical edifice. The definition adopted in this dissertation considers 
information systems security as minimizing risks arising because of inconsistent and 
incoherent behavior with respect to the information handling activities of organizations 
(Dhillon, 1995). In this dissertation, strategic information systems security is defined as 
a plan or pattern of actions to attain viability and effectiveness of an organization by 
securing information handling activities in the light of a changing critical environment. 
This definition is based on Quinn’s and Mintzberg’s definition of the strategic function. 
Quinn (1995) defines strategy as a pattern or plan that integrates an organization’s 
major goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole. Mintzberg (1987) 
defined strategy as a plan, ploy, pattern, position, and perspective. 
Strategy as plan is a consciously intended course of action, a guideline (or set of 
guidelines) to deal with a situation. Strategy as a ploy is a specific “maneuver” intended 
to outwit an opponent or competitor. Strategy is a pattern in stream of actions. Strategy 
as position is the mediating force or match between organization and environment 
between the internal and the external context. Strategy as perspective has its content 
consisting of an ingrained way of perceiving the world. (Mintzberg, 1987).  
 
Many researchers have proposed definitions of the term strategy. In essence, 
these definitions actually capture Quinn’s and Mintzberg’s view of strategy in 
one form or another. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
 This section presents an overview of the chapters in this dissertation. The 
research is structured in seven chapters. In this first chapter, the nature of the research 
problem was explicated and the scope of the research was described. Chapter two 
reviews the research literature in the field of information systems security. The aim of 
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literature evaluation is to position this research according to the philosophical 
underpinnings. The underlying argument is that security research needs to mature from 
mechanistic tendencies and ground itself in the contextualism paradigm. 
 Chapter three describes the research methodology. The philosophical 
assumptions of this research are discussed here. This chapter also provides the 
theoretical basis to conduct the research argument. It presents the research design with a 
particular mode of inquiry adopted for empirical analysis. Chapter four presents the 
contextualist interpretation of security initiatives in organizations. It provides an 
analysis of the Information Technology Agency and the Department of Transportation 
using the theoretical framework.  
Chapter five presents the empirical findings from the Information Technology 
Agency case. The focus of this chapter is to evaluate the development of their strategic 
information systems security program. Chapter six presents the detailed findings from 
the Department of Transportation case and presents an analysis of the implementation 
of their strategic information systems security initiatives.  
Chapter seven engages in a discussion based on the empirical findings from the 
two case studies. The findings are reviewed on the basis of theoretical underpinnings of 
the research. Finally, chapter eight presents the conclusions from this research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A Critical Review of Research in  
Information Systems Security 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction    
 The aim of this chapter is to review and understand the body of knowledge in 
information systems security. Such a review allows for an understanding of the 
philosophical underpinnings of extant work, which assists in positioning this research 
relative to the dominant paradigms of the field. The underlying argument of this chapter 
is that information systems security research needs to mature from mechanistic 
tendencies and ground itself in the contextualism paradigm. A similar endeavor is 
ongoing in information systems and prominent research works include Iivari (1991), 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), Iivari et al. (1998), Dahlbom and Mathiassen (1993), 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2001). 
The chapter is organized into eight sections. Following the introduction, section 
2.2 presents the intellectual map that is used to understand the research literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses the formist view of information systems security.  In this section, 
formism as a world hypothesis is described and used to analyze the literature. Section 
2.4 presents the mechanist view of information systems security literature. Section 2.5 
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and 2.6 provides the contextualist and organicist views of the security literature 
respectively. Section 2.7 discusses the perspectives gained from employing world 
hypothesis as an intellectual tool to traverse the information systems security literature. 
Section 2.8 highlights the contribution of this chapter.  
 
2.2 The Intellectual Map 
 Stephen C. Pepper was an American philosopher who was influenced by 
pragmatism. He primarily worked in the fields of ethics and aesthetics. His major 
research contributions have been to enhance understanding about the issues of social 
sources of knowledge, mind, logic, ethics and valuation. Pepper’s work has influenced 
numerous disciplines including philosophy, psychology, education, management, mass 
communication, ethics, information systems, planning, ecological economics, and 
nursing. The most influential work by Pepper is the development of root-metaphor 
theory.  
Pepper (1970) claims that our knowledge about the world can be reduced to four 
world hypotheses on the basis of the root-metaphor theory. Pepper argues that our 
knowledge about the world originates from common sense. There are two types of 
evidence – uncriticized and criticized. Every item of common sense should be critically 
scrutinized before accepting it. The appropriate way to do this is through corroboration. 
That is, in order to improve evidence we should find further evidence to corroborate it. 
There are two types of corroboration – multiplicative and structural. The former is the 
corroboration of man with man while the latter is corroboration of fact with fact.  
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In multiplicative corroboration, we confirm the repetition of the identical item of 
evidence in different occurrences. The facts are in the form of data which is collected 
through observation. The data so collected is loaded with interpretation.  The refined 
data can be empirical or logical in nature. In structural corroboration, qualitatively 
different items of evidence converge in support of a single item. This type of 
corroboration depends upon a theory or hypothesis that connects different facts or items 
of evidence. In essence, it is the theory or hypothesis which is corroborated. The facts 
are in the form of danda which is captured through the hypothesis. Danda is a name 
given to evidence which has been refined through structural corroboration.  
A theory or hypothesis is a structure which does not involve any evidence. 
Evidences for the hypothesis refer to various items that are not organized according to 
any structure. A structurally corroborated hypothesis can be refined in terms of 
precision or scope. An ideal hypothesis would have unlimited scope. Such a hypothesis 
is a world hypothesis. It is a legitimate cognitive source of prescription. The criteria for 
the determination of cognitive validity involves the specific theories of truth, 
perception, reason and scientific method that are associated with a particular world 
hypothesis. A number of world hypotheses have been proposed in the research literature 
which can be reduced by employing the root-metaphor theory. This theory is a 
descriptive summary of the trends of structural corroboration. The application of root-
metaphor theory to the available world hypotheses provides us with four basic world 
theories that “are derived from certain masses of empirical evidence, originating in 
    10 
 
common sense, which become cognitively refined and may be codified into sets of 
categories that hang together” (Pepper, 1970).  
The four basic concrete standards of judgment and evaluation are formism, 
mechanism, contextualism and organicism (figure 2.1). These four world theories have 
the highest available degree of structural corroboration. These world theories are 
autonomous and have the same degree of adequacy so that they can not be the judge of 
one another. The guiding principles for the application of these theories are rational 
clarity in theory and reasonable eclecticism in practice. In terms of the knowledge about 
a particular subject,  
…there are four well-corroborated alternative world theories about the subject which 
describes it in detail thus, thus, thus and thus. The post-rational eclecticism consists 
simply in holding these four theories in suspended judgment as constituting the sum of 
our knowledge on the subject. (Pepper, 1970) 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Scheme of world hypotheses 
The four world theories organize themselves into analytical and synthetic 
theories, and further into dispersive and integrative theories.  The main difference 
Analytical 
Theories 
Synthetic 
Theories 
Integrative Theories 
(Inadequacy of scope) 
Mechanism 
Formism Contextualism 
Organicism 
Dispersive Theories 
      (Inadequacy of precision) 
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between an analytical and synthetic theory is in terms of the basic facts. The basic facts 
of the analytical theories lie in the nature of elements or factors. As such, the synthesis 
of facts is derivative. The basic facts of the synthetic theories lie in the complexes or 
contexts. As such, the analysis of facts is derivative. Formism and mechanism are the 
analytical theories while contextualism and organicism constitute synthetic theories.  
The main difference between a dispersive and an integrative theory is in the 
analysis of facts. In dispersive theories, facts are taken one by one from the original 
source and are interpreted as they arise or become evident. Formism and contextualism 
belong to this category of theories. For these theories, the universe is a multitude of 
facts that are loosely scattered, not determinative. The cosmos is not highly systematic. 
The idea of pure chance or unpredictability is consistent with these theories. Dispersive 
theories are threatened by indeterminateness or lack of precision. In formism, the 
problem of precision increases with added information about a “fact.” Here, the facts of 
determinate order are real while facts of disorder are unreal. For contextualism, the 
more we know about a “fact” the more determinate the description. Any fact is real for 
contextualism.  
In integrative theories, the analysis of facts is treated integratively. The world 
appears as a cosmos where facts occur in a determinate order, and where, if enough 
were known, the facts could be predicted or described. Consequently, unpredictability 
or cosmic chance is inconsistent with these theories. The aim for integrative theories is 
to get everything into one determinate order. Integrative theories are threatened by the 
lack of scope.  
    12 
 
The dispersive theories view integrative theories as profiting on human 
propensities to rationalization and sublimation. The integrative theories consider 
dispersive theories to be profiting on human ignorance. According to Pepper (1970), 
“mechanism is the stronger analytical and integrative theory, while contextualism is the 
stronger synthetic and dispersive theory.”  
 
2.3 Research in Information Systems Security 
 This section classifies research in information system security. It first describes 
the world hypotheses and then systematically places the security literature research 
within each world-view. The methodology adopted to conduct the literature review is 
provided in Appendix A. Other researchers (Payne, 1975; Hayes et al., 1988) have 
similarly used the intellectual map provided by Pepper (1970) to understand the body of 
literature of the respective fields.  
 
2.3.1 Formism as world hypothesis 
There are two types of formism – immanent and transcendent formism. The 
immanent formism deals with the naturally occurring things, while transcendent 
formism covers artificially created or man-made products. The root metaphor of 
immanent formism is similarity. It implies the simple perception of similar things. For 
example, blades of grass, leaves on a tree. According to Pepper (1970), “immanent 
formism describes the experience of two exactly similar objects minutely, and accepts 
the results of this description.” Characters, particulars and participation are three 
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categories of immanent formism which can be considered as perception aspects of any 
event or object. Character refers to the characterizing entities, quality and relation of a 
given object. Particular refers to the individual manifestation. Its only characteristic is 
difference. Participation is the tie between characters and particulars to produce an 
object. It is particularization of character or characterization of a particular. Ties are 
categorical relations which cannot be characters. A given object may have a number of 
different characters that may occur in a number of different particulars. A class is a 
collection of particulars which participate in one or more characters. It is neither a 
character, nor a particular, nor participation, but an actual working or specific operation 
of three immanent categories in world. An organization of classes is called a 
classification.  
It proceeds from more general to less general. That is, from classes with smallest 
number of characters and largest number of particulars to those with largest number of 
characters and smallest number of particulars. (Pepper, 1970) 
 
The root metaphor of transcendent formism is plan and material. For example, 
develop objects according to the same plan or for the same reason. The objects are 
developed keeping in mind the limitations of the material. Transcendent formism has 
three categories – norms, matter for exemplification of the norm, and a principle of 
exemplification, which materializes the norms. There are laws of nature that are norms 
and regulate occurrences of nature.  
Both immanent and transcendent formism recognize a category of forms, a 
category of the appearance of these forms in nature, and a category of the connection 
between first and second categories. The amalgamation of the categories of these two 
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forms of formism involve two important terms – existence and subsistence. Existence is 
the field of basic particulars, while subsistence is the field of basic characters. The 
categories can be merged as follows: forms consisting of characters and norms which 
may have second-degree participations with one another, basic particulars, and first-
degree participations or exemplifications. 
For a formist, all concrete existences do participate in the physical laws of space 
and time. That is, all characters appear in the form of time and space. A formist explains 
causality as a result of the participation of patterns, norms and laws in basic particulars 
through the forms of time and space. Causality is the determination of the characters of 
certain basic particulars by a law which is set in motion by the characters of other basic 
particulars which participate in that law. A law is a form. Norms are laws determining 
the concrete course of existence. In formism, systematic organization of facts is not 
assumed.  
In formism, truth is the degree of similarity which a description has to its object 
of reference. There are two kinds of truth – historical and scientific (table 2.1). 
Historical truth refers to existence and describes the qualities and relations of particular 
events. Scientific truth refers to subsistence and describes the norms and laws. These 
descriptions can be of empirical uniformities or of natural laws. The former are 
considered as half-truths whereas the latter are considered full truths. Epistemologically, 
for the knower the world is known directly. In formism, laws of nature are discrete and 
separate from each other. There is no single integrated system. For formism, there is 
reality of forms distinct from the reality of particulars.   
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Table 2.1: Summary of formistic world-view 
Root 
(Ontology) 
Similarity; plan and material 
Epistemology World is known directly 
Aim of Enquiry To classify 
Degree of similarity which a description has to its object of reference 
Types of Truth Refers to Description of 
Historical Existence (basic of particulars) Qualities and relation of particular events 
Theory of 
Truth 
Scientific Subsistence (basic of 
characters) 
Norms and Laws 
Inadequacy Precision 
Logic Similarity 
1. Forms 
2. appearance of forms in nature 
Categories 
3. connection between first & second category 
 
Information systems security literature 
A common approach in the formistic world view is to classify research literature 
according to the similarity of elements. It is a logical approach to identify gaps and 
problematic areas with respect to prevalent theories and approaches. Dhillon & 
Backhouse (2001) used the Burrell and Morgan framework as an intellectual map to 
analyze the socio-philosophical concerns in various information systems security 
approaches. It is important to understand the theoretical concepts that form the basis of 
a methodological approach.  The prevalent literature in information systems security has 
used the formistic view to study areas of concern like threats, computer abuse and 
planning.  
Loch et al. (1992) investigated management information systems (MIS) 
executives’ concerns about different types of threats. This research study presented a 
framework for the source and perpetrator of threats to information systems security. The 
analysis indicated a gap between the use of technology and an understanding of the 
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security implications inherent in its use. The focus of the study was to classify threats to 
microcomputers, mainframes, and networks.  Likewise, Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) 
concentrated on the security threats in mainframe and client/server environments. This 
research paper addresses the commensurability of security measures against the 
seriousness of potential threats in the two environments. The authors argue for a 
proactive approach to address security exposures to an organization. In building upon 
the proactive assertion, Jung et al. (2001) argued the need to identify specific threats 
before designing a secure system and they broadened their focus to examine security 
threats across four industries - manufacturing, banking/financial, research 
institution/university, and distribution/service. The threats are catalogued as 
interruption, interception, modification, and fabrication. These threats are then 
investigated against five types of security services - authentication, access control, data 
confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation.  
 The possibility of occurrence of threats results in significant risks to information 
systems. Boockholdt (1989) provides a classification of risks associated with linking of 
personal computers to a corporate mainframe computer. The study examines the impact 
of the link on computer security and data integrity and identifies critical guidelines to 
control such risks. In another research paper (Boockholdt, 1987), the author addresses 
the impact of microcomputers on information systems integrity and security. The study 
is formistic in nature as it outlines the impact not the causal connection, that is, does not 
correlate parts to security. Risks to an information system also arise from the use (or 
misuse) of passwords (Zviran and Haga, 1999). These authors list the core 
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characteristics and associations of user-generated passwords. This research study 
addresses the gap in evaluating the characteristics of real-life passwords. To address the 
inadequacy of security in organizations, Straub and Welke (1998) employed the general 
deterrence theory to argue for the formalization of a specific aspect of security. The 
authors contend that security managers fail to cope effectively with systems risks 
because they lack awareness of the full range of security controls available for 
implementation. The paper classifies security risk control measures as a security 
program which includes use of a security risk planning model, education or training in 
security awareness, and countermeasure matrix analysis. A checklist in the form of 
guidelines is also provided to help managers cope with risk. 
The abuse of information systems is a critical problem for organizations. In an 
earlier definition, Kling (1980) defines computer abuse as unauthorized, deliberate and 
internally recognizable misuse of assets of information systems by individuals. The 
concern has varied from disciplining such a behavior to monitoring employees who use 
computers. Straub and Nance (1990) group various organizational responses to the 
problem of computer abuse, including discovery of abuse incidents and discipline of 
perpetrators. The authors formulate an approach to security administration in terms of 
security effort allocations and disciplinary actions. The case for security administration 
is supported by Ariss (2002) who argues for effective supervision as a business 
necessity. The research paper classifies the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with computerized monitoring at the workplace. However, the author warns against 
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excessive computer monitoring since it may be regarded by employees as unethical and 
prove to be economical destructive.  
 The problem of computer abuse has also led to the emergence of privacy issues. 
Turn (1987) presents an overview of the basic issues for privacy protection and 
implementation requirements. The author examined problems that arise in extending 
privacy protection to international data processing systems. Protection of privacy is a 
major concern for consumers of information systems. Smith et al. (1996) categorizes 
information privacy practices of the organizations. The paper identifies and measures 
the primary dimensions of individuals’ concerns about organizational information 
privacy practices. The authors argue that the researchers cannot credibly test 
explanatory theories regarding causal links between practices, individuals’ perceptions, 
and societal response in the absence of a validated instrument. The aim of the paper is 
not to check for causality relationships and does not provide a causal model.  
 
Summary 
The formist view informs us about the similarity of forms inherent in the nature 
of information systems security. Researchers have investigated threats, computer abuse 
and planning aspects of security. In doing so, various classification schemes have been 
developed and presented to increase our understanding of information systems security. 
For threats, researchers have proposed typologies and catagories to understand the 
nature of threats. The issues associated with computer abuse have been categorized and 
grouped together to provide descriptions of uniformities. The formistic view of behavior 
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as immanent in the element because it is a member of a particular class has been 
usefully employed to investigate security planning. Checklists, guidelines and matrices 
to control the critical factors of the planning process are based on the consideration of 
class member characteristics. 
 
2.3.2 Mechanism as world hypothesis 
The root metaphor of mechanism is machine. A machine is composed of 
discrete parts related to each other in a systematic way. Each part exists independently. 
In a machine, a force is exerted or transmitted through the system to produce 
predictable outcomes. There are two types of mechanism – discrete and consolidated. 
Discrete mechanism considers structural features of nature as loosely or externally 
related. It emphasizes independence in the world. This leads to accident and necessity.  
Accidental comes from the conception of the independence of details, and the necessary 
from the inevitability of the event’s being just what it is since there is no reason to be 
found for it being anything different. (Pepper, 1970) 
 
Traditional discrete mechanism involves theory of elementary particles distributed in 
space and time.  
Consolidated mechanism considers details to be involved and determine one 
another. There is no accident. There are no laws in consolidated mechanism, only 
structural modifications of spatiotemporal field. There are no primary qualities as these 
are resolved into field laws, which are themselves resolved into the structure of the 
field. In consolidated mechanism, only a particular exists namely spatiotemporal-
gravitational-electromagnetic field. This type of mechanism lacks in scope.  
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Mechanism consists of primary and secondary categories. The primary category 
includes the field of location, primary qualities, and primary laws. The field of location 
defines existence and reality. The fundamental particulars are time and space. Primary 
qualities are concerned with the properties of location in the field and differentiating 
properties. Laws holding for configurations of primary qualities in the filed are the 
primary laws. There is confidence in precisely determined laws. The universe is 
considered to be completely mechanized and internally determined.  
Secondary categories consist of secondary qualities, a principle for connecting 
secondary qualities with the first three primary or effective categories, and secondary 
laws. Secondary qualities involve characters of human perception. These are irreducible 
characters of the world which are not identifiable with primary categories. In terms of 
connecting principle, three main theories have been proposed - identity, causation and 
correlation. Correlation is the only promising one and is signified with emergence. 
Emergence signalizes correlated appearance. Secondary laws are the laws for 
regularities among secondary qualities.  
Mechanism considers immediate evidence to be of secondary qualities which are 
private to each individual organism. As such, mechanism knowledge of the external 
world is symbolic and inferential. The theory of truth of mechanism is the causal theory 
of truth. This theory implies a system of causal connections which holds between an 
environmental stimulus and response of an organism. Truth thus becomes a name for 
physiological attitudes which are in adjustment with the environment of an organism. 
Error arises from lack of adjustment of body.  
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The older theory of truth is the theory of correspondence which considers truth 
as correspondence between visual images and external facts. Here idea and object are 
being compared. This theory was replaced by symbolic theory of correspondence. In 
this theory, an idea is a group of symbols in a sentence or formula. Truth then equates to 
symbols corresponding with features of an object and symbolized relation among 
symbols with relation among objects. The inherent deficiencies of this theory led to 
operational theory of truth. This theory considers truth of a formula as its workability. 
In other words, this theory rejects the importance of correspondence and emphasizes the 
predictive power of sentence or formula to produce expected results.  
The inadequacy of this hypothesis results from the gap between primary and 
secondary categories. In mechanism, causal connection is excluded and correlation is all 
that remains. The causal adjustment theory of truth covers this gap but the concept of 
correlation has implications for formistic similarity. In mechanism the goal is to 
discover the parts and relations among the parts of existent machine (table 2.2). The part 
is basic and the whole is a synthesis of parts. Mechanists seek to discover the true 
nature of a given event by specifying what kind of part it really is and by placing it 
properly in the machine. This goal is aided by apriori model or theory. This hypothesis 
is resonant with hypothetico-deductive research methodology.  
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Table 2.2: Summary of mechanistic world-view 
Root 
(Ontology) 
Machine A machine is composed of discrete parts related to each other in a systematic 
way. Each part exists independently. 
Epistemology Symbolic & 
Inferential 
Knowledge of external world is symbolic and inferential. 
Immediate evidence is of secondary qualities which are private to each 
individual organism. 
Aim of 
Enquiry 
To correlate 
Theory of 
Truth 
Causal Theory of 
adjustment 
A system of causal connections which holds between an environmental 
stimulus and response of an organism.  
Inadequacy Scope Gap between primary and secondary categories. 
Logic Causality 
1. Field of location defines existence and reality. The fundamental 
particulars are time and space. 
2. Primary qualities properties of location in the field, and 
differentiating properties 
3. Primary laws Laws holding for configurations of primary 
qualities in the field.  
Primary 
There is confidence in precisely determined laws.  
The universe is considered to be completely mechanized and internally 
determined. 
1. Secondary qualities Involve characters of human perception.  
These are irreducible characters of the world.  
2. Principle for 
connecting secondary 
qualities 
Three main theories: identity, causation and 
correlation.  
Categories 
Secondary 
3. Secondary laws Laws for regularities among secondary qualities. 
 
Information systems security literature 
The research literature that uses the mechanistic approach to information 
systems security is discussed in this section. Risk management has been the traditional 
approach to address information systems security issues, in addition to checklists 
(Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Kotulic and Clark (2004) point to the lack of empirical 
research in the area of security risk management to justify the importance of their study. 
The authors provide a conceptual model for security risk management program 
effectiveness based on a firm-level study. Their study is based on the assumption of 
causality addressing only a few factors to achieve an effective security risk management 
program. This study provides an interesting twist as it provides details on how the 
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validation of their research model was unsuccessful. The authors argue that information 
security research is one of the most intrusive types of organization research. As such, 
the authors do not propose the use of mass mailings of survey instruments when 
attempting to collect sensitive data. However, Sun et al. (2006) developed a 
theoretically grounded methodology for risk assessment of information systems 
security. Their method is based upon evidential reasoning approach of the theory of 
belief functions. It defines security risk as the plausibility of security failures.  
 The main objective of technical security is to protect corporate data. This 
objective is the motivation for the research study by Murray (1979). The author argues 
for the use of cryptographic transformations as an effective data security technique. The 
data stored on a single computer needs to be protected; however such an approach does 
not capture the reality of data use. The data should be secured in a distributed system 
also. Bussolati and Martella (1981) argue that the security architecture should reflect the 
logical architecture of the distributed system. The authors are concerned with the 
security data management in a distributed data base of aggregated type. Further, the 
existing data should be evaluated in terms of security to prevent vulnerabilities.  Sarathy 
and Muralidhar (2002) argue for the importance of determining the extent to which 
confidential attributes may be exposed to attacks. As such, the ability to evaluate the 
extent of disclosure for such data is significant. In particular, the research study 
develops a methodology using canonical correlation analysis for evaluating inferential 
value disclosure of either individual or linear combinations of confidential numerical 
attributes by snoopers. Another approach to the data integrity issue is to address 
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strategic information manipulation. Biros et al. (2002) conduct a research study with 
causal underpinnings that by inducing sensitivity to deception we would be able to 
improve decision-making performance. The aim of this study is to examine the effects 
of manipulated data on professionals’ task-related decision behaviors: deception 
detection, false alarms, and task accuracy. The authors argue that professionals must be 
sensitive to the threat of deception if users are to improve their ability to detect 
deceptive data. An interesting approach to ensure data security is the proposal to use 
electronic signatures. Gupta et al. (2004) question the cost savings and security 
associated with electronic signatures across business activities. The authors argue that 
the benefit of digital signatures lies in the potential improvement of stepwise sign-off 
processes including negotiation and contract/document generation. To enable different 
business processes, the documents have to be explicitly managed as a collection of 
entities with multiple ownerships. The authors highlight the need for a secure and 
authentication-based automated document management and contract negotiation 
system.  
Access control issues address information systems security from a technical 
viewpoint. Roos (1981) was an early proponent for the socio-organizational perspective 
by highlighting the importance of end user responsibility. The aim of the research study 
by Roos (1981) is to understand confidentiality of information. The author argues that 
data sharing control is weakened with any departure from strictly preventive controls. 
End user responsibility for information control is defined as the relationship between 
organization structure, the supporting information systems and the confidentiality issue. 
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In terms of technical access control approaches, the security for multilevel and 
distributed systems has been of chief concern. Thuraisingham (993) addressed 
multilevel security issues for information retrieval database management systems. In a 
later study (Thuraisingham, 1995), the author addressed security issues for linking the 
conceptual nodes in the context of hypermedia-based information retrieval systems. The 
paper provides direction for designing systems that support the data processing 
requirement of next generation systems. Yiu et al. (2006) discusses the issue of sharing 
access rights and claim they are critical to designing information systems. Their 
research addressed sharing of encrypted documents and delegating the access rights of 
encrypted documents. The research problem can be reduced to that of storing 
confidential documents in a system. The authors argue that an access control list and 
session key symmetric encryption should be components of the solution system.  
Unauthorized access to an organization’s information system can be effectively 
checked by intrusion detection systems. Cavusoglu et al. (2005), however, argue for a 
rigorous assessment of the value of intrusion detection systems in IT security 
architecture. In this paper, the IT security problem is modeled as a game between a firm 
and a hacker where the former attempts to minimize loss from a security breach and the 
latter aims to compromise the information systems of that firm. It is assumed that the 
model parameters were common knowledge to the firm and users. The analysis 
indicates that the value of an intrusion detection system lies in increased deterrence, 
which is enabled by improved detection. However, the firm would only be able to 
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realize this value potential if the firm optimally configures the IDS based on the hacking 
environment.  
The inadequacy of technical approaches in addressing security issues in 
organizations has led some researchers to study behavioral aspects as well. Goodhue 
and Straub (1991) argue for a better understanding of security concerns focusing on 
users' perceptions about the security of their systems. A user's concern about security is 
considered to be a function of industry risk, company actions, and individual awareness. 
Frank et al. (1991) believe an understanding of security-related behavior of personal 
computer users in organizations is important for controlling behavioral security. The 
behavior and attitudes of users’ towards backup, documentation, data storage, and file 
access practices was examined in their research paper. The analysis indicates that user 
knowledge and informal department norms are significantly related to security-related 
behavior. The underlying assumption is that of correlation in terms of variables that 
impact security-related behavior of users. Harrington (1996) also examined the 
intentions of information systems employees. The author uses vignettes to understand 
the casual connection between codes of ethics and computer abuse judgments. Another 
area of concern has been the creation of passwords for system access. Adams and 
Chang (1993) employ the theory of the search of associative memory as the theoretical 
lens to anticipate what subjects will choose for passwords or personal identification 
numbers (PIN). The authors argue that security can be improved by providing users 
with a keypad (or an image of it) while creating the passwords. The causal nature of the 
research study underlies the problem of how passwords can be made more secure.  
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Corporate managers need to be security prudent in their decisions pertaining to 
organizational activities. Even decisions involving software choices require the keen 
involvement of managers who are well versed in IT security. For instance, the 
effectiveness of open source software in terms of security issues has been evaluated by 
Payne (2002). The research study empirically assesses the relationship between open 
source code and security against the dimensions of confidentiality, integrity, availability 
and audit. The findings indicate that open source software is not intrinsically more 
secure than proprietary code. Post and Kagan (2000) examined organizational responses 
to the threat of computer viruses. The three basic sets of tools considered in this study to 
minimize the threat of virus are management policies, anti-virus software, and backup 
procedures. The authors highlight the importance of identifying the trade-offs between 
different tools. The study is mechanistic in nature as it correlates the effect of various 
tools to combat virus threat. The critical nature of policies for security has been 
established by Katos and Adams (2005).  The authors argue for the need to adopt 
appropriate and consistent policies to satisfy privacy rules and security concerns. The 
theory of information richness is used to develop the foundation for privacy and 
security policies metrics.  
In recent times, alliances have been suggested as an effective method to ensure 
organizational security. Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) investigate the implications of 
sharing security information and the impact of investments in security technologies. The 
authors assume a rather simplistic model of the world where the market consists of two 
firms producing a differentiated product in a two-stage non-cooperative game. The 
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approach followed is that of economic modeling based on the field of industrial 
organization. The authors argue that economic issues would impact achievement of the 
goal. The findings indicate that security technology investments and security 
information sharing are strategic complements in equilibrium. Further, the sharing 
alliances would yield greater benefits in competitive industries.  
 
Summary 
The mechanist view informs us about the casual connections in the nature of 
information systems security. The universal structure of information systems security is 
analytically investigated to identify the components in order to explain its true nature. 
Models, relations, linkages and functions have been predominantly used by security 
researchers to establish correlation among different components considered critical to 
attain effective security. Various data security and risk management methodologies are 
based on the insight that behavior of the whole is deliverable from the behavior of the 
parts. Analytic modeling explores the intricacies of access control mechanisms and 
information sharing based on the assumption that driving force of some sort is 
necessary in any operation of information systems security. 
 
2.3.3 Organicism as world hypothesis 
The root metaphor of organicism is organism or integration. It is the process of 
organic development where integration in the process is of interest not duration. In 
organic systems, change is given and stability has to be explained. The operation of 
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rules of change needs to be explained, assuming that change occurs according to these 
rules. The whole is basic, and parts are meaningless except in the context of the whole. 
Organicism approaches every actual event in the world as concealed organic process 
(historic process).  
The categories of organicism consist, on one hand, in noting the steps involved 
in the organic process, and, on the other hand, in noting the principal features in the 
organic structure ultimately achieved or realized. There are seven categories, which are 
the features of any organic or integrative process and its achievement. 1) Fragments of 
experience which appear with, 2) nexuses or connections or implications, which 
spontaneously lead as a result of the aggravation of, 3) contradictions, gaps, 
oppositions, or counteractions to resolution in, 4) an organic whole, which is found to 
have been, 5) implicit in the fragments, and to 6) transcend the previous contradictions 
by means of a coherent totality, which 7) economizes, saves, preserves all the original 
fragments of experience without any loss. Categories 1-4 are the progressive categories 
which deal with appearance. Ideal categories deal with reality and consist categories 4-
7.  
A fact is referred by a judgment which is a fragment in itself. A judgment is a 
fragment and its nexus. The truth of a judgment consists in fragment’s finding, through 
its nexus, a whole in which it is free from contradictions. The formal expression of 
judgment is always in terms of verbal or mathematical symbols. It is not essentially the 
sentence that is true, but what the sentence means, that is, the judgment. The degree of 
truth improves with an increased integration of facts. The criteria of truth are 
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inclusiveness, determinateness, and organicity. This theory of truth is known as 
coherence theory. Coherence is the positive organic relatedness of material facts. For 
organicism, we cannot know the whole truth until absolute is attained. Absolute is fact 
itself and is completely organic. Epistemologically, organicism adopts constructivism. 
For organicism, the knower actively contrues the world.  
Organicism has a limitation of inadequacy of scope (table 2.3). Progressive 
categories are required to give scope to organicism but progressive categories involve 
time, change, and finitude. Time, change, and finitude cannot be true as only the 
absolute is true and in the absolute there is no time, change or finitude. This is the 
contradiction.  
 
Table 2.3: Summary of organicistic world-view 
 
Root 
(Ontology) 
Organism or 
integration 
The process of organic development where integration in the process is of 
interest not duration. 
Epistemology Constructivism The knower actively contrues the world. 
Aim of 
Enquiry 
To integrate 
Coherence theory The positive organic relatedness of material facts 
Degree of truth Improves with an increased integration of facts 
Theory of 
Truth 
Criteria of truth Inclusiveness, determinateness, organicity 
Inadequacy Scope Progressive categories involve time, change, and finitude. Time, change, and 
finitude cannot be true as only the absolute is true and in the absolute there 
is no time, change and finitude. 
Logic Structure 
1. Fragments of experience which appear with,  
2. nexuses or connections or implications, which spontaneously lead as a 
result of the aggravation of,   
3. contradictions, gaps, oppositions, or counteractions to resolution in,   
Progressive 
(deals with 
appearance) 
4. an organic whole, which is found to have been 
5. implicit in the fragments, and to  
6. transcend the previous contradictions by means of a coherent totality, 
which 
Categories 
Ideal 
(deals with 
reality) 
7. economizes, saves, preserves all the original fragments of experience 
without any loss. 
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Information systems security literature 
The research literature employing the organistic view of information systems 
security is discussed in this section. Information systems security is actually a corporate 
governance responsibility (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004). The authors argue that 
appropriate security governance would lead to an increase in overall productivity of the 
organization. The paper develops an information security governance framework that 
integrates information security into corporate governance. Voicing similar concerns, 
von Solms (2005) argue for implementing comprehensive and standardized information 
security governance environments. The research paper examines the complementary 
nature of COBIT and ISO 17799 as reference frameworks for information security 
governance. However, any model for information security governance must emphasize 
or integrate the control aspects of corporate governance (von Solms and von Solms, 
2006). The authors propose a security governance framework which is based on the 
direct-control cycle. 
 Since the security requirements differ from one organization to another, the 
generic information security standards are ill equipped to serve as a basis for security 
policy development (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). As such, the authors address the 
current requirement for information security policy formulation to be federated and 
emergent. The research paper proposes a meta-policy that addresses the concerns of 
security policy formulation, implementation, enforcement and validation. A meta-policy 
could take into account critical organizational requirements and would lead to an 
integration of security throughout the process of information systems development and 
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management. The position of integrating security into higher information systems 
processes is also supported by Doherty and Fulford (2006) who investigate the 
relationship between strategic information systems planning and information security 
management. The authors argue that a strategic information systems plan is a critical 
prerequisite for information security policy formulation and the two should be carefully 
aligned. In a specific narrow context, Morin and Pawlak (2006) encourage debate at the 
policy management level to discuss the strategic dimension of digital rights 
management. The authors propose a framework for studying, analyzing and defining 
corporate policy management towards its partial digital instrumentation. The assertion 
is that enterprise information systems will have to factor in persistent protection, 
governed usage and managed content in the future which represents a major challenge.  
The absence of international criteria or standards poses problems for the 
management of information systems security (von Solms et al., 1994). The authors 
argue that information security policy, risk analysis, risk management, contingency 
planning and disaster recovery are all interrelated in some way. Therefore, any 
evaluation of information security should be conducted according to internationally 
accepted criteria. A model for information systems security management is proposed.  
 
Summary 
The organicist view informs us about the structural characteristics inherent in 
the nature of information systems security. The significance in the integration of the 
process is highlighted by security researchers who propose various governance and 
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policy approaches. Such an approach contends that components cannot be explained 
without reference to the whole structure of information systems security. The 
interrelatedness of various components of security is critical for an international 
standard and emphasizes the meaninglessness of parts except in the context of the 
whole.  
 
2.3.4 Contextualism as world hypothesis 
The root metaphor of contextualism is historic event. A historic event is an act 
in and with its setting, and an act in its context. Disorder and change are the categorical 
features of contextualism. Contextualism believes in a given event and direct 
verification. It emphasizes the changing present event (changed into something novel). 
The contextualistic categories are change and novelty which are exhibited in quality and 
texture. For contexualism, the entire world is comprised of events and every given event 
has quality and texture.  
Quality of a given event is its intuited wholeness or total character. It is the 
experienced nature of an event. Quality involves spread, change and fusion. Spread is 
the feeling of future or history. It is characterized by specious present which is the basic 
structure of all events or facts. Change goes on continuously and never stops. It is the 
categorical feature of all events. As such, for contextualism the whole world is 
continuously changing. Fusion involves the integration of textural details of a given 
event. It is an agency of qualitative simplification and organization.  
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Texture deals with the details and relations of an act that make up its quality. It 
is made up of strands and it lies in a context. Quality consists of strand, context and 
references. Strand is whatever directly contributes to quality of texture. It is the 
interconnection among details of an act. Context is whatever indirectly contributes to 
quality of texture. It is the interconnections among strands. References are strands more 
intimately considered. It is temporal relation or interconnections between details. 
References maybe linear, convergent, blocking or instrumental.  
In contextualism, actual structure of an event is ultimately determined by its 
qualitative structure. For contextualistic theory of analysis, there is no final or complete 
analysis of anything. There is no top or bottom in contextualistic world. The support of 
every texture lies in its context. There is no cosmological mode of analysis that 
guarantees the whole truth or an arrival at the ultimate nature of things. One does not 
need to hunt for truth, as every present event gives it as fully as it can be given. All one 
has to do to get at the sort of thing the world is, is to realize, intuit, and get the quality of 
whatever happens to be going on. Significance lies in some purpose we are pursuing. 
An analysis is always for some purpose. 
The theory of truth for contextualism is the operational theory of truth. It is truth 
in terms of action, of actual events having references which lead to satisfactions in other 
events. The question of truth arises when a strand is blocked. That is, a problem arises 
and we seek a solution to the problem. We analyze the situation in search of a 
hypothesis that will lead us to a solution of problem. This analysis consists in following 
strands of a blocking condition within the context of a blocked strand. This leads to 
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various relational schemes. Truth is the result of an instrumental texture which removes 
a blocking and integrates a terminal texture. Contextualism is threatened with evidences 
for permanent structures in nature.  
There are three distinct specifications of theory of truth: successful working, 
verified hypothesis, and qualitative confirmation (table 2.4). In successful working, 
truth is utility or successful functioning. Successful action is the true one. This 
specification implies that a hypothesis can never be successful when it is framed, nor 
can success ever be hypothetical when it comes. The problem arises as the hypothesis is 
excluded from truth. For a verified hypothesis, truth is in verification. It is not the 
successful act that is true, but the hypothesis that leads to the successful act.  
 Table 2.4: Summary of contextualistic world-view 
Root 
(Ontology) 
Historic event An act in and with its setting, act in its context 
Epistemology Belief in given event and direct verification. 
Aim of Enquiry To attend 
Theory of 
Truth 
Operational 
theory of truth 
Truth in terms of action, of actual events having references which lead to 
satisfactions in other events. 
Inadequacy Precision 
Logic Distinction 
Quality of a given event is its intuited wholeness or total characters. 
Spread The feeling of futurity or pastness. It is characterized by 
specious present which is the basic structure of all events. 
Change Change goes on continuously and never stops. All world is 
continuously changing. 
Quality 
Fusion The integration of textural details of a given event. It is an 
agency of qualitative simplification and organization. 
Texture deals with the details and relations of an act that make up its quality. 
Strand whatever directly contributes to quality of texture. It is the 
interconnection among details of an act 
Context whatever indirectly contributes to quality of texture. It is the 
interconnections among strands. 
Categories 
 
Texture 
References strands more intimately considered. It is temporal relation or 
interconnections between details.  
 
Truth is the relation between a hypothesis and its eventuality rather than the 
quality of an act as successful or unsuccessful. In total, there are three articulations: the 
    36 
 
formulation of a symbolic texture (hypothesis), a following out of symbolic references 
(operations), and a satisfaction or blocking of these references (verification proper). A 
hypothesis is true if satisfaction is achieved in the verification. For qualitative 
confirmation theory, truth is a relation dependent upon the act of verifying. A true 
hypothesis coheres and corresponds with the event that verifies it. “Qualitative 
confirmation” theory suggests that the body of hypotheses possessed by science and 
philosophy gives us a considerable amount of insight into the structure of nature. 
Contextualism is very definite about the present event and premonitions it gives of 
neighboring events, but less and less definite about the wider structure of the world.  
 
Information systems security literature 
Backhouse et al. (2006) approach standards as instruments of power. The 
authors theorize about the power mechanisms required for a standard to evolve from an 
idea into an obligatory passage point for organizations and agencies. The argument is 
that power operates silently but relentlessly in the generation and institutionalization of 
a standard, and brings to light valuable insights into the social and political processes 
that form the core of standards setting work. It studies an event in its context. The 
argument is based on an underlying assumption that the institutionalization of a 
standard is initiated by exogenous contingencies in an organizational field. The authors 
criticize the economics approach in explaining development of a standard. They 
contend that the decisions about design and implementation of standards are not 
normally reached on the basis of a rational-logical process, but are instead constructed 
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through the constant realignment of interests among the actors involved. This research 
study uses the theory of circuits of power to reveal the power mechanisms that shape 
that realignment. It examines the interaction of external contingencies, powerful agents, 
resources, meaning and membership of relevant social and institutional groupings in 
generating successful political outcomes. Even though actors are key to the generation 
and adoption of standards in general, institutional factors, such as regulation and 
legislation, also play a fundamental role. The study underlines the part played by 
alliances and legitimacy in obtaining sufficient support for an emerging standard.  
 
2.4 Discussion  
 
 The world hypotheses involving formism, mechanism, contextualism and 
organicism are four different ways to look at the world (Pepper, 1970). In this chapter, 
we used the four hypotheses to help us understand the body of knowledge developed so 
far in the field of information systems security. The respective world hypotheses 
provide us with an interesting and different approach to analyze and understand the 
world. In purist terms, mechanism and contextualism are considered to be the stronger 
among the other hypotheses (Pepper, 1970). However, this is not the view taken in this 
chapter. In analyzing the security research literature, it is argued that each of these 
hypotheses is critical for improving our understanding about the complex world of 
information systems security.  
 As discussed in the previous section, the formist view informs us about the 
similarity of forms inherent in the nature of information systems security. Various 
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classification schemes (Kling, 1980; Boochholdt, 1989; Turn, 1987; Loch et al., 1992; 
Straub & Welke, 1998) have been developed and presented to enhance our knowledge. 
The mechanist view informs us about the casual connections in the nature of 
information systems security. The universal structure of information systems security is 
analytically investigated to identify the components (Murray, 1979; Roos, 1981; 
Bussolati & Martella, 1981; Goodhue & Straub, 1991; Harrington, 1996; Payne, 2002; 
Cavusoglu et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2006) in order to explain its true nature. The 
organicist view informs us about the structural characteristics inherent in the nature of 
information systems security. The significance in the integration of the process 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Doherty & Fulford, 2006) and the importance of whole 
structure (von Solms et al., 1994; Posthumus & von Solms, 2004) has been emphasized. 
The contextualist view informs us about the distinctions in various events of 
information systems security. It is important to include context (Backhouse et al., 2006; 
Karyda et al., 2005) in the analysis of an act. The four corroborative alternative world 
theories, namely formistic, mechanistic, contextualistic and organicistic theory of 
security, constitute the sum of our knowledge on the subject of information systems 
security (figure 2.2). 
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Dispersive theories
Integrative theories
Synthetic 
theories
Analytic 
theories
Contextualism
Backhouse et al. (2006)
Karyda et al. (2005) 
Solms et al. (1994); Baskerville & 
Siponen (2002); Solms (2005); 
Doherty & Fulford (2006); Posthumus
& Solms (2004) 
Organicism
Murray (1979); Bussolati et al. (1981); Sarathy
et al. (2002); Biros et al. (2002); Gupta et al. 
(2004); Kotulic & Clark (2004); Sun et al. 
(2006); Roos (1981); Thuraisingham (1993); 
Yiu et al. (2006); Cavusoglu et al. (2005); 
Goodhue & Straub (1991); Frank et al. (1991); 
Adams & Chang (1993); Harrington (1996); 
Post & Kagan (2000); Katos & Adams (2005); 
Payne (2002); Gal -Or & Ghose (2005)
Mechanism
Formism
Dhillon & Backhouse (2001); 
Loch et al. (1992); Ryan et al. 
(1997); Jung et al. (2001); Straub et 
al. (1990); Ariss (2002); Smith et al. 
(1996); Straub & Welke (1998); 
Boockholdt (1987, 1989); Zviran & 
Haga (1999); Turn (1987)
 
 
Figure 2.2: Information systems security literature 
 
In studying information systems security, researchers have used analytic theories 
to understand the security problems. The basic facts of analytical theories lie in the 
nature of elements. Although such an approach is useful it is imperative for security 
researchers to examine the other end of the spectrum to obtain a complete picture. The 
increasing complexity of the security environment requires an understanding of the 
context in which any initiative is introduced. In order to be successful, security 
problems need to be studied from the position of synthetic theories. The basic facts of 
synthetic theories lie in the contexts or complexes. There is a dearth of security research 
employing a synthetic perspective of the world. The significance of research analysis 
lies in the research purpose that is being pursued. Such an analysis would provide rich 
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insights of the security aspects under consideration. In order to understand the nature of 
information systems security it is imperative to realize, intuit, and obtain the quality of 
the event of interest, which involves an act in and with its setting.  
 The analysis of the extant information systems security literature indicates that 
researchers have predominantly used analytic theories to understand the security 
problem. This is evident from figure 2.2 where the research studies depicted on the right 
of the vertical axis (dimension of analytic theory) significantly outnumbers those on the 
left of the vertical axis (signifying dimension of synthetic theories). The focus of 
analytical theories lies in the nature of elements. In following this position, the 
dominant security research theme has been to find the factors or components that would 
impact overall organizational security. The mechanistic tendencies in information 
systems security research have also been noted by Dhillon & Backhouse (2001) and 
Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006).  
To improve the security posture of an organization it is imperative to realize, 
intuit, and get the quality of the event of interest, which involves an act in and with its 
setting (Pepper, 1970). At the same time, it is also important to understand the 
constituent, as well as, processual models for the implementation of a successful 
information systems security program. An eclectic approach to study the security 
problem is better than a static approach. The complexity of security problems can only 
be navigated successfully if we take into account the different positions of the dominant 
security paradigms. In other words, we need to investigate how the content and context 
of the security programs are linked together. The content comprising of security 
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objectives and security policy would interact with the security culture, security 
governance structure and the political context of an organization to generate possible 
changes that may or may not be aligned with the intended security goals of an 
organization. Similarly, we also need to understand how the link between context and 
process of security implementation can have an impact on the outcome of the security 
initiative. The study of these linkages would provide a richer understanding of the 
nature of information systems security problems.  
 A finding of the literature review is that a significant number of studies adopt an 
analytic theoretical position rather than a synthetic one, which reflects the maturity of 
information systems security as a discipline. During the early stages of development of 
a discipline, we are intrigued with the factors or elements and our tendency is to classify 
them so as to come to grips with the subject. This is the case with the discipline of 
information system. Several instances of early studies which were based on a formistic 
notion of similarity include:  Senn (1978), Alter (1978), Swanson and Culnan (1978), 
Weiss (1980), Nolan and Weatherbe (1980), Colter (1984), Stabell (1987), Barki et al. 
(1988), Necco et al. (1987), Tan and Benbasat (1990), Baroudi (1991), Meyer and 
Curley (1991), Byrd and Zmud (1992), Goldstein and Storey (1992), Ein-Dor and 
Segev (1993), and Choudhury (1997). Next, we try to figure out the relationships 
between various factors. We seek the causal connections between various dependent 
and independent factors. In information systems, the research stream focused on user 
acceptance, in particular the technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989, Davis et al. 
1989) can be seen as an instance of the proliferation of research imbibed in mechanistic 
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tendencies. Few prominent studies conducting research in this area include: Mathieson 
(1991), Adams et al. (1992), Szajna (1994), Taylor and Todd (1995), Igbaria et al. 
(1995), Chau (1996), Venkatesh and Davis (1996), Jackson et al. (1997), Gefen and 
Straub (1997), Igbaria et al. (1997), Lucas and Spitler (1999), and Dishaw & Strong 
(1999). As the discipline matures, our focus of interest moves to the field where the 
factors interact. We become engrossed with the event of interest and explore our 
understanding of the complex setting. There are significant research studies in 
information systems that abide by the tenets of synthetic theories. These studies include 
research by Wijnhoven et al. (2006), Gao (2005), Wagner and Newell (2004), Irani et 
al. (2005), Nandhakumar et al. (2005), Wilson and Howcroft (2005), Liang and Xue 
(2004), Caldeira and Ward (2002), Avgerou (2001), Ang et al. (2001), Walsham and 
Sahay (1999), Barrett and Walsham (1999), Ward and Elvin (1999), Mao and Benbasat 
(1998), and Shanks (1997). However, there remains a lack of empirical security 
research employing this view of the world.  
 Information systems security research literature has witnessed limited efforts at 
theoretical development (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). There are few research studies 
involving adequate empirical findings from a substantial research process with 
appropriate theoretical underpinnings. In this chapter, we developed a critical synthesis 
of the current philosophical debate about information systems security. Such an exercise 
informs us about the potential and the impact of various approaches. It informs us about 
the limitations of different approaches as well. To trace the complexity of information 
systems security we have defined the set of beliefs and assumptions about the nature of 
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social reality. The analysis of the philosophical debate has implications for possible 
theoretical improvements. The literature review combined with the above discussion 
suggests that the contextualist perspective is the way forward for the maturing of the 
information systems security discipline.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 The contribution of the chapter is as follows. First, it presents the philosophical 
foundations of socio-organizational information systems security research. The 
literature review identifies the prominence of formistic and mechanistic perspectives, 
which may be attributed to the belief in analytic theories during the early stages of a 
discipline. The critique of current approaches lays the foundation for a contextualist 
perspective in dealing with security issues. This standpoint is also aligned with the need 
for research that employs a synthetic theoretical position for the security discipline to 
mature. Finally, there is potential for empirical studies grounded in a contextualist 
perspective to help improve the security posture of an organization.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the research methodology for 
investigating strategic information systems security initiatives. It is important to 
understand the philosophical considerations of the research approach adopted. The 
underlying philosophical assumptions would guide the research methodology. At the 
same time, it is imperative for the researcher to acknowledge the role of theory in a 
research study.   
 This chapter is organized into five sections. Following a brief introduction, 
section 3.2 outlines the philosophical assumptions underlying this research. Section 3.3 
provides the theoretical perspective adopted to conduct the research. The argument and 
research questions are also explicated in this section. Section 3.4 presents the research 
design.  The chapter concludes with section 3.5.  
 
3.2 Philosophical Considerations 
In the philosophy of science, ontology and epistemology are two of the most 
central concepts. Ontology refers to the nature of reality. It points to the claims or 
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assumptions that a particular approach to social inquiry makes about the nature of social 
reality (Blaikie, 1993). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), ontological 
assumptions are concerned with whether the reality to be investigated is externally 
imposed on the individual mind or is produced internally to an individual and is a 
product of their cognition. In general, there are two positions on ontological 
assumptions pertaining to social enquiry: realist and constructivist. The realist position 
assumes that there is a single social reality which is ordered in nature. The constructivist 
position assumes that there are multiple social realities which are pre-interpreted and 
inter-subjective in nature. 
Epistemology addresses how to gain knowledge of the social reality. According 
to Blaikie (1993), an epistemology is a theory of knowledge; it presents a view and a 
justification for what can be regarded as knowledge. According to Burrell and Morgan 
(1979), epistemological assumptions are about the nature of knowledge and how one 
might understand the world and communicate it to others. In general, there are two 
basic positions on epistemological assumptions pertaining to social enquiry. These are 
outside and inside positions (etic versus emic). The outside (etic) position entails social 
reality as existing independently of the observer. The social reality can be directly 
observed and explained. The inside (emic) position considers social reality to be 
produced and reproduced by actors. This suggests that the social world can only be 
known by understanding the local language, meanings, culture and social rules 
associated with the actors involved in the activity of interest. In other words, the social 
world can be properly grasped by adopting the social actor’s point of view.  
    46 
 
 At an epistemological level, positive and interpretive approaches to social 
enquiry are associated with outside and inside positions respectively. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) name the outside and inside positions of epistemological debate as 
positivism and anti-positivism respectively. Myers (1997) considers three categories of 
approaches to social enquiry: positivism, interpretivism and crtitical theory. Guba 
(1990) and Schwandt (1990) follow a similar classification although they term 
interpretivism as constructivism. For Blaikie (1993), the outside epistemological 
position involves positivism, critical rationalism and realism as the major approaches. 
Interpretivism, critical theory, structuration theory and feminism are the prominent 
approaches for the inside epistemological position (Blaikie, 1993). 
In this research, the epistemological assumptions adopted are from the 
interpretive paradigm. The purpose of interpretive research is to understand the meaning 
of social action. According to Blaikie (1993), interpretivism entails an ontology in 
which social reality is regarded as the product of processes by which social actors 
negotiate the meanings for actions and situations. It is a complex of socially constructed 
meanings. In terms of epistemology, interpretivism entails derivation of knowledge 
from everyday concepts and meanings.  
The social researcher enters the everyday social world in order to grasp the socially  
constructed meanings, and then reconstructs these meanings in social scientific  
language (Blaikie, 1993: 96).  
 
A researcher herself is an instrument of observation (Lee, 1999). The researcher enters 
the everyday world of social actors. She presents the account of these actors as her 
interpretation or understanding of the meanings of these social actors’ actions. The 
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social world, for interpretivism, is the world perceived and experienced by its members; 
and their behavior depends on how they (as individuals) interpret the conditions in 
which they find themselves. As such, we could say that social reality is already 
interpreted or is preinterpreted. According to Blaikie (1993), the reconstruction of 
meanings can be regarded as social scientific descriptions from which social theories or 
perspectives could be developed.  These theories or perspectives shape decision-
making, which in turn shapes the reality.  
The socially constructed reality has both objective and subjective dimensions. 
The objective dimension is observable human behavior. According to Lee (1991), the 
social scientist must take into consideration and account for (in terms of collecting facts 
and data) both purely objective and the subjective meaning that the behavior has for the 
human subjects themselves. Lee (1999) also states that the validity of an interpretation 
can be assessed. This characteristic is based on the argument that people know what 
they are doing. As such, one should be able to understand the rationale behind an action. 
This in turn leads to the assessment of the goodness of the interpretation.  
 
3.3 Theoretical Considerations 
 To conduct the research study theoretical considerations must be established. In 
conducting organizational research, Eisenhardt (1989) believes the role of theory 
contributes at three levels. That is, theory can be used as an initial guide to design and 
collect data, as an iterative process to collect and analyze data, or as a final product of 
the research. Yin (1989) points that the role of theory prior to data collection is often 
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overlooked in case study research. In elaborating upon the use of theory, Walsham 
(1995) emphasizes the importance of creating an initial theoretical framework that takes 
account of previous knowledge and forms a sensible theoretical basis for the empirical 
work. In fact, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) believe a researcher should approach the 
world with an apriori framework or theory. At the same time, there is a potential 
problem “of the researcher only seeing what the theory suggests” (Walsham, 1995). In 
other words, prior theory held by a researcher can influence what is to be observed 
(Smith and Deemer, 2000). The research on information systems should be informed by 
general theories on the nature of organizations (Walsham 1995).   
The theoretical considerations are discussed next. This section outlines the 
argument of the research and provides research questions guiding this research. The 
section on theoretical perspective explains the theory used to conduct this research.  
 
3.3.1 Research argument and questions 
The argument of this dissertation is that in order for strategic information 
systems security initiatives to be successful a proper undertaking of the content, context 
and process of formulation and implementation of a security initiative is essential. The 
business world is comprised of events with disorder and change as its key features. To 
attain success with a security program, the dynamics of security change under different 
contexts need to be accounted for and properly understood. The contextual analysis of a 
security initiative involves investigation at the vertical level, the horizontal level and the 
interconnections between them. The vertical level involves context at various levels 
    49 
 
including both outer and inner environment in which an organization operates. The 
horizontal level captures the historical, present and future time of a continuing system, a 
corporate entity. As such, an appropriate security change effort needs to be grounded in 
contextualism to be instituted in an organization.  
 Accordingly, this dissertation addresses the general research question about how 
to institute strategic information systems security change initiatives in an organization. 
The further sub research questions are: 
• What aspects of information systems goals, policies and programs should be 
included in a strategic information systems security initiative?  
• How should strategic information systems security initiatives be formulated and 
implemented in an organization? 
• Why and in what manner does the inner and outer environment of an 
organization impact the strategic information systems security initiatives? 
 
3.3.2 Theoretical perspective 
In this research, the business world is considered to be uncertain, and complex. 
This provides the basis to view change as an iterative and multilevel process. Pettigrew 
(1990) contends that change forces the players to to deal with continuity and change, 
actions and structure, endogenous and exogenous factors, as well as the role of chance 
and surprise. The change is comprised of political, cultural, incremental, environmental, 
structural and rational dimensions (Pettigrew, 1990). 
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The present study adopts a contextualist theory of strategic change developed by 
Petttigrew (1987) as the theoretical basis. To study transformations in firms, it is 
essential to adopt a holistic and dynamic analysis of change rooted in historical, 
processual and contextual aspects is essential (Pettigrew, 1990). The historical aspects 
imply the evolution of ideas and actions for change, while the processual aspects 
emphasize action and structure overtime. The contextual aspects represent the 
relationship between process and contexts.   
The underlying assumption of contextualist theory is that organizations are 
political and cultural systems. An organization can be explored as a continuing system 
where legitimacy serves as the link between political and cultural analyses. It is 
imperative to understand the processes and mechanisms used to legitimize and 
delegitimize strategic changes (Pettigrew, 1987). “The content of strategic change is 
thus ultimately a product of a legitimation process shaped by political/cultural 
considerations, though often expressed in rational/analytic terms” (Pettigrew, 1990). In 
other words, “the context of strategy can be mobilized to legitimate the content and the 
process of a strategic adjustment” (Pettigrew, 1985).  
The contextualist theory of strategic change posits that transformation of the 
firm can be understood by exploring the content, context, and the process of change 
together with their inter-connections through time (Pettigrew 1987). The formulation of 
the content of any strategy needs to acknowledge the management of its context and 
process. The three central components of this theory are summarized below: 
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Content. The content as analytic category refers to the particular areas of 
transformation under examination (Pettigrew, 1987). It addresses the ‘what’ of change. 
Content is composed of assumptions, objectives and strategic choices of the firm.  
Process. The process category addresses the ‘how’ of change. It refers to the 
actions, reactions and interactions of stakeholders in the transformation of the firm. 
According to Pettigrew (1985), the process is regarded as “a continuous, 
interdependent, sequence of actions and events which is being used to explain the 
origins, continuance and outcome of some phenomena.” It involves the formulation and 
implementation of strategy.  
Context. The context category involves the inner and outer context of the firm 
(figure 3.1). Outer context involves the external social, economic, and political 
environment in which the firm operates. Inner context is the internal structural, cultural 
and political environment of the firm. It addresses the ‘why’ of change. “Context is not 
just a stimulus environment but a nested arrangement of structures and processes where 
the subjective interpretations of actors perceiving, comprehending, learning and 
remembering help shape process” (Pettigrew, 1990). 
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Context
Content Process
Outer
Inner
 
Figure 3.1: Contextualist model of strategic change  
(reproduced from Pettigrew, 1990) 
 
3.3.3. Theoretical framework to conduct argument 
 This research adapts the contextualist theory of strategic change as the 
theoretical framework to understand the strategic information systems security 
initiatives undertaken in an organization. The analytical categories of this theory are 
used to identify the critical dimensions of interest for investigating security initiatives. 
These dimensions form the conceptual basis for the research study. 
There are three analytic categories (table 3.1) in the contextualist theory of 
strategic change that guide our understanding of strategic security initiatives. In the 
initial step, the content of a strategic security initiative is identified. The security policy 
of an organization is analyzed. This should be in alignment with the overall security 
goals and objectives of that organization. Further, the extant security guidelines and 
procedures are also analyzed. In the next stage, the concern is to understand the context 
in which the firm operates. The context is analyzed in terms of information systems 
security aspects. The scrutiny of inner context leads us to study the prevalent security 
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culture. The security culture also impacts the governance structures in place, which is 
analyzed along with the associated political system. An understanding of outer context, 
which includes socio-economic and competitive environment, is also essential. Here, 
the government regulations and laws to establish a standard level of practice are further 
reviewed. For the analytic category of process, the formulation and implementation of 
strategic security initiatives is examined.  
 
Table 3.1: Analytic categories of contextualist security change 
Analytic 
categories Description 
Factors of interest in information 
system security 
Content Particular areas of transformation under examination 
Security goals and objectives, 
security policy, security standard, 
security program 
Inner 
context 
Intra-organizational environment 
of the firm 
Security culture, security governance 
structure 
Outer 
context 
External environment in which he 
firm operates 
Regulations, laws, competitive 
environment 
Process Continuous, interdependent, sequence of actions and events 
Formulation and implementation of 
strategic security initiatives 
 
 
The aim of the theoretical framework is to guide a researcher during empirical 
work. It is not meant to provide a rigid structure. A degree of openness to the field data 
is required in interpretive field research (Walsham, 1995). The researcher should be 
willing to modify initial assumptions and theories if new developments in the research 
study become apparent.  
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3.4 Research Design 
 The research design for contextualist interpretation of strategic information 
systems security initiatives is discussed under research strategy, unit of analysis, data 
collection and data analysis.  
 
3.4.1 Research strategy 
This research follows an in-depth case study method using a qualitative 
approach in the interpretive tradition. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1989). It 
refers to the examination of a real-world event as it actually exists in its natural, real-
world setting (Lee, 1989). The case study method is appropriate for research problems 
in their formative stages, where the experiences of the actors and the context of action 
are critical (Benbasat et al., 1987). Using a case study allows the researcher to ask 
penetrating questions and capture the richness of organizational behavior (Gable, 1994). 
Walsham (1995) contends that four types of generalizations can be developed from an 
interpretive case study research. These are development of concepts, generation of 
theory, drawing of specific implications, and contributions of rich insight.   
The appropriateness of the case research strategy can be judged by employing 
the criteria as outlined by Benbasat et al. (1987). In this research, the phenomenon of 
interest needs to be studied in its natural setting. Secondly, the focus of the research 
study needs to be on contemporary events. Thirdly, the research process does not 
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require control or manipulation of subjects and events. Finally, although the research 
problem is investigated using an established theoretical case such an inquiry mainly 
provides insight into an issue. Case studies provide a supportive role to facilitate deeper 
understanding of the issue, which then advances knowledge. This is the feature of an 
instrumental case study. In this type of case study, “the case still is looked at in depth, 
its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this helps the 
researcher to pursue the external interest” (Stake, 2000). 
Many researchers (for instance, Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Marshall, 1990; 
Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993; Walsham, 1995; Walsham and Sahay, 1999; Klein and 
Myers, 1999; Madison, 1988; Trauth and Jessup, 2000) provide the criteria to check the 
validity of a case study in the interpretive tradition. This dissertation uses the evaluative 
criteria guidelines proposed by Klein and Myers (1999). These criteria are summarized 
in table 3.2.  
 
3.4.2 Unit of analysis 
Multiple-case designs are desirable when the intent of the research is 
description, theory building, or theory testing (Yin, 1989). Such a design allows for 
cross-case analysis. Further, multiple cases yield more general research results 
(Benbasat, 1987). In the present research process, two government organizations were 
identified based on the selection criteria to conduct the research. These two 
organizations are Information Technology Agency (ITA) and Department of 
Transportation (DOT). The two sites satisfy the site selection criteria as advocated by 
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Yin (1989). This criteria entails selection of sites where similar results may be used as 
"literal" replications, and where contradictory results may be chosen for "theoretical" 
replication. With careful site selection, the researcher can extend and revise the initial 
propositions of the study. 
 
Table 3.2:  Evaluative criteria for interpretive case study  
(adapted from Klein and Myers, 1999) 
Klein and Myers 
(1999) criteria Explanation 
The Hermeneutic 
Circle 
All human understanding is achieved by iterating between 
considering the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole that 
they form. This principle of human understanding is fundamental to 
all the other principles. 
Contextualization 
Requires critical reflection of the social and historical background 
of the research setting, so that the intended audience can see how 
the current situation under investigation emerged. 
Interaction Between 
the Researchers and 
the Subjects 
Requires critical reflection on how the research materials (or 
"data") were socially constructed through the interaction between 
the researchers and participants. 
Abstraction and 
Generalization 
Requires relating the idiographic details revealed by the data 
interpretation through the application of principles one and two to 
theoretical, general concepts that describe the nature of human 
understanding and social action. 
Dialogical Reasoning 
Requires sensitivity to possible contradictions between the 
theoretical: preconceptions guiding the research design and actual 
findings ("the story which the data tell") with subsequent cycles of 
revision. 
Multiple 
Interpretations 
Requires sensitivity to possible differences in interpretations among 
the participants as are typically expressed in multiple narratives or 
stories of the same sequence of events under study. Similar to 
multiple witness accounts even if all tell it as they saw it.  
Suspicion Requires sensitivity to possible" biases" and systematic "distortions" in the narratives collected from the participants. 
 
Information Technology Agency (ITA) is a state technology agency operating in 
the southeastern part of the US. At the time of this study, the organization was engaged 
in the development of an information systems security program with a strategic focus. 
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The organization and the security program are unique. ITA is a consolidated and 
centralized state government agency for the IT needs of all government agencies in the 
state. It is responsible for the operation of IT infrastructure, governance of IT 
investments, and procurement of technology in the state. The information systems 
security efforts at ITA are an interesting effort to develop an integrated security 
program in a federated environment. This case was selected because the organization 
was in the process of formulating security initiatives for the entire state to protect IT 
assets of all state agencies. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) is a state transportation agency that is also 
located in the southeastern part of the US. At the time of study, the organization was 
engaged in implementing a strategic information systems security program that had 
been developed by the state. DOT is responsible for building, maintaining and operating 
the state’s roads, bridges and tunnels. It also provides funding for airports, seaports, rail 
and public transportation. DOT has been mandated by state legislation to comply with 
the state information security policy and standards. As such, the organization had to 
reconfigure its existing security approach to meet the requirements of new state security 
initiatives. This case was chosen because the organization was in the process of 
implementing security initiatives in a federated environment. Another interesting 
feature was that the organization’s IT operations were outsourced to another state 
agency. This essentially meant that DOT had to rely upon an outsourcing firm to ensure 
adequate technical security controls and measures, although DOT was responsible for 
protection against adverse security events. 
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The primary reason to select the two organizations is because these provided an 
opportunity to learn (Stake, 2000). Both organizations were involved in developing and 
implementing different facets of information system security initiatives with particular 
attention to future needs in the changing business environment.   
 
3.4.3 Data collection 
The techniques that do not jeopardize the ability to observe in-the-moment 
reactions and behaviors were used for data collection in this research study. Also, the 
data collection techniques need to abstain from being intrusive. As such, semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations with participants served as the primary 
method for data collection. The interviews were conducted at different management 
levels. A list of organizational members interviewed at ITA and DOT appears in 
appendices A and B. The stakeholders were identified and interviewed from within the 
security departments, as well as, other departments across the two organizations. In all, 
thirty-three organizational members were interviewed from the ITA and twenty-nine 
members were interviewed from the DOT. Participation in the interviews was voluntary 
and informed consent of the participants was obtained prior to the interviews. 
Interviews were conducted based upon a topic guide developed from the 
theoretical framework. Topic guides were customized for each interview. Hand-written 
notes were taken during the interviews. These were updated and transcribed 
immediately after the interview to ensure all details were captured. None of the 
interviews were tape-recorded, which helped to build a level of trust with participants 
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and allowed the researcher to repeatedly observe events in contextualized detail. This 
was considered to be more important and enriching than to capture exact words spoken 
just once. Additional sources of data included participant written-cases, group sessions, 
community meetings, documentary and archive data. The field notes were recorded into 
a notebook computer. Qualitative data analysis software, Atlas Ti, was employed to 
develop conceptual maps for the problem situation at Department of Transportation. In 
general, findings emerging from data collection and analysis were shared with an 
informant in each organization for validation purposes.  
 
3.4.4 Data analysis 
 The empirical evidence collected in the form of data from interviews and secondary 
sources indicated a variety of different issues. These were evaluated with respect to the 
research framework. The triangulation of data was achieved by verifying the empirical 
evidence with an informant in each respective setting. The research findings were 
interpreted consistently with the ontological beliefs of this research. By abiding with the 
tenets of interpretive research, the resulting principles of this research are expected to be 
useful in settings other than the government sector.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter outlines the research methodology adopted in this study. The 
methodology is based on ontological and epistemological considerations. An interpretive 
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approach of inquiry is used to conduct this research. This approach is justified based on the 
nature of the research problem and the theoretical perspective adopted.  
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CHAPTER 4 
A Contextualist Interpretation of Strategic  
Information Systems Security in Organizations  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a description of the organizations used in this dissertation 
research work. The organizations are studied utilizing the contextualist theoretical 
framework as presented in chapter 3. As per the research framework, an organization 
should be analyzed in terms of its context, content and processes. The next section 
provides a description of the Information Technology Agency. The organizational 
context, content of the program and associated processes are described under this 
section. The subsequent section analyzes the Department of Transportation using a 
similar structure. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of issues that emerged based 
on the theory of contextualist strategic change.  
 
4.2 Information Technology Agency 
The Information Technology Agency (ITA) is a state technology agency that is 
located in the southeastern part of the US. It is a consolidated and centralized 
government agency for the state of Wonderland. ITA is responsible for providing 
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information technology (IT) services to about ninety government agencies within the 
state. In essence, it is a behind-the-scenes service provider. ITA is responsible for the 
operation of the IT infrastructure, governance of IT investments, and procurement of 
technology in Wonderland. The emphasis of the agency has been to create 
accountability for public funds being spent on technology in the state. The goal is to 
become a leader in the use of technology in government across the country. This is to be 
achieved by transforming the IT environment, keeping costs consistent with market, and 
achieving results by reinvesting savings. In 2007, the agency had an operating budget of 
about three hundred million dollars. 
Information systems security initiatives in the state of Wonderland are primarily 
the result of efforts by the governor’s office.  In the wake of a financial crisis in 2001, 
the Governor decided to centralize IT efforts for the entire state. At that time, various 
government agencies were developing IT systems and programs spending thousands of 
tax dollars. The governor believed that significant financial gains could be achieved if 
such duplication of systems or efforts was reduced across the state. As such, 
centralization of technology efforts seemed to be a viable solution to mitigate the 
financial budget problems. Budgetary restraint was a key driver behind IT consolidation 
efforts in Wonderland. 
During the same period, there was public concern for the government to protect 
the public’s information privacy rights. There had been an increased number of 
incidents involving loss of personal and financial information of citizens at several 
government agencies. Such incidents threatened potential losses that might damage the 
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lives and finances of individuals.  There were also concerns from the federal 
government to protect personal information pertaining to citizens. In recent years, the 
federal government has enacted regulations and acts, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
Health Information Privacy Protection Act, for various industries to force the 
organizations to protect the information resources of citizens. In short, there was 
growing concern for privacy at the national level. The context, content and process of 
information system security initiatives at ITA are described in the rest of this section.   
 
4.2.1 Context 
The Governor of Wonderland pushed for information technology reforms in the 
state in order to address the growing budgetary concerns, privacy concerns, and also the 
promise of delivering efficient management to the state. These reforms were well 
received by state legislators who unanimously approved them. The reforms led to the 
creation of several new functions and positions for the state: Secretary of Technology, 
Technology Investment Board (TIB) and Chief Information Officer (CIO). The new 
legislation mandated the Secretary of Technology to achieve IT consolidation and 
secure the IT environment for the state. The reforms led to the creation of ITA in 2003 
and consolidation of IT infrastructure and related resources from other state government 
agencies. ITA was to provide all IT related services to the agencies. However, agencies 
were allowed to have in-house IT application development teams. The personnel for 
different positions at ITA were selected from the entire employee pool of state 
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government agencies that had IT expertise. As can be expected, the formation and 
existence of ITA was complex.  
The early days of ITA were marred with problems and issues related to 
operational procedures. Much confusion surrounded daily operations due to the scope of 
the agency. Such a scope could be challenging for any organization especially the one 
without any prior expertise in handling services on such a large scale. Despite these 
concerns, the state was lauded for its efforts and won several national awards. However, 
the failings were real and there was growing anxiety over how to handle the IT situation 
of the state. Given these concerns, the change in government called for a new direction 
in technology efforts.  
 
Regulatory environment 
In 2002, Wonderland passed a bill that authorized the Secretary of Technology 
to conduct technology security audits for the state agencies. In response, the Strategic 
Plan for Technology for 2002-2006 from the Secretary of Technology Office stipulated 
that the CIO of ITA should develop and implement an IT security program for the entire 
state. In addition, the CIO had the responsibility to create a statewide information 
security office, and to develop evaluation tools to measure the cost savings generated by 
a statewide security program.  
 By 2003, legislation was passed to create ITA and the CIO was appointed 
around January 2004 by the Technology Investment Board (TIB), which oversees ITA. 
The legislation mandates that the TIB and the CIO establish security policies, 
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procedures and standards for the executive branch agencies of the state. The legislation 
also details directions to the CIO pertaining to security of government database. Per this 
legislation,  
The CIO shall direct the development of policies, procedures and standards for assessing 
security risks, determining the appropriate security measures and performing security audits of 
government databases and data communications. At a minimum, these policies, procedures and 
standards shall address the scope of security audits and which public bodies are authorized to 
conduct security audits.  
 
The CIO charged the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) with development of  
information security policies, procedures and standards to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the state’s information assets. In accordance with the 
legislation, all government agencies are responsible for complying with the state 
security policies and standards. In addition, the legislation requires each agency to 
report to ITA all security incidents that have the potential to compromise security of the 
IT infrastructure. Such incidents must be reported within twenty-four hours of 
occurrence.  
An important factor influencing the security program at ITA was the state 
security audit report. In 2006, the General Assembly of the state passed a resolution 
directing state auditors to report on the adequacy of security of state government 
databases and data communications. As a result, the ITA was required to develop an 
action plan to respond to this audit report. The current state of security program 
developed by ITA is in direct response to the recommendations provided by the audit 
report. In 2007, the Governor issued an executive order that empowered the Secretary 
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of Technology to ensure compliance with the state’s information security policies and 
standards.  
 
Competitive environment 
The ITA operates in a federated environment supporting the digital needs of 
government agencies in the state. The primary motive of a government organization is 
to provide efficient service to citizens. Prior to the formation of the ITA, each state 
agency was responsible for its own IT infrastructure and associated technical services. 
Not surprisingly, there was enormous duplication of efforts in terms of technology 
development resulting in waste of critical resources. To reduce this waste of tax dollars, 
the state government consolidated the IT infrastructure of the entire state to ITA, as well 
as the responsibility of IT related support for the executive branch agencies. In addition, 
ITA became accountable for the governance of IT investments in support of the duties 
of the TIB and the CIO of the state. Finally, ITA was made responsible for procurement 
of technology for the entire state. In essence, IT infrastructure and services moved from 
individual agencies to ITA. Thus, all network support staff became employees of ITA 
as well. This implied that employees were reporting to supervisors who did not work for 
and were not affiliated with or familiar with the services of the agencies that their staff 
supported. 
 The financial considerations for the ITA are rather interesting. The state 
legislators directed the ITA to fund operational expenses through direct charges to 
agencies. That is, ITA is following a fee-for-service model. The practical impact of this 
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decision was that certain expenditures to meet legislative mandates and minimum 
standards would be reflected in additional charges to affected customer agencies. In 
addition, agencies have to pay the ITA for services rendered. As a result, the ITA 
started to charge the agencies a five-and-a-half percent fee for each employee that 
provided services to that agency. So, not only did agencies still pay the employees 
salary, they now paid an additional five-and-a-half percent of that salary directly to the 
ITA. On recommendation by the TIB, the Governor approved an agreement with the 
Outsourcing Firm in 2005 to modernize the state’s IT infrastructure. The ten-year 
partnership valued at around two billion dollars is expected to result in about three 
hundred million dollars capital investment in the state.  
 In 2006, the Outsourcing Firm took responsibility for the operations and 
management of all IT infrastructure components, such as desktops, servers, mainframes, 
and routers for agencies that the ITA serves. However, the TIB, the CIO and the ITA 
itself continued to retain responsibility for the state’s IT security governance. As per the 
contract, the ITA specified the required information systems security standards and 
controls for the state agencies. The Outsourcing Firm was to use that information to 
ensure their operations meet the state’s security standards. As such, the ITA took on the 
role of a middleman between the state agencies and the Outsourcing Firm. As part of 
the partnership, the Outsourcing Firm accommodated around five hundred and fifty ITA 
employees who accepted enhanced job offers in the first phase of the job-offer period. 
Political pressure forced legislators to give employees an option to move to the 
Outsourcing Firm. This was done to minimize the impact to employees as a result of the 
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Outsourcing Firm partnership. In essence, many employees saw their job functions 
being outsourced from the ITA and then to the Outsourcing Firm. The partnership with 
the Outsourcing Firm has added increasing complexity to the already complex 
operational environment in Wonderland.  
 In the case of information systems security, all agencies have to be compliant 
with the state security policy and standard. Now, agencies face a dilemma. It makes 
sense to have their security measures evaluated by the ITA, as they are the developers 
of the security policy and standard. An audit so conducted by the ITA would point to 
gaps in security. In order to plug these gaps, the agency would have to rely on the ITA 
to provide appropriate service and would have to pay for these services as well as the 
evaluation. The problem is that the state agencies were concerned that the ITA would 
inflate their services to coincide with their monetary requirements. Agencies do not 
necessarily have to purchase the services of the ITA. However, there is only one 
government agency that provides IT security services in the state. As such, agencies 
have to turn to the ITA for support. Although it seems that leverage has been provided 
to agencies to make their decisions, they are restricted to the ITA and the Outsourcing 
Firm for their IT needs. Thus, state agencies are being forced by politics and law to deal 
with the ITA.   
 
Organizational Structure 
The CIO is at the helm of organizational structure at the ITA. This position must 
be approved by the state assembly and is appointed for a period of five years. The CIO 
    69 
 
essentially serves as ITA’s chief administrative officer and leads the organization to 
attain IT governance and operational excellence in the state. The CIO is appointed by 
the TIB, which serves in a capacity similar to a board of directors in private 
organizations. The TIB acts as an oversight committee that reviews technology 
investments across state government agencies and the board members are appointed by 
the Governor, the General Assembly and the Secretary of Technology. The aim of the 
state government is to select members from industry who would bring substantial 
experience from the business world and contribute to IT reforms in the state.  
The ITA is divided into eleven internal directorates. However, the organization 
is viewed in terms of six functional areas for reporting and planning purposes (figure 
4.1). The Customer Management directorate is responsible for maintaining business 
relationships with customers, which include government agencies in the state. The 
purpose of the directorate is to help agencies identify technology requirements and 
integrate IT with business strategies. The IT Solutions directorate has three areas of 
responsibility and provides statewide IT governance and oversight services. In this 
capacity, the directorate helps in formulating strategy for future IT direction in the state. 
Also, it provides guidance in implementing specific technology initiatives. In addition, 
the directorate extends its technical expertise to develop statewide technology solutions. 
Finally, it is responsible for the development and support of technology applications for 
internal use at ITA.  
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Figure 4.1: Organizational structure of the Information Technology Agency  
 
The aim of the Audit directorate is to provide objective assurance and consulting 
services. The directorate is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of risk 
management, control and governance processes. The Finance & Administration 
directorate is concerned with financial and procurement responsibilities. It performs the 
functions of supply chain management, financial management, internal performance 
measurement, and human resource management. The Outsourcing Management 
directorate is focused on managing the IT infrastructure partnership between the ITA 
and the Outsourcing Firm. The directorate must interact daily with the Outsourcing 
Firm for technical operations, service delivery, and also ensure that proposed 
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technology solutions are appropriate from a security standpoint. It also provides an 
operational and tactical interface to customer agencies. Finally, the directorate is 
responsible for contractual aspects, and also provides oversight and assurance of 
partnership operations.  
 The IT Security directorate provides information technology security support to 
the state. It is responsible for security assurance activities and ensures a secure IT 
environment for agencies. It also provides a framework for IT security program based 
upon principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability. The director of the IT 
Security directorate also serves as the CISO of the state. In this capacity, the CISO is 
required to protect state information while providing information security governance 
services. For the ITA, the CISO is expected to provide information security risk 
management services. The director is assisted by the Deputy CISO to protect the state 
information through IT security. The Deputy CISO is responsible for managing daily 
operations for the directorate. She is also expected to coordinate the state Information 
Security Officer (ISO) program. As per initial structure of the ITA, the Security 
Advisory Group (SAG) supports the CISO in an advisory role. However, the SAG is 
now a forum to enhance communication between the security department at the ITA 
and other agencies. The SAG is comprised of ISOs from different agencies of the state 
and meets on a monthly basis.  
 The security directorate is internally organized into six functions (figure 4.2). 
One of the main functions of the directorate is to define IT security program for the 
state. The directorate must develop IT security policies, standards and guidelines for 
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statewide implementation. A manager has been assigned the task to develop and revise 
policies, including configuration and policy standards and exemptions of customer 
agencies. Another vital function is information security assurance which assesses the 
security posture of the state. An assurance manager is responsible for performing this 
function by employing security audit reports and security assessments of high-risk 
systems. The responsibility also involves managing the Security Services Information 
Security Data Warehouse, which provides a central repository listing of all the state’s 
sensitive systems and relative security controls. The manager is assisted by two security 
analysts to analyze IT security requirements and controls, and vulnerability 
assessments. 
 
Figure 4.2: IT security directorate of the Information Technology Agency 
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The Information Security Architecture function is responsible for developing a 
standard IT security architecture for the state. A security architect is expected to assess 
IT systems and network designs to enable a secure technology structure. In case of an 
incident, the incident management function at the directorate is expected to serve as the 
IT Security Incident Response Team. The Director of this function would provide 
analysis and response to the security incident as a technical expert. An engineer is 
responsible for daily activities that include collection, analysis, and classification of 
security incidents.  
 The Critical Infrastructure Protection & Service Continuity function is 
concerned with physical security, personnel security and developing continuity of 
operations plan (COOP). The function manager is expected to provide oversight for the 
records management of the security directorate, the security awareness program, and 
physical security of ITA facilities. The security awareness and training function uses 
different approaches including face-to-face and online awareness training for 
organizational members. The function manager is also required to coordinate disaster 
recovery planning with agencies. She is assisted by a planner for business continuity 
planning, while the security program manager provides support for physical and 
personnel security.  
 The organizational structure is dynamic to meet emerging needs of the 
environment. For instance, the position of Information Assurance manager was created 
although such a position was not outlined in the original structure. As the organization 
matured, the security department was restructured to assume a governance role. The 
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CISO position was subsequently changed to Chief Information Security & Internal 
Audit Officer (CISIAO). In essence, the IT Security and Audit directorates were merged 
under single leadership. Further, the development of a Security Council is another 
indicator of the flexibility of the management team. This council was developed as the 
nature of SAG emerged to be different than its intended advisory role. The aim of the 
Security Council is to provide advice to the security department on how to improve 
security services for state agencies. The emphasis of the directorate has been to develop 
well-articulated roles and clearly defined organizational structure.  
 
4.2.2 Content 
The contextualist theory of strategic change posits that transformation of the 
firm can be understood by exploring the content, context and the process of change 
together with their interconnections through time (Pettigrew, 1987). The formulation of 
the content of any strategy needs to acknowledge the management of its context and 
process.  The content as analytic category refers to the particular areas of transformation 
under examination.  It addresses the ‘what’ of change.  Content is composed of 
assumptions, objectives and strategic choices of the firm. In the initial step, the content 
of strategic information systems security initiatives is identified, followed by a 
description of security policy. The security policy should be in alignment with the 
overall security goals and objectives of that organization. The  information systems 
security standard and guidelines supporting the ITA security policy are described in this 
section. 
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Information systems security objectives 
ITA is focused on protecting data, software, hardware, and communications of 
the state. The security program is intended to protect IT systems and data from credible 
threats, whether internal or external, deliberate or accidental. The overall objective of 
the security program is to protect the state’s data against unauthorized access and use; to 
maintain the integrity of data; to meet requirements for data residing on IT systems; 
and, to meet federal, state and other regulatory and legislative requirements. The ITA 
adopted the traditional view of information security and based its program on the 
principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.  The principle of 
confidentiality ensures that information is shared among authorized persons or 
organizations only. Integrity is concerned with the correctness of the information as 
well as whether it can be trusted and relied upon. Availability implies that the systems 
required for delivering, storing and processing information are accessible when needed 
and by those who need them. 
 
Information systems security policy 
The ITA has an elaborate IT security policy which became effective in July 
2006. This policy superseded the earlier IT security policy dated 2001. The aim of the 
policy is to protect the state IT systems and data from various threats. The focus is on 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability principles of information systems security. 
This policy clearly defines various security roles and responsibilities in the 
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organization. It also explicates the IT security program as well as the requirements for 
compliance.  Finally, it details the necessity for IT security audits and protection of IT 
resources. The formally stated purpose of the policy is to protect state information 
technology assets and information processed by defining the minimum information 
technology security requirements for state agencies. 
 The policy details responsibilities of the ITA, as well as, differentiates between 
those of an agency. In general, the ITA is charged with developing security policy and 
programs while the agencies are charged with adequately implementing the policy. This 
again reflects the nature of the relationship that exists between the ITA and different 
agencies, which are its customers. The twenty-three pages policy document has come a 
long way from its predecessor one page security policy of 2001. The old IT security 
policy (2001 version) recognized the reliance of various agencies on information 
systems. It is quite interesting to see the use of the term ‘information systems’ in the old 
document compared to the shift in current 2006 policy to IT systems. Further, the policy 
also recognized differences in the information environment of various agencies and left 
it upon the agencies to develop an appropriate structure of IT security.   
 The new security policy clearly defines the role of the CIO, the CISO and other 
security officers for the ITA. The policy addresses the responsibilities of the Agency 
Head and various IT users as well. The roles addressed include the ISO, the privacy 
officer, the system owner, the data owner, the system administration, the data custodian 
and the IT system users. The policy briefly describes the security program to be in place 
in order to protect state IT systems and data. The program involves nine functional 
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components which target protection of various systems and data based on sensitivity 
levels. Each of these components has a supporting guideline, which provides detailed 
procedures on how to implement the specific component. These components as 
presented in the state security policy are briefly discussed in the remaining part of the 
section.  
 The first step in risk management is to conduct a business impact analysis (BIA). 
This analysis identifies those business functions that are essential and are dependent on 
IT. After completing BIA, agencies are to classify the sensitivity of IT systems and 
data. Then, agencies have to determine ownership of all sensitive IT systems so that IT 
security roles can be appropriately assigned. A periodic, formal risk analysis is required 
for all IT systems classified as sensitive. The risk analysis process assesses threats to IT 
systems and data, probabilities of occurrence and the appropriate security controls 
necessary to reduce these risks to an acceptable level. The sensitive IT systems require 
periodic, independent security audits. These audits are necessary to determine whether 
the overall protection of IT systems and data they handle is adequate.  
 The purpose of IT systems security is to define steps necessary to provide 
adequate and effective protection for agency IT systems in the areas of IT systems 
hardening, systems interoperability security and systems development life cycle 
security. Another component addressed in the policy is logical access control (LAC). 
This component defines steps necessary to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of IT systems and data against compromise. The LAC requirements identify 
the measures needed to verify that all IT systems users are who they say they are and 
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that they are permitted to use the systems and data they are attempting to access. This 
component defines requirements in the areas of account management, password 
management, and remote access. The data protection provides security safeguards for 
processing and storing of data. This component of the security program outlines 
methods to safeguard data in a manner commensurate with the sensitivity and risk 
involved.  
 The IT contingency planning defines processes and procedures necessary for 
recovery and restoration of IT systems and data in case of an event that renders these 
unavailable. It includes continuity of operations planning and disaster recovery 
planning. The facilities security safeguards provide a first line of defense for IT systems 
against damage, theft, unauthorized disclosure of data, loss of control over system 
integrity, and interruption to computer services. The component of personnel security 
outlines access determination and control requirements that restrict access of IT systems 
to those individuals who require such access as part of their job duties. This component 
also includes security awareness and training requirements regarding security policy. 
 The threat management addresses protection of IT systems and data by 
preparing for and responding to IT security incidents. This component of the security 
program includes threat detection, incident handling, and IT security monitoring and 
logging. The IT asset management concerns protection of the components that comprise 
IT systems by managing them in a planned, organized, and secure fashion. It includes 
asset control, software license management, and configuration management. In terms of 
compliance with IT security policy and standards, the policy emphasizes monitoring, 
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audits, and confiscation and removal of IT resources. For monitoring, the policy states 
various monitoring activities and no expectation of privacy for the users. It also 
provides information on what is to be monitored and authorization for such.  
 The state legislation ascribes the CIO of ITA with the responsibility of 
performing security audits of government databases and data communications. Such 
audits are to be conducted annually and require compliance with ITA’s security policy 
and standard. The audits can be conducted by CISO personnel, agency internal auditors, 
the state public auditors, or staff of an appropriate private firm. The audit report must be 
submitted to the respective Agency Head, who will develop a required action plan based 
on the report. Finally, the policy describes a provision for Agency Heads to request any 
exceptions from the IT security policy. Such requests must clearly identify any reasons 
for the exception and identify the appropriate controls that are in place.  
 The current state security policy appears to be simply a current version of the 
older 2001 version of the security standard. The old standard was comprised of thirteen 
components which formed the security program. These components were reorganized 
into a smaller set of components in the new policy document. The older security policy 
was very broad in nature and did not reflect an appropriate level of granularity. The new 
security policy advocates a security program which has nine components that seem to 
have evolved from the earlier thirteen components. 
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Information systems security standard 
The security standard for the ITA became effective on July 2006. The standard 
was created to support the IT security policy. The purpose of the standard is to define 
minimum requirements for each agency's information technology security management 
program. The IT security standard adopts the underlying assumptions of security policy.  
The aim of the standard is to establish a baseline of security controls that meet the 
requirements of various laws, regulations and security policy.  
 The security standard is organized around nine components of the security 
policy.  Each component describes in detail the requirements which are mandatory or 
programmatic activities for a specific area of the IT security program. It also provides 
examples which describe how the agencies may meet these requirements. The standard 
requires agencies to develop and implement the IT security program in a manner 
commensurate with sensitivity and risk. 
 The first component addressed in the standard is risk management. The risk 
management delineates the steps necessary to identify, analyze, prioritize, and mitigate 
risks that could compromise IT systems. It defines requirements for roles and 
responsibilities, system inventory, business impact analysis, sensitivity classification, 
risk assessment, audits, and risk response. The IT contingency planning provides the 
steps necessary to plan for and execute recovery and restoration of state IT systems and 
data in case of an adverse event. This component focuses on continuity of operations 
planning, disaster recovery planning, and IT system backup and restoration.  
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 The IT systems security requirements address how to protect IT systems through 
systems hardening, interoperability security, malicious code protection, and systems 
development lifecycle. The logical access control requirements provide necessary steps 
to protect IT systems and data by verifying and validating users to access IT systems 
and data. This can be achieved through account management, password management, 
and remote access. The data protection requirements address protection of data from 
improper or unauthorized disclosure. The focus here is on data storage media 
protection, and encryption. The facilities security requirements identify the steps 
necessary to safeguard the physical facilities that house IT equipment, systems, 
services, and personnel.  
The personnel security requires restricting to those individuals who require such 
access as part of their job duties. Such an effort involves access determination and 
control, security awareness and training, and acceptable use. The threat management 
lists the steps necessary to protect IT systems and data by preparing for and responding 
to IT security incidents. This component addresses threat detection, incident handling, 
security monitoring and logging. Finally, the IT asset management outlines steps 
necessary to manage IT assets in a planned, organized, and secure fashion. The focus of 
this component is on IT asset control, software license management, and configuration 
management. 
 All these components have been reorganized from a larger set of thirteen 
components as described in the older security standard that was effective since 2001. 
The purpose of the older security standard (2001 version) was to define minimum 
    82 
 
requirements for a security program and to align security technology with the business 
needs of the state. It emphasized the need of involving top agency management for an 
effective security program. It is interesting that business continuity planning was not 
part of the security program as reflected by the thirteen components. However, the 
standard recognized the critical impact of disruption of business on sensitive 
information and recommended that this be part of security planning.  
 
Information systems security guidelines 
The security guidelines describe methodologies that may be used to implement 
various requirements of the security policy and standard. For every component of the 
security standard, there is a corresponding guideline on the procedures required for 
compliance. Agencies are not required to follow the guidelines; however, these actually 
provide information on how to operationalize the standard. By the end of 2006, the ITA 
was still developing guidelines to support the security standard. The draft versions of 
five guidelines were uploaded on an online document system to obtain comments from 
various customer agencies. This essentially meant that agencies could use these draft 
versions to achieve compliance with the security policy and standard. However, the 
guidelines were not fully endorsed by the ITA since the documents were considered 
draft versions.  
 All supporting guidelines have been developed with a focus on educating users 
about information security. This is consistent with the approach advocated by CISO 
who believes that policy, standard and guidelines need to educate users on security as 
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well. As such, these guidelines provide general information on various concepts. 
Unfortunately, the balance has tilted towards providing more information on different 
security concepts rather than be clear on providing directives to users regarding how to 
achieve the objective of the guidelines. The summary and analysis of security 
guidelines developed by the ITA security department are presented next.  
  
IT Logical Access Control guideline  
The standard defines logical access control requirements in the areas of account 
management, password management and remote access. For account management, the 
guideline defines identification, authorization and authentication of various accounts. It 
also addresses the criteria to be used while processing various access requests. These 
include principles of least privilege and role-based access control. In addressing remote 
access, the guideline concentrates on encryption techniques and service hardening. The 
latter concept basically implies that the remote access services need to be secured both 
physically and logically.  
 The guideline failed to clearly articulate that an effective access control requires 
three levels of support: authorization, authentication, and monitoring. The guideline 
requires an explicit section on the assumptions, principles or objectives that are adopted 
or followed. However, this section needs to include the principles like default deny, 
least privilege, and need-to-know to be followed. This section should also indicate that 
role-based access control (RAC) has been adopted. Currently, RAC is listed under 
Account Management. Further, the access rights need to be aligned with the adopted 
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classification scheme (eg, top secret, secret, confidential). The current guideline does 
not recognize the importance of maintaining access rights through organizational 
changes. The guideline should also address controls for mobile and telecommuting 
aspects of business based on a risk assessment of each. Further, the guideline is silent 
on the issue of monitoring which should include details on reviews and audits of logs 
(for instance, what, who, how and timeframe involved).  
 
IT Security Threat Management guideline  
The IT security threat management guideline addresses threat detection, incident 
management, and monitoring and logging to minimize security risks. For threat 
detection, the focus is on intrusion detection and prevention practices. The goal of the 
threat detection process is to lower the difference in mean time between when an attack 
occurs and when responsible agency individuals becomes aware of an issue. Incident 
management details the activities required to investigate and to respond to detect 
security attacks on the organizational IT infrastructure. The aim is to minimize the 
impact and duration of security incidents. The final section describes the activities 
important for achieving an effective monitoring and logging of incidents. It provides 
information on system logging design, event log monitoring and correlation, and 
possible use of data mining techniques. For all these components the guideline clearly 
defines the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders.  
 A review of the guideline indicates that there is no need for this guideline. The 
elements of this guideline should be captured in Risk Management, Logical Access 
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Control and Business Continuity Planning guidelines. Instead of having a separate 
Threat Management guideline it seems to make more sense to merge the portions of this 
guideline with other relevant guidelines. For instance, the Threat Detection section from 
this guideline could be merged and addressed under the Risk Management guideline. 
The Incident Handling section should be addressed under the Business Continuity 
Planning guideline. This would also reduce confusion among users in terms of 
expectations and their responsibilities. 
 
IT Contingency Planning guideline 
As per the guideline, the aim is to identify, exercise and review the actions 
necessary to restore and recover IT systems and data that support essential business 
functions. This is done by recommending methodologies to develop IT components of 
the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP), the IT Disaster Recovery Plan, and the IT 
Systems Backup and Restoration plan. These plans would assist in recovering any IT 
systems or data that may have been rendered unavailable because of an unplanned 
security event. The guideline also emphasizes the need for regular exercises which test 
the plan in its entirety.  
 The review of this guideline indicates some concerns with the lack of clarity in 
its suggestions for contingency planning. Also, the guideline does not cover the subject 
area adequately. The IT contingency planning guideline should address the issues 
associated with assessment, plan, maintenance and teams. The assessment section could 
include risk assessment and business impact analysis. The next section of the plan might 
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provide information on preparation, response, resumption, recovery and restoration of 
business. The maintenance section should explain the testing, review, and audit 
requirements. Finally, the roles and responsibilities of various teams need to be clearly 
articulated.  
 
Data Protection guideline  
This guideline lists data protection practices that include roles and 
responsibilities, relationship to agency privacy policies, what must be protected, data 
storage media protection practices and data encryption practices. The guideline provides 
information on sensitive data and various risks to data. It then addresses different 
precautions required for storage and transmission of sensitive data. There is clear 
differentiation of responsibilities between data owner and custodian. The section on 
data storage media protection details the requirements for mobile data storage, 
authorization, disposal and re-use of such media.  
 The overall concern here should be with data integrity issues. The use of ‘CIA’ 
triad in the document is too prominent and repetitive. These principles are applicable to 
technical information systems. However, not all situations require confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. The current guideline may be improved by reorganizing it to 
address data sensitivity, data backup, data storage, and data protection mechanisms. A 
data sensitivity section should address data classification, risks to data and data losses. 
The section on data backup should detail appropriate policies and procedures. The 
storage of data must address both regular media and mobile media. Encryption 
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techniques may be discussed under the data protection mechanism section. This section 
would also include other mechanisms necessary to achieve the required level of data 
security. 
 
IT System Security guideline  
This guideline is structured around the directives of the state security policy. 
The security policy defines the area of focus for IT systems security to be IT systems 
hardening, IT systems interoperability security, malicious code protection, and IT 
systems development life cycle security. The logic behind the identification of these 
areas is not clear. For instance, malicious code protection is separately addressed in 
addition to IT systems hardening. Then again, various protection mechanisms available 
like encryption and intrusion detection systems have not been discussed.  
 In its current form, the guideline needs to take into consideration logical access 
control, data protection, threat management and IT asset management guidelines so as 
to minimize any repetition of controls and issues already addressed. Also, the issues 
covered under systems interoperability security seem to have been addressed in other 
guidelines. The guideline should be broadly organized to have sections on systems 
development and systems maintenance. The latter would provide required controls 
necessary to ensure security of existent systems. IT systems hardening and network 
architecture could be potential topics discussed in this section. The former would 
provide details about how to incorporate security into systems while they are under 
development. 
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Personnel security guideline  
All the components addressed in this guideline are relevant to the subject matter. 
However, the effectiveness of the guideline could have been further enhanced. A new 
component on security incident reporting by personnel is required in the guideline. This 
section may address the issue of training users for incident recognition and reporting 
mechanisms. It is important that users are able to quickly communicate any suspicious 
activity to the right authorities.  Also missing in the guideline is a statement on 
disciplinary action in case of any violations. This might have been captured in the 
security policy however it needs to be provided in the guideline as well. In its current 
form, the guideline does not emphasize security education, awareness and training 
programs in agencies. All these activities should be done on an on-going basis. The 
agencies need to understand the significance of awareness and training. 
 
IT Security Audit guideline  
The guideline does not clearly articulate the role and purpose of an IT security 
audit. The document fails to provide an adequate explanation of an IT security audit and 
why these are important. For instance, we might state the need for assessing the 
adequacy of organizational standards, or whether they help mitigate risks to an 
organization. The document does not emphasize that the audit basically reflects an 
organization’s risk management posture, as well as its policies and standards that must 
be followed. Such an audit checks whether security controls are mitigating risks to an 
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organization. An audit should be based on an organization’s objectives and risk 
priorities. Further, the document does not clearly state the importance of establishing an 
audit baseline. One may use the existing standard in its entirety for such a purpose.  
 As of July 2007, the ITA was still in the process of developing the IT asset 
management guideline and facilities security guideline.  
 
Information assurance and compliance program 
In addition to the security policy, standard and guidelines, the security program 
at the ITA involves an information assurance program and a compliance program. 
These have been developed in response to an audit conducted by the state. The ITA was 
directed to develop an action plan in response to recommendations of the audit report. 
However, there was no comprehensive approach developed to achieve an integrated 
program. Rather, the program developed in an emergent fashion. CISO decided on the 
issues that required immediate attention. As the security department started working on 
these components, other aspects of the program emerged that needed to be addressed as 
well. These aspects made sense so as to achieve an effective security program. Partly, 
these newer aspects emerged as the security department interacted with different 
agencies and tried to understand their security needs and compliance with different 
regulations. Each of these components of the security program are discussed in this 
section.   
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Information assurance program  
The aim of the information assurance program at the ITA is to perform security 
analyses of sensitive IT systems in terms of appropriate security controls. The ITA has 
the responsibility for providing a secure IT infrastructure that also encompasses various 
regulations and laws, both state and federal, as applicable. The security department 
must collect information, including IT security audit plans, on each sensitive system so 
as to conduct the analysis. A template was provided to 63 agencies in order to capture 
the required information. In addition, a technical data survey captured information on 
servers (logical and physical), infrastructure and network devices, and environmental 
and physical controls.  
Based on the information from agencies, an analysis would be performed by the 
ITA to assess the security controls in place. Such analysis would identify various gaps 
and provide recommendations on appropriate security controls required. In case of 
inadequate security controls, the ITA would develop a working plan with necessary 
corrective actions to be implemented. This would also take into account the risk 
assessment and corresponding adjustments to risk management. In the end, the ITA 
would issue a letter of assurance to each agency notifying of the results of the security 
analysis. To facilitate the process of information assurance, the security department has 
initiated development of a security data warehouse. The goal is to provide customer 
agencies with online access to update security information in the database. The security 
analysis of sensitive systems at different agencies will be conducted on an annual basis 
by the ITA security department.  
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Compliance program  
The monitoring and enforcement of the security policy and standard has to be 
continuous so as to assure effectiveness of different protection measures. The security 
directorate would evaluate compliance through the use of audits, management reviews, 
self-assessments, surveys, and other informal indicators. A combination of these 
measures would be used to achieve greater reliability of results. Each agency is also 
required to designate an ISO and a backup ISO. In addition, agencies must perform 
business impact analyses and exercise contingency plans. That is, agencies need to be 
prepared for response to IT security incidents. All IT systems and data need to be 
inventoried and classified. A thorough risk assessment and IT security audit of sensitive 
systems is also required by the security directorate. The security requirements are to be 
incorporated in SDLC of IT applications. The security configuration standards are also 
to be implemented. Appropriate data protection practices will be defined and formal 
account management practices documented. The agencies need to establish access 
control, security awareness training and acceptable use policies for personnel security. 
Finally, it is imperative to safeguard the physical facilities.  
 
4.2.3 Process 
The state legislation requires all government agencies to comply with the state 
IT security policy and standard. In addition, the state required assessment of 
information security controls at agencies by state auditors. The security program so 
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developed is in reaction to the security audit. Around December 2006, the audit report 
was presented in state assembly and legislators required the security directorate at the 
ITA to address all its recommendations. Overall, the report provided four 
recommendations to improve the state of security at Wonderland. Based on 
recommendations of the security audit report, the officers of the security department 
formulated an action plan to achieve the desired security objectives. The security 
program so developed is not the product of well planned or thought out processes. 
Rather, it is reactionary in nature. The executives at the security department worked 
first on the security policy and standard because of legislative mandates. Once these 
were developed, the directorate started working on the guidelines.  
 The organizational structure of the ITA security services department reflected 
the prior security program. The security department was broadly divided into six 
divisions including standards, policies and procedures, secure infrastructure and 
technical support, critical infrastructure protection and service continuity, risk 
management, information security training and awareness and, incident management. 
Each of these divisions was responsible for specific components of the security 
program. Post audit report, the organizational structure of the security services 
department reflects the inherent changes based on the recommendations of the report. 
The most significant change is the emergence of a security assurance division. This 
division, along with standards and guidelines promotes information security in the state.  
 In response to the first recommendation of the audit report, the action plan 
developed by the security services department involved analysis of audit data to define 
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areas of need, identify communication vehicles, promote information security, and 
comply with the state information security standard. Based on the security domains 
from the security assessment report, the top-five areas of need were SDLC security, 
software change management, monitoring and logging, standard configuration, and 
security awareness and training. To promote information security, the security 
department is expending its efforts on the development of standards and guidelines, 
configuration standards, and an information assurance program. The assurance program 
involves collecting information and performing IT security audits on sensitive systems. 
It further involves analyzing current security controls and documenting any gaps. The 
purpose of the program is to provide assurance that the IT infrastructure of agencies has 
sufficient safeguards in place to protect information and databases.  
 Each individual in charge is responsible for developing that particular security 
component. The developmental efforts of the division must incorporate requirements 
from the security policy and standard, as well as, the audit report. Such initiatives must 
ensure that various activities of the division result in achievement of security objectives 
set forth by the state. The scope of these divisions includes the ITA and other 
government agencies.  It is the responsibility of various divisions of security services 
department to provide assistance and expertise to agencies as they develop their 
information security programs. Each individual in-charge of a division works in 
consultation with the Deputy CISO and CISO to identify specific initiatives of the 
division. The finer details of these initiatives are hammered out by division members 
with the assistance of consultants. The process involved for developing security 
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initiatives might differ between divisions; however, the general nature of development 
remains the same.  Ultimately, the CISO must approve various initiatives before any 
work is undertaken. In addition to email and face-to-face meetings, various tasks are 
assigned by the CISO at the bi-monthly staff meetings. The staff meetings also provide 
a forum to get updates and status reports of various projects.  
 Let us now take a look at the operations of the Standards, Policies and 
Procedures division of the security services department. The process followed by other 
divisions will be briefly described afterwards.  
 
Security policy, standard and guideline review process  
The policy, standard and guidelines review process is described in this section. 
The subject area in-charge writes the document, which is then reviewed by the security 
manager who provides suggestions or comments. Then, initial feedback or comments 
are sought from one or two stakeholders. The revised document is given to management 
(CISO, deputy CISO) for comments. The document is then sent to an internal policy 
expert and his team for review. It is then sent back to the security management for 
approval.  Upon approval, the document is uploaded on an online document system for 
about one month for comments from all state agencies. Then, the review committee 
meets to discuss any comments. The revised document goes back to the security 
management for further comments. The final document is sent to the Secretary of 
Technology, the Governor, and the State legislature for approval or enactment. In 
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general, policy, standard and guideline documents undergo four to twelve revisions 
before getting finally approved.  
 During review committee meetings, the members sequentially review comments 
from online document system. The comments received from agencies through the 
online document system generally address minor issues. Occasionally, there are a few 
interesting comments. The comments are not filtered for the review meeting but rather 
all comments are discussed. A consultant reads each comment and provides her 
perspective. Then, the floor is open for the rest of the committee to comment. If there is 
disagreement, the viewpoint of the ITA security member is final. The aim is to generate 
consensus among the group. Even if there is only one member who has an issue or 
different perspective, this issue is heard, analyzed and deliberated.  If it deserves even 
little bit of merit, her suggestions are included. Disagreements are common.  
While consultants generally try to rush up through the comments however, the 
ITA team consistently deliberates each comment. They try to understand and identify 
ways in which other readers might misunderstand or misconstrue the statement that 
raised the discussion. These members do bring their past experience in government 
agencies to enlighten the current problem. They are able to fall back on their experience 
in various agencies and develop statements that would be consistent with the ground 
realities and user habits in those agencies. The members are flexible enough to take a 
radical or fresh view which might be better than their view or consideration. The 
endeavor seems to be on developing the best and most appropriate guidelines. 
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 There is constant struggle during meetings about the objectives of the guideline 
as to what they are trying to achieve. For instance, the members question whether the 
concerns need to be addressed at the business level or the IT level. Another instance 
involves whether to have emphasis on user education or to simply stipulate what needs 
to be done. In case of disagreements, the consultant suggests a language that catches the 
disagreeing member’s sentiments and is at the same time agreeable to the rest of the 
members. In other words, the meetings include a considerable amount of negotiations. 
If major changes are incorporated, the document needs to go through another round of 
revision from agencies. The decision regarding another review process is made by a 
group of internal policy experts at the ITA.  
 
Information assurance process 
The focus of the assurance program seems to be on compliance. The emphasis is 
on checking whether rules have been followed and documented for cases when the 
standard is not followed. There might be cases where rules cannot be followed 
thoroughly. Such cases need to be documented and new rules specified. It is also 
important to identify mitigating mechanisms. The group relies upon state security policy 
and other mandates such as HIPPA or IRS rules provided by agencies. The group is 
mainly concerned with the Outsourcing Firm as IT infrastructure providing 
organization. The group has to evaluate weaknesses in infrastructure that might have an 
impact on ITA’s operations.  
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 For the assurance process, templates were developed for different agencies. In 
terms of reaching out, the group used email, SAG meetings and developed a data 
warehouse. The purpose of the data warehouse was to help identify problems. The data 
warehouse spreads over domains of technical and audit plan information. One of the 
issues that the group is facing with the data warehouse development is that plans, 
phases and processes are constantly changing. This has led to significant delays in the 
development of this project. Essentially, the data warehouse has been created to collect 
remediation plans from agencies. The agencies are expected to provide information on 
sensitive data. They have to identify and submit audit plan for sensitive systems. Then, 
the result of the audit must be reported to the ITA. If there are any weaknesses 
identified, the security group requires agencies to submit appropriate remediation plans. 
The warehouse also assists in capturing associated roles and responsibilities within an 
agency.  
 The security group realizes that they do not have resources to help every agency. 
The hope is that as the department grows, assurance teams can be sent to various 
agencies in order to help them out. The group would also like to conduct an annual 
audit of twenty-five large agencies. In terms of issues, the group has observed the lack 
of expertise in smaller agencies. Another impediment has been the relatively large 
number of systems that need to be audited. Big agencies appreciate an audit; however, 
smaller ones do not. But the group realizes that they have to conduct audits of all 
processes and systems. Lack of support from agencies is an issue.  
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In order to overcome the problem of withholding information, the group 
constantly adjusts questions and asks for elaboration. This is to overcome the problem 
that some agencies withhold information to protect themselves if the questions are not 
specific enough. The group is striving to reach a position where it can assign grades to 
agencies on their assurance level. However, such an effort has its own issues. The 
grades can in fact be a reflection on the security group at the ITA. This is because the 
ITA owns the systems and infrastructure while agencies own only the data. This is the 
kind of fuzziness involved as a result of IT consolidation endeavors in the state.   
 
Awareness and training 
The ITA security department identified training as a major activity in the 
security program formulation process. There is recognition of the human role in security 
problems of organizations, which points to the significance of an awareness program 
about information security issues to prevent or detect security problems. The awareness 
training at the ITA is to focus on executives, policy makers, program and functional 
managers, security and audit personnel, computer management and operations, and end 
users. Such training can be disseminated through existing policy and procedures 
manuals, written materials, presentations and classes, and audio-visual training 
programs. The aim of training is to create an awareness of security risks and the 
importance of appropriate safeguards, while emphasizing specific responsibilities of 
each stakeholder. Another effort involves providing information about the security 
program through the orientation for new ISOs. During such orientations, new ISO of an 
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agency is educated about necessity for good security in an organization and the security 
program developed by ITA. 
 
Communication vehicles 
To achieve the objectives of the security program, the ITA realized the 
importance of communicating effectively with the different stakeholder agencies. These 
communication vehicles include meetings, councils and various communiqués. One of 
the prominent mediums used for communication with agencies is the monthly meeting 
of the Security Advisory Group (SAG). These meetings are attended by ISOs of all 
agencies either physically or remotely through telecommunication technology. In 
addition, there are IT Resource (ITR) meetings which are mandated by regulation where 
IT requirements of the various agencies is discussed. Finally, there is communiqué from 
the CIO via email and other email communication from the Governor’s office informing 
about the current state of security. These vehicles could also be used to indicate support 
of management at the highest level in the state.  
 A new initiative by the security department at ITA is the formation of a Security 
Council. The members of this council are the representatives of politically heavyweight 
agencies and also those organizations that have been able to achieve some level of 
success with security efforts. The underlying aim is to be productive in terms of 
security. This council provides guidance to the security department on what to do, how 
to improve the security program, and how to make the SAG meetings more beneficial 
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for agencies. To gauge customer satisfaction, another council has been formed which 
involves only customer agencies of the ITA.  
 
4.3 Department of Transportation 
 The Department of Transportation (DOT) is a state transportation agency 
located in the southeastern part of the US. It maintains one of the largest state-
maintained highway systems in the nation with approximately sixty thousand miles of 
roadway and twenty thousand bridges. The DOT is responsible for building, 
maintaining and operating the state’s roads, bridges and tunnels. It also provides 
funding for airports, seaports, rail and public transportation. The DOT employs around 
eight thousand and eight hundred full time organizational members, along with 
additional part-time employees and contractors. The DOT is a multi-million dollar 
business that transcends engineering and construction areas. The organization has been 
known for transportation excellence for over hundred years and is also the largest 
landowner in the state of Wonderland. The context, content and process of information 
system security initiatives at DOT are described in the rest of this section. 
 
4.3.1 Context 
The DOT defines its mission as to plan, develop, deliver, operate and maintain, 
on time and on budget, the best possible transportation system for the citizens of the 
state. Towards this end, it has to design network to meet future needs and also provide 
the engineering and financial expertise to construct the project. The DOT is also 
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responsible to manage the operation of a safe, effective and efficient ground 
transportation system. The DOT has clearly defined values that it expects all 
organizational members to abide by. These values include safety and security; truth, 
trust and teamwork; environmental excellence; action and accountability; and, results 
and respect. The ongoing emphasis of the organization is on innovation and 
improvement to become 21st century transportation mobility agency.  
 
Regulatory environment 
As a government agency, the DOT is regulated by the state legislations and 
statutes, and is accountable to the state citizens. In terms of information systems 
security, the DOT has to abide by the state legislation which requires compliance with 
the state security policy and standard. The legislation mandates the head of each agency 
to inform the state technology agency of any known security incident within twenty-
four hours of discovery. Further, the head of each agency would be held accountable for 
any security incident in that organization. The Secretary of Technology has been 
empowered to ensure compliance with the state security policy and standard across 
Wonderland.  
 
Competitive environment 
The DOT is a government agency responsible for the transportation needs of the 
state citizens. The DOT has a total annual budget of about four billion dollars with forty 
percent of the budget allocated to highway maintenance and twenty-five percent 
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assigned for highway systems construction. One quarter of the budget is funded through 
the federal sources, while the rest is generated by the state. Due to increased costs and 
lack of funding, the DOT’s six-year plan for transportation improvement was reduced in 
2002 from ten billion dollars to about four billion dollars. As a result, the focus of the 
organization shifted to deliver projects on time and on budget along with maintaining 
high quality. The management structure was streamlined to ensure effective decision-
making authority whereby accountability was shifted from central office to the field.  
 Since 2002, the endeavor for efficiency has helped DOT achieve an annual cost 
reduction of about a quarter billion dollar. More than eighty percent of the projects are 
delivered on time and within budget as compared to half the projects completed within 
budget and only one-thirds delivered on time since the accountability efforts began. In 
addition, significant savings has also been achieved through outsourcing and reducing 
organizational size. The DOT has utilized public-private partnership that encourages 
private companies to build and operate roads and other transportation services. The 
organization has collaborated with private sector to find new ways to help fund and 
deliver projects. This has resulted in construction projects valuing more than eleven 
billion dollars. 
 As a consequence of non-availability of dedicated funding, the DOT shifted its 
focus from construction to achieving operational efficiency. The organization realized 
the issue was efficient flow of traffic and simply building more roads was no longer a 
viable solution. The change in perspective pushed the organization to seek solutions 
through technology. Now, the DOT takes pride in becoming a leading technology savvy 
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government agency. In order to become more transparent, a web-based performance 
measurement system was developed to provide customers a real-time snapshot of 
DOT’s projects in terms of time and budget. A newer version of this system aims to 
broaden the scope to show latest performance of all business areas including road 
maintenance, plans, studies, safety, finances, operations and environmental compliance.   
 The DOT has also developed the Smart Traffic Centers across the state that 
utilizes technology to consolidate different functions in order to improve traffic flow 
and traveler information. A statewide phone system has been developed to provide real-
time traffic information to the motorists. In order to improve operational efficiency, a 
Project Cost Estimation System has been developed that allows DOT to obtain accurate 
project forecasts. It also implemented an Asset Management System that tracks asset 
conditions.  
A utilities management system has been developed that provides current updated status 
of highway projects. The consistent emphasis is on developing intelligent transportation 
systems. The electronic toll collection has been improved through secure tags. The DOT 
has also invested heavily in sophisticated geographic information systems.  
In order to retain knowledge because of brain drain, the DOT has established a 
knowledge management program to capture and preserve knowledge of the most 
experienced employees. The system allows preserving institutional and employee 
knowledge. It creates and fosters internal networks of experts on a subject to promote 
efficiency and to ensure consistency of best practices throughout the organization. DOT 
also created an automated information management system to ensure requests for 
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records and data consistent with the Freedom of Information Act are responded to 
quickly and accurately. The development and maintenance of all these IT applications 
and systems are done in-house at the IT division. The emphasis so far has been on 
innovation and integration of technology with business operations at the DOT. The aim 
is to achieve improved transportation program through the use of technology.  
 
Organizational structure 
The Transportation Commissioner is at the helm of DOT’s organizational 
structure. This position is a political appointment with appointees nominated by the 
Governor. The Commissioner is not actively involved with the business operations of 
the DOT. The position of Commissioner is more symbolic and the role is to guide the 
organization in transforming the Governor’s vision. The Transportation Board serves as 
an oversight for the Commissioner’s position and the role is similar to that of a board of 
directors in a non-government organization. The State Secretary of Technology serves 
as the chairman of this board. The members of the board are appointed by the Governor 
and approved by the General Assembly. The Deputy Commissioner is responsible for 
the day-to-day business operations at the DOT (figure 4.3). This position is equivalent 
of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position in a non-government organization. 
Individuals for this position are generally promoted from within the organization. It is 
an active appointment.  
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Figure 4.3: Organizational structure of the Department of Transportation 
 
As an organization, DOT is broadly structured as divisions and districts. For 
highway operations, the state of Wonderland is divided into nine districts headed by a 
District Administrator. Each district is responsible for the maintenance, construction 
and operations of transportation projects for that particular region. The central office is 
divided into ten core areas that are officially headed by a Chief. An organizational 
member who has demonstrated competence in the specific area occupies this position. 
Each core area is further divided into divisions. There are approximately thirty 
divisions, which essentially serve as operational and administrative units at the DOT. 
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The Information Technology Division is placed under the Technology & 
Research in the organizational structure. This division is led by the Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) and is responsible for all the IT needs of DOT. The division is structured 
into five units with a manager in-charge of each unit. The units basically involve 
applications development, systems engineering, and IT governance. The IT division 
also houses a unit operated by the state technology agency to provide necessary 
technological infrastructure support to ensure smooth operations. This is essentially a 
result of statewide IT consolidation initiative. The information security program at DOT 
is placed under the IT Governance unit (figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Information security department of the Department of Transportation 
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The CIO decided to take on the position of the CISO as an additional 
responsibility. A manager has been appointed to run the security operations, who also 
serves as the designated Deputy CISO. This presents an interesting situation as the 
Deputy CISO is technically supposed to report directly to the CISO; however, the 
security operations have been placed under supervision of the IT Governance Manager 
in the organizational structure. The information security program is handled by two 
executive officers, three security analysts and two consultants. These individuals are 
responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the program. 
However, the CISO is ultimately responsible for the security program and held 
accountable in case of any adverse event. 
 
4.3.2 Content 
The security department at DOT adopted the state information systems security 
policy in its entirety. The group also decided to follow the prescribed state security 
standard and supporting guidelines. The details of the state security policy, standard and 
guidelines, along with the security program are provided in section 4.2.2. In addition, 
the group decided to develop a security program manual for internal operations at the 
DOT. In essence, the security department members reconfigured the state prescribed 
security policy and standard in the context of DOT business environment. For each 
component, the group detailed exact responsibilities and procedures as applicable for 
DOT in order to ensure necessary security requirements.  
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 The security program manual represents details of how DOT will manage 
adherence to the state security policy and standards. The manual’s parallelism with the 
state security policy extends to the level of each itemized component identical to the 
component in the security standard. For each component, an office of primary 
responsibility is assigned, which is responsible for defining requirements, overall 
management, and implementation of processes and procedures associated with the 
component. In addition, compliance validation for each component is also provided, 
which identifies the means by which effectiveness of the processes can be monitored 
and measured. The manual is structured along nine components as outlined by the state 
security policy. The description of each of the component areas is briefly described in 
this section. 
 For risk management, well-defined processes need to be implemented that 
would minimize the effect of threats to IT system assets. This would involve 
establishing formal roles and assign responsibilities to manage and protect the security 
of IT systems. A business impact analysis must be used to identify business functions 
that are essential to DOT’s mission. In addition, IT systems, applications and data need 
to be classified by the systems and data owners according to their sensitivity with 
respect to an unauthorized disclosure, modification and sensitivity to outages. Risk 
assessment may be used to determine the likelihood of the threat’s occurrence, evaluate 
the potential loss or threat, assign a criticality and identify mitigation and recovery 
strategies. Finally, a security audit needs to be conducted to examine IT systems 
policies, records and activities.  
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 The threat management component defines the requirements for processes to be 
implemented by service providers to prepare for and respond to the IT security 
incidents. An intrusion detection and prevention must be implemented. Adequate 
response to suspected or known breaches of IT security safeguards needs to be 
identified. Also, procedures need to be specified so as to effectively monitor and record 
IT systems and application activity. The IT asset management defines the procedures to 
protect its IT systems, applications, data and equipment in a planned, organized, and 
secure fashion. DOT is to adopt configuration management to provide a logical model 
of the IT infrastructure by identifying, maintaining and verifying the version of all 
configuration items. The contingency planning component defines requirements and 
processes needed to recover and restore IT systems, applications, and data that support 
essential business functions. The COOP plan identifies the steps necessary to provide 
continuity for such functions. The restoration of mission-critical IT systems and 
applications is necessary to support essential business functions. Such procedures form 
the basis of disaster recovery plan.  
 The IT systems security specifies DOT’s requirements for securing IT assets. In 
order to do so, technical security controls are necessary to protect the DOT systems 
against vulnerabilities. Interoperability security identifies the steps necessary to protect 
data shared between the IT systems and applications from damage caused by malicious 
code. Finally, the security-related processes must be defined during each phase of the 
development life cycle for the protection of the DOT application systems. The 
component of data protection details the processes and procedures necessary to validate 
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protection of data from improper or unauthorized access or disclosure. Data needs to be 
protected whether it resides or travels through the DOT IT systems and applications. In 
order to protect sensitive data, a framework would be provided for selecting and 
implementing encryption controls. 
 The logical access control outlines the process to validate that users are who 
they say they are and that they are permitted to use IT system’s assets of the DOT. It is 
imperative to identify the steps necessary for requesting, granting, administering, and 
terminating accounts and access to the DOT computer application and data. Also, 
continued verification processes are necessary for password management by the DOT’s 
employees and the IT service providers to protect IT assets. In terms of remote access, 
the steps necessary to provide for the secure use of remote access within the IT network 
need to be identified.  
 The facilities security is concerned with protection of physical facilities that 
house IT equipment, computers, systems, services, and personnel of the DOT. The 
Security Operations department and Critical Infrastructure Protection department are 
responsible for identifying necessary processes and procedures. The personnel security 
component provides requirements that are necessary for restricting access to IT assets to 
only those individuals who require such access as part of their job duties. This 
component is also responsible for the logical and physical access determination and 
control mechanisms. Also, organizational members need to be made aware of system 
security requirements and their responsibilities to protect IT assets of the DOT.  
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4.3.3 Process 
The process of implementing the information security initiatives at DOT is 
described in this section.  
 
Risk management 
The security group conducted classification of systems and performed risk 
assessment as part of the process for risk management. The group emphasizes the need 
for risk assessment of IT systems that are critical to operations. In general, the systems 
are the responsibility of the systems owners but the security department decided to 
enforce standard procedures across these systems. The department established and 
documented procedures for those areas that are covered by the IT security manual. The 
technology owner is in charge but the security group felt that a tool was needed to 
capture information and therefore, decided to have a team member work with the users. 
Such an approach is to help the users and train them on classifying sensitive systems.  
 The last assessment conducted by the group was on behalf of the ITA on cyber 
security. It was agency-wide review and the focus was on agency rather than 
applications. Technically, the security group was not able to get compliant or perform 
all risk assessments by the deadline; however, plans were in place and assessments were 
ongoing. The security group re-conducted the BIA as the business needs had changed.  
The group members also conducted data classification as per new criteria and 
reassessed all systems for sensitivity.  
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Contingency planning 
The COOP entails developing manual operations in case the IT operations are 
unavailable. Although addressed under the IT security manual, the COOP component of 
the security program is not under the IT department at DOT but rather the Operations 
Security department (OS). This department manages the program and coordinates 
COOP activities of nine districts at the DOT. This was done as COOP was considered 
to have different requirements than IT. Further, it did make sense to assign COOP to a 
group that does not have political authority. The IT department does not dictate policies 
and hence should not have responsibility to ensure COOP. The management decided to 
follow industry practice which states that COOP should be located in the operations 
department.  
 With the new state requirement, the department is integrating IT security 
requirements in COOP. This was not done earlier as IT was contracted out. The 
integration is carried out across all nine districts and there is some internal alignment 
going on. In past four years, the DOT is moving rapidly towards operations based 
approach. The Division Heads have assigned a COOP coordinator in all divisions at the 
central office. These COOP coordinators regularly meet with the OS department 
members to discuss changes. For COOP there are three tiers. Tier 1 is ascribed to the 
systems and processes that need two days to be restored to normal operations. Tier 2 
implies that the systems can wait a week before restoring, while tier 3 is assigned to not 
so serious systems.  
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 Preparedness has become core issue for all agencies. In terms of day-to-day 
operations, one does not think about COOP on regular basis. To address such concerns, 
the group has emphasized the need for organizational members to know about COOP. 
For latter, the department has created awareness initiatives. For instance, the month of 
September is earmarked as the preparedness month and various informative displays are 
put across the central office. The OS department also has an online repository for 
COOP literature. The group has also sought support of the top management. The 
problem encountered by the group is that the government agencies generally do not do 
things till law requires them to.   
 Another concern is protecting access from unauthorized users. The problem is 
that with an increase in numbers drastically the security might be relaxed. For example, 
if there is pandemic flu, buildings are here but people are not. In such an event, people 
are working from home. The current policy says that one can only access the state IT 
network with a state machine. This might be problematic as people would not be able to 
access the systems. As such, the ITA is planning to relax security and extend the policy 
to be applicable for personal machines as well.  
 
Disaster recovery 
In case of disaster recovery, the security group found that the procedures were 
not documented properly. The group also realized that the procedures were not being 
tested properly either. As a result, the security members started to document all 
procedures. The aim was to put together an organization with good communication 
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procedures. The group was focused on establishing different steps required in place for 
various components of the security program.  
 
Data protection 
The security group conducted data classification and performed sensitivity 
analysis. For hard disk retiring, the security group members focused on understanding 
the processes. The effort required cooperation from organizational members where they 
would report back to the security group. The security group members also realized the 
importance to go to vendor and conduct spot checks to see whether data was dealt with 
appropriately. For such an effort, the group realized the need to develop forensic 
expertise. Such plans were postponed for the time because of the lack of adequate 
resources. For the earlier half of the year, the group was getting procedures, documents, 
and reports. Now, the security process is ongoing and in an operational mode.  
 
Account management 
At DOT, there were number of different methods to request access to the IT 
systems. The security department members worked on the problem to get standard 
forms for request. The members decided to address the problem in three phases. For the 
first phase, the need to have standard process for access was determined. Next step 
involved making standard request forms available. Finally, the members realized the 
practicality of the process to be automated for web-based access. The latter effort was 
ongoing at the time the researcher left the field site.  
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Intrusion detection 
The security policy ascertains the responsibility of monitoring and log to respective 
agencies. The DOT did not have this responsibility because the agency was no longer 
owner of the IT infrastructure. The security department at DOT had to communicate 
with the ITA on this aspect. The ITA responded that they did not have an intrusion 
detection system at the moment and as such, there were no associated logs. The 
problems that the group felt was the lack of control over the ITA in order to get them do 
what is required. The IDS was supposed to be active but was not available. This 
required the security group at DOT to plan for the risk exposure due to the lack of an 
intrusion detection system.  
 
Incident management 
At DOT, there were procedural problems in the process of incident reporting 
and handling. The organization did not have a predefined channel to report IT security 
problems. The organizational members were not clear on whom to contact or what to do 
in case of an IT security emergency. In case of an incident, the members would end up 
contacting either the police or the CIO. A formal procedure for reporting incident was 
missing. As a result, a document outlining procedures for the district and division 
offices was developed detailing necessary steps required to ensure security as expected 
by the security department at DOT. The issue was whether the state technology agency 
needs to know about an incident. Subsequently, the process for detecting attacks against 
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the agency was streamlined. Basically, the aim was to reduce the time involved in 
reporting an incident. This was seen to be essential so that the DOT could get decent 
response time before the incident were to be notified to the state technology office.  
 In order to reduce time for quicker response, there was the need for a reporting 
system that all employees could access. Further, the department did not have a standard 
form for reporting incidents although need for such a form was clearly there. In fact, 
two incidents occurred before the department agreed on developing a standard form on 
the lines of one used by the state technology agency. In case of an incident, a user 
completes the incident form and submits it. This generates notification to be accessed 
by the security analysts and the security manager. Once an analyst gets an incident 
report, she is expected to gather relevant information, file and track the incident. Such 
process involves contacting respective district or division office where the incident has 
happened. From then on, the security analyst is expected to take the responsibility and 
determine the future course of action. The security department is expected to notify 
stakeholders at the DOT and also inform the state technology agency, which is 
responsible for technical security. 
 As follow up to an incident, the security department is required to keep records 
about the details of an incident, its status, and resolution in terms of particular steps 
taken to control or resolve the incident. Such information is also required for audit 
purposes. In terms of technical measures taken, the department relies upon the state 
technology agency to regularly forward reports pertaining to incidents occurred at the 
DOT on a monthly basis. However, the state technology agency does not have a system 
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to provide timely reports.  
 
Awareness and Training 
The department manages an online training program. Each new employee has to 
take this online certification within thirty days of joining the organization. The group 
has fine-tuned the security policies to meet the DOT requirements. The vendor updates 
the vault (where policy documents are stored) when there is any change in the policy. 
All employees of the DOT have to undergo an online security training and obtain a 
certification of compliance each year. Each employee has to read the IT security policy 
and answer few multiple-choice type questions pertaining to the security policy. At the 
end of successfully answering these questions, each user is awarded a certificate that 
records date of completion of the online training. The account access is generally 
terminated for employees who do not attain an online certification.  
 The security group created a website and developed a prominent position on the 
portal of the DOT for incident reporting, awareness training, security program manual, 
security policy, and cyber tips. For incident reporting link, the group posted 
documentation and incident forms. The portal provides an access form for new 
employees to be signed by the supervisor and is then forwarded to different data 
owners. Another form is used to remove users from all systems for which the manager 
has to initiate the process. The security group also provides monthly newsletters on 
incidents, education, and best practices. A brochure on useful security tit bits is 
distributed to all districts and divisions. The group also publishes weekly reports that 
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are forwarded to the top management. The report provides information on what person's 
are in non-compliance with security.  
 The security group felt the need to provide the security training manually and 
have awareness workshops. The group decided to conduct workshops for the officers of 
responsibility from each division. During the period of February to July 2007, the group 
conducted four awareness workshops although not on a regular interval. The 
participants for the workshops include the Information Security Coordinators and the 
District Administrator. The security executives inform the attendees about the security 
program and the need for such an endeavor. In fact, the awareness and training impacts 
all parts of the security process.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
The theory of contextualist strategic change has been used in this chapter as a 
theoretical framework to study two organizations. This theoretical framework has been 
used in the extant literature in a static sense. That is, various researchers have analyzed 
an organization using content, context and process components of the theoretical 
framework. However, such an approach is problematic. The static use informs us about 
what has been done in a particular case. It does not answer the ‘why’ element to allow 
richer analysis. The theory of contextualist strategic change provides a structure or 
framework that best serves as a meta-theory. The real intent or motivations of actors 
cannot be explicated without understanding or exploring the relationships between 
theoretical components of this framework. For instance, one may question why a 
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particular process or action was undertaken? Maybe it was done to account for 
contextual realities. The contextualist theoretical framework alone does not explain 
such questions adequately.  
 In essence, there is a need for a dynamic use of the theoretical framework. The 
contextualist theory in itself is limited in providing rich insight about ‘why’ things are 
being done as they are done. At the same time, the theory does not help us in unraveling 
‘what’ are the reasons for embarking upon a certain path. The static use of the 
framework only answers ‘how’ aspects such as how things are currently conducted in a 
given situation. We can definitely analyze the situation as per the literature but such an 
approach again is not rich in analysis. The theory is indeed useful in identifying relevant 
areas for analysis, however the need to study subtle underlying relationships between 
the components is generally missed.  
 Pettigrew (1987) developed the theory of contextualist strategic change based 
upon Pepper’s (1970) world theory of contextualism. For contextualism, the social 
world is comprised of events and each given event has quality and texture. The quality 
of a given event is its intuited wholeness, while texture deals with the details and 
relations of an act that makeup its quality. The texture is made up of a strand and it lies 
in a context. The strand is the interconnection among details of an act, whereas context 
is the interconnection among strands. Here, the emphasis is on the intricate relationships 
between details of an act that form an event. In contextualism, the actual structure of an 
event is ultimately determined by its qualitative structure. As such, we need to pay 
attention to the relationships between the theoretical components of the theory of 
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contextualist strategic change. That is, it is imperative to study the links between 
context, content and processes.  
 In explaining the theory of contextualist strategic change, Pettigrew (1987) did 
mention the need to study the interconnections between context, content and process 
through time. Walsham (1993) indeed studied the link between context and process, 
while rest of the linkages was usefully assumed to be the content of an information 
system. However, the content of an information system can also be analyzed and indeed 
have implications for success with the subsequent implementation of an information 
system in an organization. In order to understand the subtle yet powerful relationships 
underlying the phenomenon of study we need to employ further excavating tools in the 
form of theoretical systems that would operate within the assumptions of the overall 
(meta) theoretical framework of the contextualist strategic change. Further, such 
theoretical systems to be employed to study the relationships should also be aligned 
with the ontological and epistemological position of the meta-theory.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the contextualist interpretation of case studies has been provided. 
The Information Technology Agency and the Department of Transportation have been 
analyzed in terms of the context, content and process components of the theoretical 
framework. The chapter has called for a dynamic use of the theory of contextualist 
strategic change rather than a static one. This is to emphasize the need to study the 
relationships between different components of the theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Development of Strategic Information Systems  
Security Initiatives at Information Technology Agency 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, Bourdieu’s cultural theory is employed to understand 
introduction of information system security initiatives in an organization. A cultural 
perspective would be helpful in developing the content of an initiative with respect to 
the context of a given organization. In order to achieve desired security objectives it 
becomes imperative to use a theory that would be considerate in explaining the 
relationship between context and content. At the same time, an analysis of culture 
would also have to account for the interaction between content, context and process, as 
formulating the content involves managing the latter two respectively. Bourdieu’s 
theory has been used here especially since it emphasizes the continuous (rather than 
change) orientations of culture in terms of reproducing the objective structures of social 
world and subjective dispositions of actors. The introduction of an initiative does not 
mean that such an initiative be divorced from an organization’s rich context. But rather 
we should take advantage of the historical context. A proper understanding of the 
    122 
 
cultural intent of the stakeholders would be helpful in creating opportune situations that 
are accommodating to institutionalization of information systems security initiatives in 
an organization.  
This chapter is divided into nine sections. The next section describes Bourdieu’s 
cultural theory. This is followed by the sections explicating field, habitus and capital in 
the case of ITA. Section 5.6 provides cultural analysis of various strategies pursued to 
attain actions at ITA. Section 5.7 presents the role symbolic forms play in establishing 
dominance in the social world. Section 5.8 identifies the key findings for discussion. 
The last section concludes the interpretation of information systems security initiative in 
an organization from a cultural perspective. 
 
5.2 Bourdieu’s Cultural Theory 
Bourdieu’s model of practices conceptualizes action as the outcome of the 
relationship between habitus, capital, and field (figure 5.1). It emerges from the 
encounter between the opportunities and constraints (objective structures) presented by 
situation and dispositions (subjective) of habitus. Field specifies power relation and 
hierarchy. These are the arenas of conflict and struggle over valued cultural resources. 
For habitus, actors are adapting to external constraints and establishing distinction from 
other competing actors. Practices cannot be attributed to either habitus or field but 
grows out of the inter-relationship between them. The relation of agency and structure is 
considered to be one of the main problems in social theory. Bourdieu approaches this 
issue as a dialectical relationship between agency and structure in order to transcend the 
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dichotomy. He does not agree with the position of considering human action as a direct 
result of either external or internal factors. Bourdieu integrates agency and structure by 
considering action as a function of culture, structure and power.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Bourdieu’s cultural theory 
 
A field is a structure of relationships between positions (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). An individual or group is defined by the particular position it 
occupies in the field. This positional property cannot be assimilated to intrinsic 
properties (Swartz, 1997). A group distinguishes itself by way of its relationships with 
other individuals or groups in the field. There are numerous fields within a social space. 
Each field has a specific logic and principles. It also has a body of specialists who 
adjudicate practices, knowledge and products (Swingewood, 1991). As the social world 
is perceived to be relations between positions, there is a struggle for defining the 
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    124 
 
boundaries of a field. These struggles are seen to transform or conserve the field 
(Bourdieu, 1983). In essence, the fields are arenas for struggle for control over valued 
resources (Swartz, 1997).  
Another important theoretical component of the cultural theory is habitus. It is a 
concept involving a set of subconscious fundamental dispositions that enable agents to 
interpret and act in a social world. Bourdieu (1971) explains habitus as “a system of 
lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every 
moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the 
achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, through analogical transfers of schemes 
permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems.” These dispositions are developed 
through early socialization process. Dispositions are acquired in social positions within 
the field and imply a subjective adjustment to that position (Mahar et al in Harker et al., 
1990). The fundamental social conditions of existence are the ones internalized into 
dispositions. Such conditions are those that determine materially, socially, and 
culturally what the probable, possible, or impossible for a given social group (Swartz, 
1997). 
 The habitus is affected by the changing conditions in ways that either reinforce 
or modify it (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). There is an associated change in 
dispositions with a change in positions within fields. Such ongoing adaptation tends to 
find a compromise with the material conditions. That is, habitus is never fixed. The 
adaptation process is generally slow, unconscious, and tends to elaborate rather than 
alter fundamentally the primary dispositions (Swartz, 1997). The inherent bias lies in 
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the observation that the perception of objective conditions (of the material and social 
environment) is itself engendered and filtered through the habitus (Mahar et al. in 
Harker et al., 1990).  
Capital is the third component in Bourdieu’s cultural theory. It is the logic that 
orders struggles for position and legitimate authority in a field (Mahar et al. in Harker et 
al, 1990). Capital is a kind of “energy of social physics” (Swartz, 1997). Capital acts as 
a social relation within the system of exchange. It is applicable to all the goods that are 
perceived to be worthy of attaining in a particular social formation (Bourdieu 1977). 
The value given to capital is related to the social and cultural characteristics of the 
habitus (Bourdieu 1984). There are four types of capital – economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic. We can convert one form of capital into another under certain conditions. 
Action is not a mechanical response to external determining structures. Rather, 
habitus shapes the responses to existing conditions by mediating the effects of external 
structures. That is, action is the product of class dispositions intersecting with the 
dynamics and structures of fields. The following is the equation as a summary of 
Bourdieu’s cultural model , [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Action as strategy is to emphasize the interest-orientation of human conduct (Swartz, 
1997). Interest is defined practically as whatever motivates or drives action toward 
consequences that matter (Bourdieu, 1987). These are embodied dispositions of actors 
that operate at a tacit, taken-for-granted level. Struggles are over the accumulation of 
any form of capital where strategy is used to maximize the profit.  
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5.3 Constructing the Field Map 
Social space is a multi-dimensional space with an open set of relatively 
autonomous fields (Cheal, 2005). In the case of Information Technology Agency (ITA), 
there are two sets of fields that have an ongoing direct impact. One is the IT field, and 
the other is Government field. Here, we are concerned about both the fields as specific 
to the Commonwealth of Wonderland. In other words, although IT field and 
Government field have broader affiliations we are interested in field as specific to the 
Wonderland. The Government field of Wonderland has characteristics similar to that of 
any state government. However, it particularly differentiates itself as a commonwealth 
model of governance. The government field is comprised of the Executive, the 
Legislative and the Judiciary fields. Among these, the Executive field has specific 
implications for the ITA. Similarly, the IT field of Wonderland shares characteristics 
and concerns of IT in general, for example, shortage of trained personnel in security, it 
differentiates itself as being specific to the government organizations and in particular 
to the Wonderland. The IT field of Wonderland is comprised of further sub-fields. 
These sub-fields are, in fact, IT environment of different state government organizations 
such as the Department of Social Services and the Department of Motor Vehicles. 
Although sub-fields might share some similarities with the Wonderland IT field, these 
are specific to a particular organization’s mode of operations.  
 In addition, different disciplines within IT can also be considered as fields that 
have influence on the ITA. Each discipline has logic and principles specific to itself, 
and body of specialists who propagate the practices and knowledge of that particular 
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discipline. The traditional disciplines of database and systems development form such 
fields. In addition, the IT Security field, the IT Auditing, the IT Project Management 
and the IT Governance are few other important fields for consideration. Fields underline 
the relational view of the social world (relations between positions), where boundaries 
of fields are themselves objects of struggle (Swartz, 1997). This is particularly true for 
emerging disciplines like the IT Security where there is no clear demarcation of the 
boundaries for the field. The IT Security depends upon good practices in all the 
disciplines that come together to form information systems. It encompasses the 
technical computer security (network), the IT auditing and the IT governance. However, 
it is still unclear as to what might be the definite boundaries of the IT security. We do 
have to keep in mind that the social space of the ITA is comulgation of various fields. 
There are fields other than IT field and Government field that may be considered to 
have tertiary influence and as such, tertiary fields. The field of economics is considered 
to be the dominant one among all fields. 
 
5.3.1 Understanding position of the security department 
The impact of a position is based on its relation of dominance or subordination 
to other positions. These can be termed as a system of objective relation of power 
between social positions (Mahar et al. in Harker et al., 1990). These positions are 
subject to a certain distribution of unequal amount of different types of capital (Cheal, 
2005). The possession of capital guarantees specific profits that are at stake in the field 
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(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). These positions are also influenced by the present and 
potential situations.  
 Any change in a position would inadvertently involve redefining boundaries 
with respect to all positions. The struggle for position in fields is essentially a struggle 
for power between dominant and subordinate groups. The dominant groups have a 
degree of monopoly over defining and distribution of capital. “There is constant 
struggle between different classes and class fractions in society, who compete to impose 
the definition of social world that is best suited to their interest” (Bourdieu, 1991). In 
fact, fields can be considered to be the arenas of struggle for legitimation. Such a 
conception implies that fields involve resistance and dominance between positions (or 
groups).  
 The IT field of Wonderland is a structure of relationships between positions 
occupied by the government organizations. Each organization is subject to a certain 
distribution of different kinds of capital. One organization may be a big government 
organization whereas another might be a small citizen advocacy group. Both these types 
of organizations are endowed with different constitutions of capital. The former might 
be endowed with economic capital while the latter with a greater social and cultural 
capital. The position of IT Security department at the ITA may be considered as 
occupied by an institution. The IT security audit conducted by an auditing agency 
revealed poor security practices in state government organizations. As a result, a 
statewide endeavor was undertaken to secure the IT environment of the state 
government organizations. Legislation was passed that held heads of various 
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organizations as directly responsible for any security related adverse events. IT security 
was emphasized at all levels, although one may call this more of a window dressing. 
However, a central state initiative on IT security was embarked upon with the 
beginnings in the development of the IT security policy for the state. As a result, the IT 
Security department at ITA saw an increase in its strength of employees.  
 At the time of data collection, IT security is prominently visible among issues 
for top executives of the organization. The role of the department has shifted from 
providing direct services to that of governance. With recent shift, the role is seen more 
in terms of addressing compliance issues. This is also evident from the recent (time 
phase towards the end of data collection) merger of the security department with the 
auditing department. The new goal of the merged IT security department is to provide 
better IT security governance in the state. It would be practical to get all government 
organizations to have base IT security practices in place. The effectiveness of such 
efforts is expected to be evident in the next audit report evaluating security practices in 
the state.  
 The positions are also objectively defined by the structure of the distribution of 
species of power. For the IT security department, the legislation passed by the 
Wonderland empowered the CISO to ensure that the state security policy is complied by 
all government organizations. Needless to say, the symbolic power is very high and 
everyone tries to appease the CISO. This is true even in day-to-day practices of the 
department where the CISO might not even be present. During the committee meetings, 
members of the department would often conduct themselves in a certain manner that the 
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CISO prefers although it might not be a prudent approach to address a problem. All that 
members cared about was to make the CISO happy.  
 The symbolic power held by the security department is evident in the manner 
department can indirectly force other government organizations to spend required funds 
on security. The case in point is an extension of the deadline where organizations were 
to get compliant with the state security policy by July 1 of 2007. Many organizations 
did not have enough resources, either financial or human, to meet such a deadline. In 
fact, the ITA as part of an earlier consolidation had already appropriated most of the 
experienced IT employees of these organizations. Also, for many organizations there 
was not enough response time involved from the time of notification to the deadline for 
compliance. This was particularly the case for organizations with medium or small 
sized IT operations. The ITA extended its support to various organizations for getting 
compliant. However, there were many issues which would be discussed in the 
subsequent sections. It was made absolutely clear to organizations that they have to get 
complaint by the deadline no matter what. Also, there were only very few exceptions 
allowed since the compliance report was to be provided to the Governor. This led most 
of the agencies to divert their resources from other projects to getting compliant with 
the state security policy.  
In the end, a day before the compliance deadline the CISO decided to extend the 
deadline for a period of another six months. From the CISO perspective, there were 
many organizations that would not be able to get compliant and as such, it was prudent 
to give blanket extension to everyone in the state. The extension on last day of 
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compliance did not go well with the majority of organizations. This move further 
infuriated many bigger organizations. These government organizations saw the deadline 
extension by the CISO as an exercise in wasting significant resources and efforts. The 
agencies argued that if the CISO knew that the deadline was to be extended why could 
not such a move be done earlier so that they could plan efficiently. Many organizations 
that did divert resources felt they could have done it properly or better if they knew 
about the extension in advance. Also, these folks felt they were made to look bad by 
security department with the extension. They felt their hard work went to naught, as 
they would not get any commendation from the higher-ups. Mostly, people were upset 
that they had to put other vital projects on backburner in order to divert resources to get 
compliant with the state security policy. Also, things would have been done more 
smoothly only if the CISO had trusted them with her plans. Many felt betrayed.  
 The ITA knew that the security policy was not up to mark and had issues with it. 
There was a general acknowledgement among the security department members that the 
policy had to be reviewed sometime in the future. The logic was to get something out of 
the door fro the organizations to follow. The emphasis was to have basic security 
practices in place, although requiring improvement. Some members even joked that this 
approach would allow them to have some work to do in the next year. To sum it up, the 
whole exercise had wasted much needed resources. The very fact that majority of the 
organizations made compliance with the security policy as their priority despite vital 
projects suffering indicates the kind of symbolic power held by the CISO and the IT 
security department.  
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 The security department enjoys a dominant position within the ITA and across 
the Wonderland. In fact, the CISO has direct access to the TIB, the Governor and the 
General Assembly of Wonderland. Fields are at all times defined by a system of 
objective relations of power between social positions which correspond to a system of 
objective relations between symbolic points (Mahar et al. in Harker et al., 1990).  The 
Wonderland IT field is combination of all the IT fields of various government 
organizations. The social positions of these IT fields would include all government 
officials who may be able to influence the IT field in some form or fashion. These 
positions would include among others, the Governor, the Secretary of Technology, the 
CIO of ITA, and the CIO of various organizations.  
Further, each government organization has few legislators that are sympathetic 
and support an organization’s interests in the state. These politicians can put pressure on 
the current Governor directly or indirectly through various committees and 
commissions. Few of them also have influence on the TIB and other planning boards. In 
sum, the Legislators, the Governor, the Secretary of Technology, and the TIB members 
can put political pressure on the CIO of Wonderland to do things in certain fashion, 
which might not necessarily be conducive for the IT environment of the state. At the 
same time, reverse relationship also holds. If certain organization is not performing as 
expected, the CISO can report to the CIO or the Secretary of Technology who would 
hold that organization accountable. The Governor can also push the legislators to apply 
pressure on specific organization head for certain measures. In fact, the IT field of 
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Wonderland is defined by this system of objective relations of power between social 
positions in the field. These positions are in fact symbolic points for various institutions.  
 The positions in fields can to some extent be shaped by the habitus that actors 
bring with them. At the ITA, the Audit and IT Security were two different departments 
under previous CISO, Kevin Smith, who was in charge of security department only. 
After the exit of Kevin, the charge of security department was passed onto the Head of 
Audit department on a temporary basis. The position of CISO now was open to the 
influence of habitus of Jessica Anderson, the Head of Audit department. She had 
education credentials in accounting and vast experience in auditing. The positions once 
attained can interact with habitus to produce different postures, which have an 
independent effect on the economies of position taking within the field (Mahar et al. in 
Harker et al., 1990).  
As the auditing background of Jessica interacted with the CISO position, a new 
posture emerged for Jessica that allowed her to perceive security as a compliance 
function. This posture was given a garb of educating users so that the users would know 
how to be compliant with the security policy and do right things. The interaction of 
habitus with the position led to more and more overlap between Auditing and Security 
functions. Eventually, the Auditing and Security departments were merged and the 
position of CISO evolved to become the Chief Information Security & Audit Officer 
(CISAO). This has led members of the department into unchartered waters where the 
function of security is closely associated with that of auditing. The customers of ITA 
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see the evolution of security into auditing role as more of a policing function that goes 
beyond mere governance.  
 
Identifying position of the ITA security department in fields of interest 
The struggle for position in fields opposes those who are able to exercise some 
degree of monopoly over the definition and distribution of capital and others who 
attempt to usurp the advantages (Swartz, 1997). Within the ITA, there is struggle for 
distribution of capital between the CEO, the TIB and the heads of various departments. 
Here, the CEO is part of the dominant class while heads of various departments are the 
subordinate class (table 5.1). The ITA has six major departments that have to constantly 
struggle amongst each other to attract maximum resources. These departments are: 
Outsourcing Management, IT Security, Customer Relationship, IT Solutions, Auditing, 
and General Administration.  
 
Table 5.1: Position of ITA Security directorate in various fields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Field 
 
Position 
Internal ITA 
field 
 
IT Security 
field 
IT field 
 
Government 
field 
Dominant 
 
CEO, 
IT Solutions 
 
ITA Security Application development 
Big 
government 
agencies 
New entrant Outsourcing Management - Security ITA Security 
Subordinate 
 ITA Security 
Government 
agencies 
- 
 
Small 
government 
agencies 
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The Outsourcing Management department maintains the relationship with the 
Outsourcing Firm, which is the IT vendor for the state. This vendor has provided the 
state with much required funds that have been invested to develop the state-of-the-art 
data centers. As such, the Outsourcing Management claims to play an important role. 
The IT Solutions department develops all IT applications for internal use of the ITA. 
Therefore, they too have fair share of claim to importance.  
As already mentioned, the state legislation mandates statewide compliance with 
the IT security policy within a stipulated time. This has attracted a lot of attention to the 
information security program developed by the security department. The development 
of security policy and the subsequent adherence is the responsibility of this department. 
The Customer Relationship department maintains the relationship between the ITA and 
various customers (government organizations). These organizations are sole source of 
revenues for the ITA and as such, customer satisfaction and feedback is of paramount 
importance. The Auditing, and the General Administration have generally been 
considered powerful in organizations. Needless to say there is constant jostling for 
resources between these departments as each lay claim to an important activity that 
would undermine the efficient functioning of the ITA as an entity. The merger of the 
Auditing department with the IT Security department may be seen as a step towards 
gaining significance in this struggle. Same individual heads both these departments and 
their merger is in fact consolidation of power to gain more capital from the dominant 
class.  
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At a broader level, there is an ongoing struggle for position between the 
Outsourcing Firm and the ITA, where the former is the dominant class and the latter 
may be considered as the subordinate class. The Outsourcing Firm has provided the 
state with much needed funds to be invested in data centers. Subsequently, it signed a 
contract with the ITA to provide IT services to the state. Now, the ITA finds it difficult 
to push the Outsourcing Firm to abide by the spirit of contract. The Outsourcing Firm is 
solely focused on providing services at cheapest cost possible. The aim is to provide 
minimum services possible while maximizing the profit. One cannot blame the 
Outsourcing Firm as it has to recover the funds provided to the state government as part 
of technology development. On the other hand, the state comprises of organizations 
with diverse needs and functioning. The contract that was written between the two 
organizations does not necessarily cover all the eventualities and necessities important 
to achieve a secure environment in the state. The contract is open for interpretation by 
either party. The Outsourcing Firm wants cost minimization that would be done by 
providing minimal services as necessary. On the other hand, the ITA has been arguing 
to abide by the spirit of the contract and not necessarily hold onto the exact wordings. 
Here, we see a daily struggle to gain resources from a dominant class.   
 There is a similar ongoing struggle between the ITA and various government 
organizations that are legally mandated to get IT services from the former. The law does 
not necessarily say so but there is only one IT service provider approved by the 
government, which is the ITA. Therefore, government organizations have to buy 
services from the ITA. As mentioned earlier, these organizations are the only source of 
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revenues for the ITA. There is suspicion among various organizations that the ITA aims 
to generate more revenues by over-selling their services. The ITA has not been able to 
shrug off this suspicion. They simply brush it aside citing historical reasons for such 
distrust rather than addressing these concerns. The government organizations as 
customers, which are the subordinate class in this relationship, have to constantly 
struggle with the ITA to procure necessary services and resources as required on time. 
They do have to guard against the predatory attitude of the ITA to generate more 
revenues. Some of these customers have full-time staff employed whose sole job 
function is to check against over-billing by the ITA on various transactions.  
 Fields denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, 
services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their 
struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital (Swartz, 1997). 
The fields are arenas of struggle for legitimation, for the right to monopolize the 
exercise of “symbolic violence” (Swartz, 1997). As such, the concept of field 
emphasizes the conflictual character of social life. These are sites of resistance as well 
as domination. There is a constant symbolic struggle between the different classes and 
class fractions in society, who compete to impose the definition of the social world that 
is best suited to their interests (Bourdieu, 1991). 
 
5.3.2 Doxa 
The general assumption among all groups is that the field of struggle is worth 
pursuing. That is, there is mutual understanding between groups on the stakes of 
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struggle. This deep structure of fields is referred to as doxa. It is essentially comprised 
of two opposing dimensions – orthodox and heterodox. The orthodox – heterodox 
opposition is a struggle for the “monopoly of cultural legitimacy and the right to 
withhold and confer this consecration in the name of fundamentally opposed principles: 
the personal authority called for by the creator and the institutional authority favored by 
the teacher (Bourdieu, 1971). Entry into a field requires the tacit acceptance of the rules 
of the game, meaning that specific forms of struggle are legitimated whereas others are 
excluded (Swartz, 1997).  
 The fields are characterized by competition. Individuals compete over different 
stakes, which could be converted to capital. All individuals try to increase the value of 
the species of capital that they possess and devalue the species of capital possessed by 
their opponents (Cheal, 2005). Few individuals would be more familiar with the rules of 
the game as compared to others. The analogy to game is used to describe the structure 
of relationship in the field. Such individuals would have greater capacity to manipulate 
rules because of their established capital appropriation such as qualification, 
occupational status or social status (O’Brien and O’Fathaigh, 2005). 
Prior to creation of the ITA, the IT infrastructure was owned by various 
government organizations. These organizations had the freewill to spend IT budget as 
they saw necessary. At this point in time, these government agencies formed the 
dominant establishment in the Wonderland IT field. The state government entered the 
field as a subordinate challenger. The state government wanted to consolidate the IT 
infrastructure under a new entity called the ITA, which further outsourced the 
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infrastructure. The interference by the state government indicates that the field of IT in 
Wonderland is worth pursuing. The government had broader growth interests for the 
Wonderland in mind. The state got poor bond ratings as it was perceived to be risky 
essentially because of lack of proper disaster recovery mechanisms in place. The only 
way to avoid adverse rating was to develop a data center for backup and replace old IT 
equipment in the entire state.  
In order to obtain such huge investment, the state developed Public – Private 
partnership which would allow to get the required money from industry. The private 
industry partner would develop two data backup facilities without any amount spent by 
the state. In essence, the private partner would be providing that state with soft loan 
without any interest. In order to staff these centers, the partner would also hire 
employees from the state human resource pool. Further, one of the backup facilities was 
to be located in the southwestern region of the Wonderland, which would bring much 
needed economic development to that part of the state. In return, the Outsourcing Firm 
has been made an exclusive IT outsourcing partner for the Wonderland. This was 
essentially a way to repay the loan amount. However, IT efficiency and reducing budget 
deficit were few of the reasons advocated in justification of the public-private 
partnership. Other players of the game, namely the ITA, the Outsourcing Firm and the 
government organizations also had specific interests to be gained.  
The Outsourcing Firm’s interest in pursuing the IT field in Wonderland was two 
fold. The partnership allowed the Outsourcing Firm to move into a lucrative market of 
providing IT services to the state governments. If successful, it would be able to make a 
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case for other states as well. Another interest is about the bottom line profit generated 
for the organization. The deal with Wonderland was lucrative for the Outsourcing Firm 
in its own right as one may argue that it already possesses the necessary expertise by 
virtue of working on big contracts and projects for the defense sector. For the ITA, the 
consolidation of the IT infrastructure would enhance its role in the state and make it 
more powerful for the benefit of its stakeholders. As customers, the government 
agencies seem to be at the receiving end in terms of shifting of infrastructure to the ITA 
although they still have to pay for these resources. However, these organizations have to 
rely upon IT for efficient delivery in order to provide the required services to citizens of 
the state. The efficient functioning of the customer organizations seems to be the reason 
for reliance upon the IT field.   
 The government organizations were holding onto the orthodox position that IT 
infrastructure and resources should be located or owned by respective agencies only. On 
the other hand, the state government was advocating for a heterodox position whereby 
all IT infrastructure and resources for the state would be consolidated. The ITA was to 
be a sole provider of IT services for Wonderland. The state government called upon the 
institutional authority of constitution and state legislation to propose the public–private 
partnership whereby the ITA outsourced the IT infrastructure. This move was strongly 
opposed by various state government organizations that cited personal authority to own 
the IT infrastructure and seek services from entity other than the ITA alone. In essence, 
the struggle between the state government and other organizations is the struggle for 
cultural legitimacy whereby each player wants to have the sole authority to proclaim 
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what constitutes as culturally legitimate. The legislation does not stipulate monopoly 
status to the ITA. That is, the state government agencies are not required to procure IT 
services from only the ITA. However, there is a tacit acceptance among the ITA, the 
agencies and the state government that organizations can only purchase IT services 
from the ITA. This is the only form of legitimate struggle. The action of procuring IT 
services from a new player (other than the ITA) is excluded as an invalid form.  
 Let us consider the appointment of CISOs at the ITA and their relative struggles. 
Prior to his appointment at the ITA, Kevin Smith had developed the security program 
for one of the government agencies in another state. The expectation at the ITA was to 
develop the IT security program at the enterprise level and move it away from an 
organization level. The position of CISO was to report directly to the CIO. At the very 
first day of joining the ITA, Kevin was told that he would not be directly reporting to 
the CIO but Steven Turner, the Director of Strategic Planning, which was later renamed 
the IT Solutions department. This can be seen as competition among key players who 
act as department heads within the ITA.  Although Kevin as the head of IT security 
department was a key player, other department heads tried to undermine his power by 
influencing the decision and making him not report directly to the CIO. This resulted in 
problems with communication channels with top management. It was difficult for Kevin 
to understand what CIO’s strategic direction was. As per Kevin, 
The real impediment was communication channel. Although CIO wanted communication but it 
wasn’t happening. I don’t think things weren’t properly communicated to CIO. Also, reverse 
route is important, that is, knowing what CIO’s strategic direction is. 
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This resulted in further problems and his eventual exit from the organization. It is also 
interesting to note that Kevin did not fight but rather accepted the change in the 
reporting structure. This behavior may be attributed to a lack of awareness about the 
rules of the game since he was a new entrant. And also, Steven seems to have a greater 
capacity to manipulate the rules through his established capital appropriation with the 
ITA. The discussion about various types of capital would be undertaken in the 
subsequent section.  
 Essentially, the department heads were trying to show how important their group 
was so that their function would not be outsourced. The Strategic Planning group would 
become even stronger if the CISO in fact reported to head of the department. The 
underlying assumption is that people will usually work to increase the value of the 
species of capital that they possess (Cheal, 2005). One important consequence of the 
competitive logic of fields and their doxa is that they help create the conditions for 
“misrecognition” of power relations and thereby contribute to the maintenance of the 
social order (Swartz, 1997). In sharp contrast, Jessica Anderson, current CISO, took 
over the IT Security department as an additional duty. In her capacity as the head of 
auditing department, Jessica was reporting directly to the CIO and the TIB. She retained 
the reporting structure when she took over the duties of CISO. This can be seen as 
significant in power struggle where the CISO position has gained direct access to not 
only the CIO but the TIB as well. Eventually, to further devalue the position of the 
opponents Jessica was able to merge the security department with the auditing 
department. Needless to say, this move resulted in gain of significant stake and greater 
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appropriation of capital. Jessica’s social status and prior work at the ITA helped her to 
wrench a significant stake away from the IT Solutions group.  
 The merger of security department with the audit department in fact creates a 
change within the ITA but has consequences beyond it as well. With merger, the role of 
security may be seen as evolving to that of governance and eventually to that of audit. 
This development in change of roles may be imitated by various government 
organizations that may perceive it to be the correct role as practiced by the ITA. In turn, 
organizations might decide to restructure their security and audit departments as well. 
Thus, individuals or groups employ strategies to effectively utilize their capital in order 
to differentiate themselves (from others) and attain a position of advantage. Such 
individual or collective strategies change and preserve the field itself (Swingewood, 
1991). We will discuss strategies under section 5.4 ‘Strategizing for Action.’ 
 
5.3.3. Characteristics of fields 
The fields are characterized by three properties: autonomy, mediation and 
homology. A brief description of these properties is provided in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Characteristics of fields 
Property Explanation 
Autonomy 
 
Independence from external environment through internal 
mechanisms of development. 
Mediation External influences are retranslated into the internal logic of 
fields. 
Homology 
 
Reproduction of common patterns of hierarchy and conflict from 
one field to another. 
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Autonomy 
Fields are autonomous from external environment to an extent. These are 
structured by their own internal mechanism of development. Each field has its own 
specific interests which might be different from external interests. Fields elicit assent to 
existing social arrangements and thereby contribute to their reproduction to the extent 
that they engage actors in field autonomy (Swartz, 1997). The political and economic 
power leads to the growth in autonomy of the field. That is, they gain in symbolic 
power, which gives the capacity to legitimate existing social arrangements (Bourdieu 
and Passeron, 1977).  
 The IT field of Wonderland has been influenced by the internal mechanisms of 
development. In the 70s and 80s, the IT infrastructure in the form of networks was 
centralized. As the requirements of organizations changed, the IT infrastructure was 
decentralized and owned by individual government organization.  The role of ITA’s 
predecessor changed to that of establishing policies and standards and developing 
strategic IT planning for the state. The development of IT field in the state indicates 
relative autonomy from external environment. The external interest for government 
might be to develop efficient solutions and provide effective services for the state. 
However, the professional interest of ITA’s security department is to ensure that all 
organizations are compliant with the security policy. This would make certain that an 
audit does not indicate glaring security practices in the state. The actions of the security 
department do not indicate its concern about the potential problems created by the 
security practices for efficient development of an information system. In fact, various 
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stakeholders had repeatedly mentioned that security recommendations were being made 
with a complete disregard for the business requirements. One of the members 
considered “security as a necessary evil, where although it is necessary but more 
importantly it is evil.” This indicates significant deviation from external interests.  
 Let us take the case of the development and implementation of the security 
policy throughout the state. The ITA security department developed the security policy. 
All state government organizations were required by the legislation to get compliant 
with the state security policy by a certain deadline. In order to get compliant, customers 
would have to ensure that the Outsourcing Firm enforces the required technical 
measures. This indeed created some confusion with the customers. From customer point 
of view, the ITA is asking the organizations to ensure that the Outsourcing Firm, which 
is partner of the ITA, enforces certain technical measures. The security department 
members also developed the standards and guidelines that were provided to customers 
as a form of support. The ITA engaged the security officers from all government 
organizations through the forum of SAG meetings. The message of compliance with the 
security policy and new social arrangement was aggressively communicated. These 
officers would go back to their organizations and engage resources to begin the work to 
get compliant. In fact, many agencies diverted the resources from other business critical 
projects to meet the requirements of the security compliance. In essence, the ITA was 
engaging actors in the act of field autonomy.  
 The field of IT security was acknowledged in the state as various organizations 
diverted resources from critical projects. The customer organizations were to 
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unconditionally comply with the requirements of the security department in the form of 
the security policy so developed. Finally, the extension of security policy compliance 
deadline by the CISO was again an exercise to further legitimate the social arrangement. 
The manner in which the ITA security department indirectly forced various customer 
agencies to spend resources and money on getting compliant indicates increasing 
economic power of security department. The political power was wielded with the ease 
by which the CISO was able to extend the deadline provided by legislation on the last 
day of getting compliant. The political and economic power leads to the growth in 
autonomy of the field. Further, the security department pushed the argument that the 
Outsourcing Firm also needs to get compliant with the security policy. This met with a 
favorable response from the top management and power stakeholders in the state. The 
legislation and contract, which had been loosely drafted, was provided as documents 
supporting the argument. Such a measure was seen more as a mechanism of control 
over the Outsourcing Firm which had been dictating terms to the ITA. It allowed the 
CIO, Ian Martin, to use security policy compliance as a tool for leverage.  
 
Mediation 
External sources of influences are always mediated through the structure and 
dynamic of fields (Swartz, 1997). Such influences are retranslated into internal logic of 
fields. The federal government was not happy with the fact that the federal money 
provided to the Department of Social Work (DSW) would in fact be going to the ITA as 
the owner of IT infrastructure. As such, the federal government asked the DSW to stop 
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paying any invoices generated by the ITA. Such an action was considered by the ITA to 
be an external influence by the federal government. The problem was retranslated as 
one where federal government needs assurance that money for the DSW is actually 
being spent only on the organization. Subsequently, the ITA changed its pricing model 
where the DSW and other agencies were all charged under one pricing model, which 
was a flat rate per seat in that organization. For the ITA, such a move was premature 
since all organizations had not caught up with each other in terms of the IT 
infrastructure. There were still customer agencies that required significant investment in 
infrastructure. The new pricing model negatively impacts such small agencies that 
might not have required the budget.  
 
Field homology 
The autonomous fields are related to each other through structural and 
functional homologies. Homology refers to the isomorphic properties of the field such 
as position of dominance and subordination, strategies of exclusion and usurpation, and 
mechanisms of reproduction and change (Swartz, 1997). This means that individuals or 
groups in subordinate positions in a particular field would also find themselves in 
subordinate position in other fields. That is, the patterns of hierarchy and conflict are 
reproduced from one field to another field.  
 Based on the field analysis, the relation of supply and demand of the field of 
cultural production and the field of social classes, is mediated by field structures and 
processes (Swartz, 1997). The cultural products reflect the producer’s position of 
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dominance or subordinate in a field struggle. These products are not reflection of 
consumer demands. “The logic of objective competition at the core of the field of 
cultural production leads each of the categories of producers to offer, without any 
conscious search for adjustment, products that are adjusted to the preferences of the 
consumers who occupy homologous positions within the field of power” (Bourdieu, 
1984).  
 The security policy, standards and guidelines developed by the ITA security 
department are in fact its cultural products. Currently, the security department enjoys a 
dominant position within the ITA. However, members of this department had struggled 
to move it to a dominant position. The sormer CISO used to report to the Director of 
Strategic Planning. Now, the CISO has access to the CIO and the TIB as well. At the 
same time, the department is able to exert some influence on the Outsourcing Firm. The 
security policy, standard and guidelines reflect the dominant position of the struggle. 
Both these documents are comprised of the following domains: risk management, IT 
contingency planning, IT systems security, logical access control, data protection, 
facilities security, personnel security, threat management, and IT asset management. As 
one may infer, these domains are exhaustive and go beyond the technical aspects of an 
organization. If an organization needs to be compliant with this policy and standard it 
has to ensure that its designated the CISO indeed enjoys such dominant position so as to 
address all these aspects. Such a position would require access and influence across 
different departments within an organization.  
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 Another important aspect to be noted is that the security policy and standard 
were not written by the ITA security department from consumer’s point of view. This 
has been captured during interviews with various stakeholders within and beyond the 
ITA. The stakeholders generally complain that the policy have not been written with the 
business requirements in mind. Others complain that it just stands in isolation and is 
completely detached from the business reality. Such concerns further strengthen the 
argument that the cultural products reflect the respective positions of dominance or 
subordination of the producers rather than the demands of the consumers. The security 
policy and standard carry a hidden agenda then. Any government organization that 
would get successfully compliant with this security policy would in fact be able to do so 
by making the CISO a prominent position of influence across its organization.  
 The concept of field autonomy, mediation, and homology builds on the idea that 
legitimation of social class inequality is not the product of conscious intention but stems 
from a structural correspondence between different fields (Swartz, 1997). Actors 
unwittingly reproduce or change those class distinctions simply by pursuing their own 
strategies within the sets of constraints and opportunities available to them. Habitus is 
the real principle of the structure of the structural homologies or relations of 
transformation objectively established between fields (Bourdieu 1977). That is, it is the 
practical logic of habitus that makes the underlying connection across fields. However, 
since fields vary historically in the degree of autonomy from the economy, the polity, 
and class structure, Bourdieu claims that one cannot establish a universal classification 
system connecting the various fields (Swartz, 1997).   
    150 
 
 
5.3.4 Summary 
 Field specifies power relation and hierarchy. These are the arenas of conflict and 
struggle over valued cultural resources. It is essential to identify the influence of various 
fields and map various positions so as to expose the opportunities and constraints 
offered by the situation. For the ITA, the two fields of prominence are IT field and 
government field. The convergence of these two fields generate opportunity and 
constraints for the social space defined by the ITA. There is mutual agreement among 
actors occupying the social space that IT security is worth pursuing in Wonderland. 
Towards this direction, legislation has been enacted that empowers the IT security 
department of ITA. It also provides legitimacy to the position of CISO in various 
organizations in order to achieve required degree of security. There is a tacit acceptance 
among various actors about the rules of the game in particular that only the IT security 
department at ITA is the legitimate provider of IT security services, as well as, authority 
on statewide security initiatives. Competition, as principal dynamic of the field, 
necessitates actors to be aware of the rules of the game. The significance of being aware 
of the game is evident in the manner that the current CISO was able to change the 
reporting structure so as to have direct interaction with the CIO.   
 The arrangement in the social space of Wonderland emerged whereby the ITA 
security department would take on the role of governance, the Outsourcing Firm would 
be responsible for technical aspects of security, and customer government agencies 
were to implement the recommended security controls. The arrangement also reflects 
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the struggle for cultural legitimacy whereby each player wants to have sole authority to 
proclaim what constitutes as culturally legitimate. In this struggle, the ITA security 
department has emerged to be a powerful player. One may attribute a part of gain in 
power to the legislation that empowers the security department to enforce the security 
policy. The power held by the security department is also evident in the manner that it 
forced customer agencies to divert funds and resources from vital projects to ensure 
security requirements. Further, the extension of compliance deadline on the last day was 
another powerful demonstration of dominance by the security department.  
 All this becomes even more interesting when we consider the mutual 
acknowledgement among members of the security department that the security policy is 
indeed flawed and need to be reviewed some time in future. The security policy in itself 
is a reflection of dominance of traditional disciplines of security like risk management, 
computer security, and emergency management. In order to successfully implement the 
policy, it would be essential for an organization to designate a CISO who enjoys a 
dominant position and have influence across the functional unit of the organization. 
Such situation might be considered as an opportunity for the security department while 
constraint for other departments.  
 Field as a competitive system of social relations functioning according to its own 
specific logic implies that the security department of ITA is indeed involved in the 
struggle for power with other players. Within the ITA, security has to compete with 
traditional dominant departments of IT discipline like the IT Solutions that are involved 
in developing applications. Then, there is struggle with other customer government 
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agencies to enforce establishment of ITA’s view of security. Finally, the ITA security 
department also has to compete with the Outsourcing Firm for power where the latter 
enjoys the dominant role by virtue of being the financier to improve Wonderland’s bond 
ratings. Further, by pushing the Outsourcing Firm to abide by the security policy, the 
ITA security department is in fact garnering political leverage for the CIO. Fields are 
considered to be the arenas of struggle for cultural resources. Such resources would 
include artifacts like security policy, and security standard. So why would players 
struggle or fight over these cultural resources. The answer is simple. Players fight for 
cultural resources as these would indirectly support in creating a position of dominance. 
That is, cultural resources obscure quest for power and dominance.  
 
5.4 Understanding Habitus Peculiarities 
We will explain the articulation of habitus in the case of ITA using the Standard 
Review Committee meetings convened during the months of February and March of 
2007. The interactions and reactions of various actors or members of this committee 
would be used to explicate the characteristics of habitus. The nature of the meetings was 
to review security guidelines and also address the concerns received from various 
agencies so as to prepare the guideline for final publication release. The committee was 
comprised of Ashley Smith (Deputy CISO), Michael Smith (Security Manager), three 
external consultants, subject matter in-charge at security department, and representative 
of policy group from the IT Solutions department. The importance of the concept of 
habitus lies in the fact that it allows to explain how objective structures and subjective 
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perceptions impact human action. It is a way of explaining how social and cultural 
messages (both actual and symbolic) shape individuals’ thoughts and actions (O’Brien 
& O’Fathaigh, 2005). The environment at the review meetings varies from collegial to 
serious and argumentative.  
 Let us consider the meeting to review the contingency planning guideline.  
During this meeting, the Lead Consultant, James Smith, was very upset with review 
comments made by one of the new external consultants. This member was relatively 
young individual specializing in information security from a local university. Overall, 
there was a lot of tension in the room as both members were arguing for their comments 
and observations. Basically, consultants were resisting each comment on the guideline. 
The concept of habitus fundamentally implies that past experience plays a significant 
role in dealing with present and future situations.  Maybe, the resistant behavior on part 
of external consultants can be attributed to their frustration at having to address 
concerns from an academic. James did make statements on few occasions like “the 
comments are from an academic viewpoint,” or “academic world is different than 
industry,” and also “academics do not know what goes on in industry.”  
The habitus emphasizes the influence of historical, cultural and social contexts.  
In terms of historical context, James was frustrated with the number of times that the 
guideline had to go under revision. This concern was also expressed by Michael who 
mentioned that on average each guideline undergoes ten to twelve revisions. The 
influence of cultural context may be seen in the relative comfort of operation for the 
consultants in fast paced industry environment. They are still not used to working in the 
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government context. This was captured in one of the statements made by James stating 
that he was frustrated with how government institutions work and their lack of sense of 
urgency.  The social context is brought about in the statements emphasizing the 
differences between university and industry setting. James understands the social fabric 
of the committee and decides to play this factor. A committee reviewing standard is 
expected to be more persuasive towards solutions that actually work in the industry 
rather than trying to implement or buy a concept that is yet to be tested (from academic 
world). As such, James employs the social distinctions to tilt the situation to his benefit. 
Habitus is the primary form of classification available to an actor. 
 An interesting observation is the manner in which the standard review 
committee members leave the meetings.  The scheduling of these meetings is done 
ahead of time, generally couple of weeks in advance, and every member knows that 
they are required during the review process.  However, members leave the meeting for 
reasons that seem to be trivial given the task of reviewing the standard. During the 
meeting to review the contingency planning guideline, one of the members with subject 
matter expertise (Sarrah Smith) had to leave the meeting to be at doctor's appointment.  
Another member, Ashley (Deputy CISO) had to leave the meeting early because she 
had to attend another meeting.  The actions of all these members are bound by the 
objective social structures as internalized during early socialization experience. For both 
these members, the structure of commitments seems to be an overriding factor. The 
behavior to skip a meeting where task has not been accomplished seems to be rational 
so as to able to make appearance for another meeting. These two members are not 
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concerned with getting a specific task complete; however, putting in presence at prior-
committals seems to be the main objective. At the same time, one may also question the 
choice of the concerned actors in scheduling back-to-back meetings. Such behavior 
makes sense if we understand it through habitus. Bourdieu (1977) explains,  
Habitus as an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular 
conditions in which it is constituted, ... engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the 
actions consistent with those conditions, and no others.  
 
During this meeting, James ended up questioning the validity of continuing with rest of 
the review process as half the members of committee had left. The aim of the meeting 
was to complete the review of contingency planning and logical access control 
guidelines. 
 Let us consider another interesting observation that was made during the 
Standard Review Committee meetings. All members agree that there is a problem with 
the security policy and standard. However, they want to continue developing guidelines 
based on or in-sync with the flawed policy and standard. The emphasis is to get 
everything done for now and later revisit them and revise. The ITA security has to 
produce policy, standard, guidelines by a certain date so that the customer agencies are 
compliant by the deadline. The members argue that “let’s get the first version of 
everything out” and then we can go back and make structural changes to the security 
policy and standard. And, then guidelines can be tweaked for alignment. The question 
then becomes whether all this process is an eyewash? Should not the policy and 
standard be fixed first? Why waste resources on flawed documents?  
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The state government organizations in Wonderland have to implement these 
flawed documents and then, re-implement them again as and when changes are made to 
the security policy. This behavior on behalf of the committee members can be explained 
if we consider that such a behavior is actually based on the practical evaluation of the 
likelihood of success of such action. In the given situation with certain time constraints, 
the members believe that it is practically viable to develop guidelines based on the 
problematic policy and standard. The committee members provide the rationale that 
although problems exist with the current policy, there would be significant 
improvement or progress in moving from previous policy to the current one. The 
success has been reinterpreted as providing different agencies a minimal base for 
security rather than none at all. The problems with policy can be addressed in 
subsequent planned revision after July 2007. Habitus is based upon the "practical 
evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given situation (which) 
brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical percepts” 
(Bourdieu 1977).  
 Habitus would reproduce actions consistent with past experience in case of 
routine everyday situations. However, it innovates when confronted with new situations 
(Swingewood, 1991). The capacity to be inventive emerges from an experience and 
capital possessed (Bourdieu, 1985). This puts power and its legitimation at the heart of 
the functioning and structure of habitus. The committee members openly recall past 
experiences to enlighten the current problem.  They then discuss this experience with 
other members present. During the meeting to review the Logical Access Control 
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guideline, the members brought up two situations specific to government organizations, 
let us call them the DEQ and the DES. In the case of DES, members discussed the case 
of resetting the password for a system. Members contemplated the situation where the 
DES sends the personal identification number (PIN) via regular mail rather than e-mail, 
and upon receiving PIN user logs on and selects a new secure password. The members 
are able to fall back on their experience in various organizations and develop statements 
that are (or would be) consistent with the ground realities and user habits in those 
agencies.  
For the DEQ, as the organization is distributed across the state the system 
owners might not physically see other users.  Also, they do not have help desk. In other 
cases, helpdesk is there but operational from eight to five. How does system owner 
access files to provide or authorize user access? Banking on the past experiences and 
outcome of various situations allows the members to effectively tackle the problem that 
they are facing. These problems pertain to the effectiveness of the guidelines. The 
actors are able to think about practical options that would work in a given situation. As 
in the case of the DEQ, members did consider the resources available to such an agency 
in terms of dispersed nature of organization and availability of help desk. This allows 
them to write an effective clause in the guideline that would withstand the tests of real 
world situations. This is in fact demonstration of the explanation by Swartz (1997) that 
the dispositions of habitus predispose actors to select forms of conduct that are the most 
likely to succeed in light of their resources and past experience.  
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 There is a constant struggle between members during committee meetings about 
objectives of the guideline. The members regularly question as to what are they trying 
to capture. “Are we addressing concerns at business level or IT level? Whether we 
should educate users or simply stipulate what needs to be done?” Members are 
generally split in this regard. As per James, “Jessica wants user education.” 
Subsequently a member questions, “But where do we draw line? What constitutes (and 
how much) as educating users?” Jessica’s (CISO) emphasis on educating users can be 
explained in terms of her understanding of the situation with respect to the ITA and 
Wonderland. Jessica understands that the customer agencies have been stripped-off 
most of the experienced IT folks. These organizational members were reallocated to the 
ITA. For Jessica, the agencies have so far been in the dark related to security.   
The current progress regarding accomplishing compliance with security policy, 
standard and guidelines has its own merit. However, Jessica seems to believe that if the 
focus of these documents were slightly shifted to also provide education to users on 
security aspects it would go a long way in making agencies aware of or understanding 
security issues and concerns. Herein lies another hidden understanding of rules of the 
game by the CISO. A user who has been made to appreciate the security concerns 
through education would also be more willing to muster necessary resources and open 
to make required changes so as to enhance the security posture of the organization. 
Later on, it would be relatively easier to build on that and improve the policy 
subsequently after compliance deadline. Agents act through ‘practical sense’ in which 
goals and ends are not determined solely through conscious, deliberate and rational 
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practice but flow from the socially constituted ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). Habitus is what regulates interactions within a field in an observable, 
"objective" manner, affecting not only the individual but all those who interact with that 
individual (Lawley, 1994).  
 Habitus is most useful for explaining behavioral patterns in situations where 
normative rules are not explicit (Swartz, 1997). Habitus "maybe superseded under 
certain circumstances - certainly in situations of crisis which disrupt the immediate 
adjustment of habitus to field - by other principles, such as rational and conscious 
computation" (Bourdieu 1990). As a general rule, where material interest are 
considerable or the threat of violence eminent, it is less likely that prevailing powers 
leave the course of action up to the habitus and the more likely that action becomes 
highly formalized. Highly ritualized situations reduce (but do not eliminate) 
opportunities for strategy and innovation by habitus, whereas less ritualized ones 
enhance strategic opportunities (Swartz, 1997).  
The Standard Review Committee meetings may be considered as situations that 
are less ritualized. The normative rules are not explicit as to how a certain comment or 
concern is considered as significant over the current clause in the guideline. Generally, 
the aim of the meeting is to generate consensus among the group. Even if there is only 
one member who has an issue or different perspective, that issue is heard, looked upon 
and deliberated.  If the particular issue deserves even a bit of merit, the suggestions are 
included although the language would be changed. For the contingency planning 
guideline meeting, there are a lot of disagreements on each comment. In each case of 
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disagreement, James suggested language that catches the disagreeing member’s 
sentiments and is at the same time agreeable to rest of the committee members.  In 
short, there are lot of negotiations going on. 
 Habitus assumes a reflexive agent whose orientations to the social world is 
grounded in practical knowledge and between ‘conditions of existence’ and the variety 
of social practices the ‘structuring activity’ of human agents intervenes (Swingewood, 
1991). The individual (Andrew Smith) who wrote the IT security threat management 
guideline has a technical background. During the meeting it was clear that Andrew does 
not have an overall understanding of organizational security. As per Andrew, intrusion 
detection, prevention and protection is ‘the security.’ For instance, Andrew considers 
recording log procedures as a strategy and not an activity. At one level, such a 
conception of IT security world can be good as we can cover various elements involved 
in intrusion detection which is based on the experience from the trenches (technical 
frontliners). However, a lack of overall understanding of information systems security 
can be disadvantageous as the guideline would fail to tie-in or fit-in with bigger security 
picture.  
The emphasis of the threat management guideline seems to be on hacking 
(intrusion) although the members believe it could also be done by an internal employee. 
Further, the concerned guideline is written in a sophisticated manner rather than simply 
saying what is intended.  It is as if the individual who wrote this guideline wants the 
subject to be given a reverred status by their users. It is not a question of human agents 
adapting passively to a pre-given social world but of active creative agents open to 
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many possibilities, able to employ knowledge and skills in maintaining and advancing 
their position within fields (Swingewood, 1991). Thus, that person's knowledge has a 
genuine constitutive power and is not merely a reflection of the real world (Mahar et al. 
in Harker et al., 1990). Habitus is acquired in practice, in the activities of everyday life 
(Cheal, 2005). It preserves a sense of continuity working as non-conscious structuring 
principles governing the ways that the past plays an active role within the present 
(Swingewood, 1991). The dispositions of habitus represents master patterns of 
behavioral style that cuts across cognitive, normative and corporal dimensions of human 
action (Swartz, 1997).  
 
Summary 
 For habitus, actors are adapting to external constraints and establishing distinction 
from other competing actors. Members of the ITA security department were acting as 
per the rules of the game and conforming to the expectations of the CISO. Even during 
the Standard Review Committee meetings, there was lot of negotiations among 
members of the department in terms of selecting a correct clause for the guidelines that 
would establish distinction. Few of the guidelines were themselves written in a manner 
to achieve a revered status in contrast to other areas of security. Habitus is based upon 
the likelihood of success of a given action in a particular situation. The pursuance of the 
security policy, although mutually acknowledged among the security department 
members as having flaws, is the result of a practical evaluation of the likelihood of its 
success in the environment of Wonderland. The emphasis of the security department to 
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establish a base security practice among all organizations was served by the security 
policy even though the policy needed to be reviewed in near future.  
 The IT Security Department at ITA was initially providing security services to the 
customer government agencies. The department was involved in providing services 
such as intrusion detection and prevention as well as incident reporting. With current 
CISO at the helm, the nature and role of the department evolved to that of governance 
function. Such direction may be attributed to the dispositions of management of the 
security department whom had significant past work experience in auditing discipline. 
In fact, the CISO was assigned the responsibility in addition to serving as head of the 
Audit department at ITA. The managing officers approached security from the position 
of auditing discipline, although it does not seem to be a conscious effort on their part. 
The management of security department saw the audit approach of compliance and 
governance as more likely to succeed given the opportunities and constraints of 
operating environment at Wonderland. Slowly and subtly, the security department 
evolved to play the role of governance rather than be a technical security help desk. The 
recent renaming of the position of Chief Information Security Officer as Chief 
Information Security and Audit Officer reflects the impact of dispositions of the 
management. The development of information assurance program in fact implies to be 
in compliance with the prescribed security policy and standard. 
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5.5 Appropriating Power Through Forms of Capital 
Bourdieu treats capital as power relations founded on quantitative differences in 
amount of labor they embody. It is the study of how and under what conditions 
individuals and groups employ strategies of capital accumulating, investing, and 
converting various kinds of capital in order to maintain or enhance their positions in the 
social order that constitutes a central focus of Bourdieu’s sociology (Swartz, 1997). 
Capital can be accumulated, and once accumulated it tends to persist (Cheal, 2005). The 
unifying feature of all the species of capital is that they require time and effort to 
accumulate. The essence of all capital is therefore accumulated labor time, which allows 
interconversion between different species of capital (Cheal, 2005). There are different 
forms of capital as discussed below (table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3: Types of capital 
Type Explanation 
Economic Material wealth in the form of money. 
Social A set of lasting social relations, networks and contacts. 
Cultural Culturally valued taste and consumption patterns.  
Symbolic Prestige, status, authority and legitimation. 
 
5.5.1 Economic capital 
Economic capital exists as material wealth in the form of money or things that 
can be converted into money (Cheal, 2005). Economic capital is the dominant type of 
capital in the sense that it is at the root of all the other types of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). 
All the other forms of capital, such as cultural capital, social capital and symbolic 
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capital, are in fact “transformed, disguised forms of economic capital” (Swartz, 1997). 
Every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital (Cheal, 2005). 
Economic capital on its own, however, is not sufficient to buy ‘status’ or position – 
rather it relies on the interaction with other forms of capital (O’Brien & O’Fathaigh, 
2005). As stated in chapter 4, the ITA has an annual budget of three hundred million 
dollars. The organization does not receive any budget allocation from the state 
government. The organization generates revenues by charging for the services rendered 
to the customer organizations. For IT, the consolidation efforts by the ITA are one of 
the biggest endeavors undertaken in terms of economic capital in the state.  
 
5.5.2 Social capital 
Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). It exists as a set of lasting social relations, networks and contacts 
(O’Brien & O’Fathaigh, 2005). The volume of a person’s social capital depends on the 
number of people to whom she is connected, and on the amount of economic, cultural 
or symbolic capital possessed by each of those persons (Bourdieu, 1986). For the 
potential relationships between people to become actual relationships, however, they 
must be recognized and practiced through material and symbolic exchanges (Cheal, 
2005). Only in this way will the relationships come to be experienced as necessary 
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relationships that involve mutual obligations as a result of subjective feelings such as 
gratitude, respect or friendship (Cheal, 2005).  
The members of the IT security department at ITA indeed indulged in material 
and symbolic exchanges between security officers of various government agencies. The 
security department decided to develop guidelines that would help the agencies in 
implementing the security policy and standard. Agencies were to be compliant with the 
policy only. It was not mandatory for the agencies to use these guidelines. However, 
there were time and resource constraints on agencies in order to get compliant with 
security policy. The ITA security department considered the development of guidelines 
as a gesture of help and support for the agencies.  
The security department also procured special resource packages on subjects 
like risk management from industry consortium or research organizations. These 
packages include white papers, practical approaches and document templates in order to 
perform a specific function. In addition, the subject matter experts were also invited to 
give talk at meetings, sessions on IT security were scheduled at government 
conferences, and security tips were broadcasted through weekly newsletters and emails. 
All these indeed constitute as material exchanges between the ITA security department 
and customer agencies. Further, the security department also extended its support and 
help to the security department of other agencies. The members were made available to 
address any concerns of agencies and also guide them as deemed necessary in their 
efforts to get compliant with the security policy. As the CISO, Jessica pushed the 
agenda of educating users at every level through various published documents and 
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forums. The gesture of extending the deadline for compliance may be seen as symbolic 
exchange between the two parties.  
Investment in social capital acts as a kind of strategy which (unconsciously or 
otherwise) further serves as a mechanism to exchange other capitals (O’Brien & 
O’Fathaigh, 2005). In order to maintain the availability of other people’s resources, it is 
necessary to maintain the relationships through a constant round of sociability (Cheal, 
2005). This takes time and is also a drain on resources to meet the economic costs of 
sociability. In order to maintain the relationships, the ITA security department created a 
forum (SAG) to enable all the security officers in the state agencies to regularly 
socialize through monthly meetings. These meetings generally lasted for about three 
hours and had physical presence of over seventy officers. There were about fifteen 
officers who would participate over long distance communication.  
At these meetings, the ITA and the Outsourcing Firm would provide an update 
on security endeavors across the state. These meetings were also used as a forum for 
educating users about security. As part of this effort, a subject matter expert would be 
invited to give a talk on a particular issue of concern. More importantly, the SAG 
meetings were seen more as a mechanism to generate social goodwill and support from 
agency security officers and also dissuade any voices of concern or dissent. The security 
department eventually created a Security Council that would serve as an advisory group 
for the department, comprising of security officers handpicked by the CISO from 
different government agencies. Again, this may be seen as an effort to gain social 
capital from certain groups in the state. Jessica decided to tap this social capital and use 
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it to generate a positive influence. The council would also serve as legitimating the 
actions of security department. Both the SAG and the Security Council indeed help the 
security department in generating necessary social capital essential for effective security 
posture of the state.  
 
5.5.3 Cultural capital 
Cultural capital is defined as culturally valued taste and consumption patterns 
(Bourdieu, 1986). It refers to the ensemble of cultivated dispositions that are 
internalized by the individual through socialization and that constitute schemes of 
appreciation and understanding (Swartz, 1997). Cultural capital is the knowledge and 
tastes that are transmitted within families and in schools, and that mark those who 
possess them as socially superior to those who do not (Cheal, 2005). It covers a wide 
variety of resources including such things as verbal facility, general cultural awareness, 
aesthetic preferences, information about the school system, and educational credentials 
(Swartz, 1997). 
Cultural capital comes in three forms – embodied, objectified and 
institutionalized (Grenfell & James, 1998). Cultural capital exists in an embodied state 
as cultivated dispositions to be consumed only by apprehending their meaning. Such 
form of capital would include various schools of thought and philosophies from 
different disciplines. Jessica and Michael have significant background in auditing and 
approach information security as a compliance role. At the same time, Jessica is a firm 
believer in the school of thought that an educated user is the best form of defense. Such 
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dispositions are captured in different clauses in the security policy. Even in terms of IT 
security, both Robert Smith, the security architect of the state, and Jonathan Orion, the 
security architect for outsourcing management, have constant arguments on the 
language of certain items and their subsequent interpretation as they believe in different 
philosophies on how to develop good IT defense mechanisms. “Two security guys 
would have different answer on how best to develop architecture to security solution,” 
justifies Robert.  
 In an objectified form, cultural capital refers to objects that require specialized 
cultural abilities to use (Bourdieu, 1986a). Such objects would include security policy 
and standard documents, security guideline documents, and security manuals. The 
security audit manual may also be considered as an objectified form. Here, specialized 
cultural ability is required so as to be able to check for the presence of security controls. 
Technical systems to ensure security in an organization would also fall under this 
category of cultural capital. Intrusion detection systems are based upon different 
philosophy than intrusion prevention systems.  
Finally, cultural capital in an institutionalized form refers to the educational 
credential system (Bourdieu, 1986a). Such capital includes the degrees and diplomas 
earned in a specific discipline from a university system or an institute of higher 
education. Here, the status of the institution also matters. The industry certifications and 
affiliations also fall under this form of capital. Each form serves as “instruments for the 
appropriation of symbolic wealth socially designated as worthy of being sought and 
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possessed” (Bourdieu, 1977). The currency of such capital forms has more to do with 
their symbolic appropriation than with their possession (O’Brien & O’Fathaigh, 2005). 
 Culture can become a power resource. This occurs when cultural markets 
emerge where investors exchange currencies, strive for profits, and, in the case of 
educational credentials in recent years, suffer from inflation (Swartz, 1997). Cultural 
capital is unstable in that its accumulation can be undermined by criticism and suspicion 
(Swartz, 1997). Knowledge and tastes are used by individuals to distinguish the 
members of one class from another class (markers of social class). Since knowledge and 
tastes are shaped by socialization and education, they are often related to family and 
class background. When they are passed from one generation to the next through 
socialization, they constitute cultural capital that serves to maintain class membership 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977).  The transmission of cultural capital is a hidden means 
for reproducing class position.  
 
5.5.4 Symbolic capital 
Symbolic capital is used to explain the ways in which capitals are perceived in 
the social structure such as status value attached to certain books, values, or places of 
learning (O’Brien & O’Fathaigh, 2005). It exists as prestige, status, authority and 
legitimation (Bourdieu, 1986). Symbolic capital is the ‘power of constructing reality’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991). It is the capacity to construct beliefs about the world and to make 
them seem real. Symbolic capital is the ability to define what is perceived to be the 
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reality of the other three forms of capital (economic, cultural, social) through the use of 
symbols (Cheal, 2005).  
 In the realm of information systems security, good security practices, security 
skills, and effective policy development generates appreciation and respect among the 
players in the field. Also, achieving specific degrees of IT security in an organization is 
greatly appreciated and looked up as model for other organizations to follow. The 
prestige of winning an award from a national body is another case of recognition. Such 
explication of perceptions leads to an increase in symbolic capital. The capital 
represents power over a field at a given moment in time (Bourdieu, 1991). The most 
powerful conversion to be made is to symbolic capital, for it is in this form that the 
different forms of capital are perceived and recognized as legitimate (Mahar et al. in 
Harker et al, 1990). It is through the acquisition of capital, and the use of symbolic 
capital to perpetrate symbolic violence, that classes ensure their own legitimacy and 
reproduction (Lawley, 1994). For Bourdieu, all individuals are capital holders and 
investors seeking profits (Swartz, 1997). 
 
5.5.5 The field of power 
The field of power functions as sort of meta-field that operates as an organizing 
principle of differentiation and struggle throughout all fields. The field of power is 
defined as the relations of force that will gain between the social positions which 
guarantee their occupants a quantum of social force, or of capital, such that they are 
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able to enter into the struggles over the monopoly of power, affect struggles over the 
definition of an extended form of power as crucial dimension (Swartz, 1997).   
 Bourdieu considers conflict to be the fundamental dynamics of all social life.  At 
the heart of all social arrangements is the struggle for power.  This struggle is carried 
out over symbolic as well as material resources.  There are two major competing 
principles of social hierarchy that shape the struggle for power: the distribution of 
economic capital (wealth, income, and property), and the distribution of cultural capital 
(knowledge, culture and education credentials) (Bourdieu 1989). The distinctive 
preferences and practices of individuals and groups can be understood largely in terms 
of their distribution according to these two opposing types of capital (Swartz, 1997). 
The greater the difference in asset structure of these two types of capital, the more likely 
it is that individuals and groups will be opposed in their power struggle for domination. 
In the case of Wonderland, the ITA is considerably high in cultural capital and 
low in economic capital (table 5.4). The security department at ITA employs members 
with considerable expertise. These members are also expected to hold CISSP 
certification as part of eligibility criteria. In terms of economic capital, the ITA has to 
depend upon the customer government agencies for revenues. Basically, agencies have 
to buy services from the ITA. The state government agencies can be categorized as 
either big or small in terms of size of operations. The big agencies have huge budget for 
operations and are also mature in terms of use of IT in daily business activities. These 
agencies may also be spread across the entire state. Needless to say, these big agencies 
are high on economic capital and cultural capital as well. Such agencies would also 
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have necessary expertise and background in the field of IT security. Although human 
resources were relocated to the ITA during restructuring, most of these big agencies 
have been able to retain in-house expertise.  Few of them were able to do so by moving 
key personnel to positions of non-importance during restructuring.  
Table 5.4: Constitution of capital for field of power 
Organization 
 
Cultural capital Economic capital 
ITA High Low 
Big government  
Agencies 
High 
 
High 
 
Small government  
Agencies 
Low 
 
Low 
 
 
In contrast, small agencies in the state are considerably low on both economic as 
well as cultural capital. These agencies have a designated security officer who actually 
might be performing two to three different roles at the same time. In most cases, these 
officers do not possess any security background and experience as they were essentially 
hired to perform some other job function. However, the ITA is endowed with 
considerable higher cultural capital than rest of the customer agencies.  
There is a constant struggle for power and domination in the information 
security field of the state. Both the ITA and big agencies have been trying to dominate 
the landscape. Small agencies are key players in this struggle since they have 
comparatively low quantity of total capital (economic and cultural). Now, the ITA and 
big agencies are on the opposite ends of axis where the former is low while the latter is 
high on economic capital respectively. In order to gain some advantage, Jessica decided 
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to gain support of smaller agencies in the struggle of power against big agencies. She 
strongly advocated the education of users as the underlying theme for every security 
endeavor be it security policy or guidelines. The emphasis was to provide help and 
support to smaller agencies as they did not have enough resources. The security 
department provided the rationale that it was important to first bring everyone upto a 
certain level and build a minimum base. However, the real intent may be seen as 
building the vital support for the ITA among government agencies.   
Most of the big agencies were generally opposed to the idea of ITA and highly 
critical of any initiative launched by it. This was time and again expressed in the 
statements of various stakeholders at the ITA. The folks at ITA would consistently 
remark during the interviews that all agencies considered the ITA to be evil. “They hate 
us” was the general remark heard from Michael, security manager. The big agencies 
considered the ITA security members to not have any clue about what they were doing. 
The ITA organizational members consistently questioned the ability of security 
members to successfully perform even menial tasks as the use of office productivity 
tools. On the other hand, the smaller agencies greatly appreciated any help or support 
from the ITA as they had low cultural as well as economic capital. Such efforts were 
gladly accepted by capital deprived smaller agencies.  
In terms of compliance, the situation in Wonderland was perceived to be such 
where big agencies were able to comply with the policy to a certain extent. In such an 
event, smaller agencies did not want to end up looking bad in front of the state 
legislators by failing to comply with the security policy. The big agencies wanted the 
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ITA security department to develop the security program that would benefit them and 
give good grades in terms of the security posture. However, it would not come as 
surprise that the members of security department wanted to call the shots in relation to 
security in the state, especially since big agencies were considered to be the major 
sources of revenue for the ITA.  
 
5.6 Strategizing About Action 
 The struggle and strategy become tied together through the notion of the field, 
and are dependent upon knowledge, which has both active and materialist aspects 
(Mahar, et al. in Harker et al., 1990). “All knowledge of the social world, is an act of 
construction implementing schemes of thought and expression, and that between 
conditions of existence and practices or representations there intervenes the structuring 
activity of the agents, who, far from reacting mechanically to mechanical simulations, 
respond to the invitations or threats of a world whose meaning they have helped to 
produce” (Bourdieu 1984). Action is not a mechanical response to external determining 
structures. Habitus, traditions, customs, beliefs filter and shape individual and collective 
responses to the present and the future. They mediate the effects of external structures 
to produce action. 
 The idea of strategy as not conscious nor calculated nor it is mechanically 
determined, but is the intuitive product of knowing the rules of the game (Mahar, et al. 
in Harker et al., 1990). There is unwitting complicity of actors in pursuing their own 
vested interest. Agents then construct their social world and act to reproduce their 
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positions and to gain position in the social world (Mahar, et al. in Harker et al., 1990). 
“The most profitable strategies are usually those produced, on the hither side of all 
calculation and in the illusion of the most “authentic” sincerity, by a habitus objectively 
fitted to the objective structures” (Bourdieu, 1977).  
 There are three types of field strategies (Swartz, 1997): 
1. Conservation strategies tend to be pursued by those who hold dominant 
positions and enjoy seniority in the field. These sets of practices are designed to 
maintain position (Mahar, et al. in Harker et al., 1990). 
2. Strategies of succession are attempts to gain access to dominant positions in a 
field and are generally pursued by the new entrants.  
3. Strategies of subversion are pursued by those who expect to gain little from the 
dominant groups. These strategies take the form of more or less radical rupture 
with the dominant group by challenging its legitimacy to define the standards of 
the field (table 5.5).  
Table 5.5: Types of strategy 
Strategy type Followed by Aim 
Conservation Dominant group Maintain position 
Succession New entrants Gain access to dominant positions 
Subversion Dominated group Radical rupture with dominant group 
 
Bourdieu argues that behavior is strategic and not rule following or norm 
conforming. There is a certain interest, say x, which the dominant group is interested in. 
In order to attain x, the group follows practice y employing a particular strategy z. 
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There are quite a few practices and strategies available to choose from. However, the 
group chooses a specific strategy to achieve practice y. Such a choice can be explained 
as a function of interplay between field, habitus and capital. The emphasis is on the 
inter-relationship.  
 Let us analyze major actions undertaken by the ITA security department. We 
also have to keep in mind the relative position of the security department in the fields of 
its operations. As outlined in the field section, the ITA security department is under the 
influence of IT security field and government field in the state. Within the ITA, the 
security department is the dominated group, the IT Solutions is the dominant group, and 
the Outsourcing Management can be considered to be a new entrant in the competition 
for positions in the field. For IT security field, the security department at ITA enjoys the 
role of a dominant group. In this field, various government agencies may be considered 
as the dominated group. The government field in Wonderland has been dominated by 
big government agencies like the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department of 
Social Services. As earlier stated, these agencies have sympathetic legislators who 
support different interests and concerns in the state. The security department, as part of 
the ITA, may be considered as new entrant in the competition for dominant position. 
The above discussion details position of the ITA security department during the 
empirical observation (data collection) phase. Now, let us consider major actions 
undertaken by security department and understand them in view of different strategy 
types.  
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Conservation strategies  
One of the earlier action pursued by the IT security department at ITA was the 
formation of SAG as a forum for the meeting of information security officers from 
various government agencies in the state. This development may be seen as the 
pursuance of a conservation strategy. The dominant group pursues these strategies in 
order to maintain their position in the field. The SAG as an advisory group was formed 
to hear the concerns of various agencies and help them in some manner to implement 
the IT security policy. The basic aim was to help different agencies to achieve an 
effective information security in their respective organizations. However, upon closer 
scrutiny one may argue that the fundamental concern was for the ITA to make various 
agencies follow what it was preaching. The ITA security department was to be the 
dominant group and wanted other dominated agencies to buy-in their view of the world. 
Such a move would also thwart any attempt towards rebellion and channel voice of 
dissent in a controlled manner.  
 Lately, the SAG has evolved to be more of information sessions. Also, agencies 
started perceiving various initiatives of the ITA security department as a product of 
Jessica’s (CISO) mandates or directives. These were seen more as whims of Jessica 
than as something conscious emerging out of real concerns. In other words, the 
dominated agencies started questioning the legitimacy and validity of the directives 
issued by the ITA security department. The growing concerns among agencies were 
seen as a threat to position of the ITA security department in the state. In order to 
undermine such threat and maintain its position in the field, the dominant ITA security 
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group decided to form a Security Council which would serve as an advisory role to 
Jessica. In her words, 
I am interested in developing the synergy of councils and committees to help security initiatives. 
Currently, ITA is seen as dictating the terms or initiatives. With Council and Committee the 
program would be seen as a collective effort. 
 
The council members would comment upon the security practices proposed by the IT 
Security department and also suggest other effective security practices for the 
Wonderland to be pursued. Such an action would be considered to be taken so as to 
maintain the dominant position. “It would be appropriate to say that I am driving them, 
security council, to do these initiatives,” says Jessica. Interestingly, the members of the 
council are selected by Jessica. This further supports the argument of forming the 
Security Council as a form of conservation strategy pursued by the ITA security 
department.  
 The emphasis of the ITA security department was to help smaller agencies in 
implementing the security policy. The argument provided for such an action was that of 
achieving a common base of security throughout the state. The security department 
further justified such an emphasis as small agencies lacked resources or expertise for 
appropriately implementing the security policy. This action may also be seen as an 
attempt to maintain the security department’s position. The ITA security department 
would be able to offset the influence of big agencies by gaining support of smaller 
agencies. The support shown by smaller agencies would put bigger agencies on 
defensive in terms of any actions undermining the legitimacy and dominant position of 
security department. 
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 One of the latest instances of the conservation strategy was the extension of 
compliance deadline for the IT security policy. All agencies were to be compliant with 
the policy by a certain date. The security department projected their strictness about 
conformance with the deadline. Although agencies were facing difficulties nevertheless 
many took it seriously and diverted resources from key projects to meet the deadline. 
However, on the last day for compliance Jessica decided to extend the deadline. 
Agencies that worked hard to meet the deadline felt betrayed and cheated. As for many 
of them, time and resources have been wasted as they could have done an efficient job 
if they knew about the deadline extension earlier. Agencies suspected that Jessica knew 
about extending the deadline but purposefully did not let others know about it. On the 
other hand, the ITA security department argued that many agencies had requested for an 
extension of the deadline and there were others who were requesting for an exemption 
citing lack of resources. As these requests were being made close to the deadline, the 
CISO could only make such a decision now. This particular action of extending the 
deadline may be seen as demonstrating position of the group.  
The extension on the last day signifies dominant position of the ITA security 
department in the field and also demonstrates the conservation strategy to maintain such 
dominant position. The ITA security department sent a strong signal to various groups 
by extending the deadline on the last day. As rumored by agencies, the deadline could 
have been extended earlier. But such a move would have been indicative of a 
weakening position where the ITA security department had to bend to the demand of 
agencies. However, by announcing the extension at the last minute the IT security 
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department gave demonstration of the dominant position enjoyed by them. At the same 
time, the IT security department was able to gain support of agencies that were unable 
to meet the requirements for compliance. Such an act would check any move on behalf 
of bigger agencies to undermine position of the ITA security department.  
 
Succession strategies 
Towards the last phase of empirical observation period, Jessica was able to 
change the CISO position at ITA and make it responsible for auditing as well. The new 
position was effectively renamed as Chief Information Security & Audit Officer and 
marked the merger of IT security and audit functions. This act of merger is consistent 
with the tenets of succession strategy. The succession strategy is followed by new 
entrants to gain access to dominant positions. As earlier stated, the IT security 
department at ITA is dominated within the organization by the IT Solutions department. 
Within the ITA, the Outsourcing Management department may be considered as a new 
entrant that gained prominence because of the crucial relationship between the ITA and 
the Outsourcing Firm.  
The merger of IT security and audit functions would position the new 
department as a new entrant in the competition for the dominant position. Such an act is 
also reflective of the habitus of majority of the members of security department who 
possess significant audit background. These members perceive the role of IT security to 
be more of audit related. For them, it makes sense to merge the two functions as at one 
level their work may be seen in synergy with each other. In fact, Jessica (CISO), Ashley 
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(Deputy CISO) and Michael (Security Manager) consider themselves as auditors first. 
They joined the security department to gain experience in the latest IT concern – 
security, and be challenged. The consolidation of compliance and governance role 
under one roof would push the newly merged department in direct contention for the 
position of domination within the ITA.  
 At the beginning phase of the empirical study, it was observed that Jessica was 
anxiously meeting with the CIOs of big agencies in order to nurture their support, which 
was perceived to be essential in order for the information security program to succeed in 
the state. It was interesting to note that Jessica was meeting with big agencies while rest 
of the department members were visibly trying to help smaller agencies. In order to 
understand this observation, we have to consider the field of government at 
Wonderland. In this field, as stated earlier, the bigger government agencies enjoy the 
dominant positions while the ITA is considered to be a new entrant by virtue of 
legislation passed that indirectly confers such a title by consolidating all IT 
infrastructure of the state. The meeting of Jessica with the CIO’s of big agencies may be 
seen as an attempt to gain access to the dominant position in the field. In essence, the 
CISO is trying to make agency heads realize that the ITA is indeed a new entrant. By 
seeking their support, Jessica is indicating that the security department at ITA is 
dependent upon big agencies and is not in a dominant position. However, the extension 
of support and abiding by the view of secure world by the agencies may be seen as a 
tacit acceptance of the ITA security department as a new entrant.  
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 Once the ITA security department was accepted as a new entrant, it continued 
the push for access to dominant positions. The formation of Security Council may be 
considered as an action towards such an endeavor. By creating a Security Council and 
selectively appointing security officers of certain agencies, the ITA security department 
is indeed attempting to further fortify its quest for dominant position in the government 
field of Wonderland. The creation of a Security Council would further provide 
legitimacy to the directives of CISO. This would be further aided as the members of the 
council are selected by the CISO herself. The representation on council by certain big 
agencies would also strengthen the position of the security department against the 
influence of left out agencies.  The creation of a Security Council interestingly aids the 
succession strategy adopted by the security department both within the ITA and the 
state.  
 
Subversion strategies 
Within the realm of ITA, the IT security department was in a dominated 
position. Kevin (former CISO) was not even reporting to Ian, the CIO of ITA. He was 
in fact reporting to Steven, the Head of IT Solutions department. As per Kevin, 
The very first day I was told I would not be reporting to CIO but to Steven. From that 
point on, it was very much struggle.  
 
This clearly reflected the dominant position enjoyed by the IT Solutions department. 
The appointment of new CISO, Jessica, saw changes in the organizational structure of 
ITA. Upon taking charge of the office, Jessica started reporting directly to Ian. Such an 
action questions the legitimacy of reporting to Steven, the Head of IT Solutions. The 
    183 
 
change in reporting structure is an example of subversion strategy pursued by the new 
CISO. The subversion strategy is followed by the dominated group for radical rupture 
with the dominant group by challenging its legitimacy. The newly appointed CISO was 
also the Head of the Audit function who reported directly to the TIB. By virtue of this 
position, she continued to report directly to the CIO in the capacity of the CISO also.  
 Another example of the pursuance of subversion strategy is the development of 
an information assurance program as an area for improvement in response to the audit 
report. In the IT field, the traditional view of security is one concerned with network 
security and incident security. The development of an information assurance program 
may be seen as making the definition of IT security a bit broader (or as extending the 
boundary of IT security). The interpretation of audit report by the security department 
as necessitating the need of information assurance program as an area for improvement 
is in fact questioning the legitimacy of the viewpoints of the dominant fields. These 
fields restricted the IT security to the domain of network communication and system 
administration only. As such, the development of an information assurance program is a 
radical rapture from the dominant traditional view.  
 
5.7 Attaining Dominance Through Symbolic Value 
 In a given social space, there are different symbolic systems in operation at any 
particular time. Symbolic is defined as that which is material but is not recognized as 
being such (in a sense, a good accent, style) and which derives its efficacy not simply 
from its materiality but from this very misrecognition (Mahar et al. in Harker et al., 
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1990). In the Commonwealth of Wonderland, there are different symbolic systems such 
as science, language, myth, discourse, art and religion. In the realm of information 
technology, the IT security as a discipline is conceptualized here as a dominant 
symbolic system. Of course, there are other disciplines as well operating in Wonderland 
IT arena struggling among different symbolic systems. However, the IT security 
currently seems to be dominant both in IT realm and the public space of Wonderland. 
There is growing concern among citizens about the security of their information and IT 
systems. In response, the state government has issued legislation that gives priority to 
IT security as a statewide initiative. Given such support from public and government, IT 
security has gained significant leverage within the ITA as well. On the basis of the state 
audit report, which gave bad marks to the state of security, the security department at 
ITA has moved itself to a position of heavyweight in the organization.  
 Symbolic systems are “codes” that channel deep structural meanings shared by 
all members of a culture (Swartz, 1997). IT security can be argued to be a cultural 
system which shares among its members a particular view of the world that is to make it 
more secure. The emphasis of the members of this culture is to provide assurance about 
the privacy of the information and security of the associated systems. All members have 
a firm belief that in order for the social world to be better it is essential to protect the 
information and systems from miscreants. Risk is prevalent in business world and it is 
necessary to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level. This can be done by proposing 
solutions that are based on the belief in either technical measures or behavioral aspects 
of the problem. However, there is a general agreement on what is considered to be right 
    185 
 
or ethical practice. There is a constant struggle between black and white hats, where 
former are the miscreants or criminal hackers while the latter are considered to be  good 
guys.  
These systems make possible a consensus within the community as to the 
significance of the social world, as well as contributing to the reproduction of the social 
order (Mahar et al. in Harker et al., 1990). The social world provides the necessary 
monetary support for sustenance and also bestows upon the members a degree of 
responsibility and prestige. The members consider the profession to be worth pursuing. 
In the business world, there are executives that might not necessarily practice or pay 
attention to security. This belief provides the members with a moral responsibility to 
fight for good security practices. The symbolic systems as “structuring structures” are 
means for ordering and understanding the social world (Swartz, 1997). These may in 
fact be considered as classification systems.  
The protection of information of the social world can be approached from the 
viewpoint of IT security, information system security, information security, information 
privacy, information assurance, auditing as policing role, and IT governance. The social 
order includes intellectuals (involving academic and industry researchers), technical 
practitioners, auditors, policy developers, and consultants. These are indeed the 
symbolic producers who create symbolic power. Then, there are the adversaries 
considered to be the black hat hackers, and rogue elements including mafia and 
criminals. There is a thriving underground black market to exchange the spoils of 
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computer crimes. A general understanding exists among the community about what 
counts as ethical or unethical in terms of security practice.  
As a symbolic system, information systems security may be viewed as an art 
wherein the management of security requires proficiency in the art of security practice 
sometimes also referred to as soft security. Then, there is the science of IT security 
(hard security) that addresses problems associated with the technical system. 
Information systems security has its own language, which captures the nuances of the 
discipline. There are acronyms and terms unique to information systems security. 
Efforts have also been made to develop a dictionary of information systems security to 
explain the technical language.  
 All cultural systems are fundamentally human constructions that are historical, 
that stem from the activities and interests of particular groups, and that legitimate 
unequal power relations among groups (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). The symbolic 
systems perform three distinct functions of cognition, communication and political. 
These conceptual systems function simultaneously as instruments of communication 
and as instruments of knowledge (Bourdieu, 1971). The real political function that 
symbolic systems fulfill is their attempt to legitimate domination by the imposition of 
the correct and legitimate definition of the social world (Mahar et al. in Harker et al., 
1990).  
Robert, the security architect, narrated an incident where an ITA asset 
participated in denial of service attack against the University of Dreamland. As per 
Robert, 
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I have seen it at ITA in last two months. It happened at partnership location. 
 
He commented on the incident as a reflection of poor user education and network 
management. Here, Robert was able to recognize the participation of an ITA asset in a 
denial of service attack as a security problem. IT security performs the cognitive 
function. It also embodies the knowledge that informs the security architect about the 
asset participation as a bad thing. The security architect is able to communicate the 
problem situation using the terminology specific to IT security. He also identifies 
possible areas of concern. IT security hence performs the function of communication.  
Exposing another security professional to such an incident would evoke a 
similar response. That is, the use of an IT asset in a denial of service attack is not 
considered to be good. One may see symbolic systems as providing social integration at 
the level of communication while at the same time assisting in social differentiation in 
performing political function. By identifying poor user education and network 
management as the areas of concern, security architect is indeed advocating a specific 
definition of the world whereby network management is critical to avoid future 
participation in attacks. This is the attempt to legitimate domination. In this instance, IT 
security also serves the political function.  
 Let us consider another case as narrated by Justin Smith, the Incident Engineer.  
People need to be told that they have to stop holding doors open for strangers. People 
do this out of courtesy for others. They try to be polite.  However, they need to be made 
aware of the problems such behavior could trigger. In one case, I managed to get into 
some critical areas of an organization. It wouldn’t have been difficult for me to install a 
key logger and capture login access information for various systems being used. If we 
focus on tools, it is consistently losing battle. The awareness training is the key. 
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In this particular case, Justin is able to recognize the problem as applicable to IT 
security. The problem is that people voluntarily let people inside a building so as to be 
courteous to each other. However, this poses a serious threat as it allows access to a 
person with malicious intent. The recognition of the problem also indicates that IT 
security serves as an instrument of knowledge. Justin demonstrates his knowledge, as he 
is able to understand the severity of threat. A key logger could be installed to capture 
login access information. A legitimate domination is intended when incident engineer 
suggests awareness training as the only possible solution. This is imposing a specific 
definition of the social world. Such attempt of establishing domination is further 
justified by support of a personal account.  
The dominant symbolic systems provide integration for dominant groups, 
distinctions and hierarchies for ranking groups, and legitimation of social ranking by 
encouraging the dominated to accept the existing hierarchies of social distinction 
(Bourdieu, 1977). This dominant symbolic system utilizes the symbolic capital to gain 
symbolic power. The symbolic power exists when people voluntarily give up power 
over themselves to another, because they believe that the particular person has the 
power to do things (Cheal, 2005). Symbolic power is defined as “every power to exert 
symbolic violence, that is every power which manages to impose meanings and to 
impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its 
force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations” (Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1977).  
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The legislation passed by the state can be considered as a form of symbolic 
power. It requires establishment of security practices and makes each agency head 
responsible for the protection of data and information of the state citizens. This may be 
considered to provide a guarantee to state a particular form of official nomination. The 
legislation places responsibility of protecting citizen information squarely on the 
shoulders of the agency head. This official nomination gives a recognized identity to the 
individuals holding the post. The agency head has to ensure that a particular 
government agency has indeed adopted required security practices. The legislation 
actually confers recognition on the agency head as responsible authority to institute best 
security practices.  
In the struggle or conflict for the legitimate vision, a state named expert – the 
agency head or the information security officer - provides a point of view (such as in 
security policy) which confers universally recognized rights to others who hold 
certificate (of membership) and who act in the legitimate (expected) way. In a similar 
manner, the Executive Orders on security passed by the Governor may also been seen 
as a form of symbolic power. These Executive Orders pertain to the conferment of 
security responsibility on the Secretary of Technology who further has appointed the 
CIO of ITA as responsible. Such orders provide an official nomination for the conduct 
of and legitimizing a particular vision. The responsible officers indeed developed a 
vision to make Wonderland more secure, which is captured in the IT security policy. 
The policy further delegates rights to certain members of the organization who are 
expected to act in a manner congruent to effective security practices.  
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 The symbolic power is used by dominant symbolic systems to perpetuate 
symbolic violence in the social space (figure 5.2). In symbolic violence, people 
recognize, or tacitly acknowledge, the legitimacy of the hierarchical relations of power 
in which they are embedded (Cheal, 2005). They therefore fail to see that the hierarchy 
is, in the last analysis, an arbitrary social construction which serves the interests of some 
groups more than others. The intent of the ITA and the state government to enforce the 
vision of secure information and information technology operations in the state is 
perpetuation of symbolic violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Dominance through symbolic value 
 
The use of legislation and executive orders to force all the state government 
agencies to be compliant with the information security policy is an act of symbolic 
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violence. The ITA is using the symbolic power inherent in the position of CIO to 
enforce a certain vision about the social world. There might be agencies that do not 
agree with such a vision and might favor the vision of effectiveness over security. 
However, all agencies recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of the of Wonderland 
and have to agree with such decrees as they all belong to the same social world. This is 
in fact domination of ITA (and IT security) over all executive government agencies.  
The act of training the information security officers of various government 
agencies by the ITA security department is another instance of symbolic violence. In 
this case, the information security officers are inculcated in ITA’s doctrine of IT 
security. The newly appointed information security officers are exposed to the view of 
IT security as mandated by the ITA to be legitimate. These officers are hence 
indoctrinated in a particular vision and would indeed mould their behavior to an 
expected performance. The aim is to make these officers take for granted the vision of 
ITA as legitimate and in fact propagate such vision in respective organizations. The 
majority of ISOs would fail to recognize that they can change such a social construction 
to their benefit. In essence, the symbolic violence is domination which is exercised 
upon social agents with their complicity because they misrecognize the conditions of 
their existence (Cheal, 2005).  
 The fundamental logic of symbolic processes and systems is one of establishing 
differences and distinctions in the form of binary oppositions (Swartz, 1997). In the 
realm of information systems security, there are a few paired oppositions with the 
fundamental one being whether a particular system has been hacked or is secure. The 
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dominant systems use symbolic violence to differentiate and legitimate inegalitarian and 
hierarchical arrangements among individuals and groups. The fundamental bipolarity is 
the dominant and dominated paired opposition (Swartz, 1997). “All agents in a given 
social formation share a set of basic perceptual schemes, which receive the beginnings 
of objectification in the pairs of antagonistic adjectives commonly used to classify and 
qualify persons or objects in the most varied areas of practice” (Bourdieu, 1984).  
The distinctions established in information systems security are evident in the 
binary oppositions of being compliant - non-compliant with a policy or standard; ethical 
- unethical behavior; white hat - black hat hackers; good - bad security practice; 
effective - ineffective security controls; hacked - reliable system; hard - soft security 
approach; responsible - malicious code; restricted - open access; and confidential - 
exposed information. The binary logic of symbolic distinction determines our mode of 
apprehending the social world; it predisposes us to organize the social world according 
to the same logic of polarity and thus to produce social as well as cognitive distinctions 
(Swartz, 1997). Few other symbolic distinctions that are found in information systems 
security practice involve hacker - cracker; public - private keys; protected - unprotected 
information; open - closed port; available - unavailable system; trusted - risky 
environment; master - secondary level; cooperative - uncooperative behavior; 
encryption - decryption, to name a few.  
 The struggles between symbolic systems is to impose a view of the social world 
which defines the social space within which people construct their lives, and carry on 
the symbolic conflicts of everyday life and the use of symbolic violence of the dominant 
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over the dominated, that is education, relationships in the workplace, social 
organizations, even in conceptions of good taste and beauty. Symbolic struggles over 
the perception of the social world can take two different forms (Mahar et al. in Harker 
et al., 1990).  On the objective side, one can act through the representations (both 
individual and collective) in order to demonstrate and valorise particular views of 
reality. On the subjective side, one can act through using strategies of self-presentation, 
or by trying to change categories of perception and appreciation of the social work.  
The security group at ITA has embarked upon the strategy of projecting 
themselves as the policy group or as the planners. The security department is to develop 
the policy, standards and guidelines for the state, while individual agencies are expected 
to implement these. However, the ITA security department would provide guidance to 
agencies as the need arose. This is the subjective side of the symbolic struggle. On the 
objective side, the security group at ITA has been trying to attain the identity of 
governance or policing for Wonderland as applicable to IT security. Towards the end of 
data collection period, the management of security department released both their 
Security Incident Engineers. This action on behalf of the security department may also 
be seen as a way of shedding the identity of security technicians and moving towards 
the image of governance role.  
The intent of the security department is to project the department as the 
governance group for Wonderland. This is evident in the emphasis of the department on 
policy development process only, while implementation process has been given the 
neglect and made the responsibility of individual customer agencies. The security 
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department aims to direct all the agencies as to what needs to be done in terms of 
information security. However, agencies often complain about lack of support and 
guidance from the security department for implementing the security policy developed 
by the very same department. Such concerns have been regularly raised during the SAG 
meetings.  
 At the ITA, there is also a struggle between security and systems development 
as symbolic systems. The security policy has strict clauses that would have an impact 
on the systems development process. In fact, these clauses direct the systems 
development group, which is the IT Solutions at ITA, to implement specific controls so 
as to ensure that the systems development process has taken security into 
considerations. Brian Turner, the IT Solutions manager, remarked that such controls are 
very restrictive and often do not make any business sense.  
Tell me what the risk and tradeoffs are. I will take business decision depending upon the 
acceptable level of risk. Do not tell me that certain security control has to be implemented. 
 
Such controls only take one viewpoint - that of security. It can be seen that there is an 
ongoing clash between the two symbolic systems of security and systems development 
to impose a particular view of the world.  
For security, the aim is to make the world more secure, whereas systems 
development believes in making the world more efficient with the development of 
information systems. Similar struggles are also going on among other symbolic 
systems. For instance, the auditing discipline believes in a world where everyone is 
compliant with a given law, policy or standard. Such a worldview would again not sit 
well with the notions of systems development discipline. The aim is to make possible a 
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science of the dialectical relations between the objective structures and the structured 
dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce 
them (Swartz, 1997). Social structures become internalized into the cognitive structures 
of individuals and groups who then unwittingly reproduce the social order by 
classifying the social world with the same categories with which it classifies them.  
 To surmise, there are struggles between different symbolic systems in a given 
social space. The dominant symbolic system uses the symbolic power gained by 
increasing symbolic capital to perpetuate symbolic violence. The aim of symbolic 
violence is to create symbolic distinctions in the social world so as to establish 
domination of the dominant symbolic system. The fundamental gain in such 
legitimation is to impose a certain view of the social world which would also define the 
social space.  
 
5.8 Discussion 
 The aim of the IT security department at ITA is to establish a particular view of 
the social world, which is to make it more secure in terms of information and 
technology. That is, the overarching goal is to establish dominance of IT security in a 
social space defined by the boundaries of Wonderland. Bourdieu’s cultural analysis 
helps us to understand the critical role culture plays in this quest for power. The 
dynamics of power intersect with all aspects of cultural life. Culture obscures the quest 
for dominance and provides tools for social distinctions. The ITA security department 
was indeed pursuing quest for class power. The security program developed for the 
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government agencies in the state not only addressed the prevalent IT security threats but 
was designed to gain power for the respective security departments as well. All the 
actions undertaken by the security department were consistently geared to move it 
towards the position of dominance. The IT security department wanted to have a 
dominant role within the ITA. Similar was the case for the government field in 
Wonderland where it was considered a new entrant. Culture may be considered as 
practices following common master patterns over cognitive, corporeal and attitudinal 
aspects of action.  
 Practices are the result of dialectical relationship between fields and habitus. Field 
specifies power relation and hierarchy. The convergence of the IT field and the 
government field generates opportunity and constraints for the social space defined by 
the ITA. There is a mutual agreement among actors occupying the social space that IT 
security is worth pursuing in Wonderland. Towards this direction, legislation has been 
enacted that empowers the ITA security department to enforce the security policy across 
the state. There is also tacit acceptance among various players about the rules of the 
game. The arrangement in the social space has emerged whereby the ITA security 
department took on the role of governance, the Outsourcing Firm became responsible 
for technical aspects of security, and the customer government agencies were to 
implement the recommended security controls.  
 The above-mentioned arrangement also reflects the struggle for cultural 
legitimacy whereby each player wants to have sole authority to proclaim what 
constitutes as culturally legitimate. In this struggle, the ITA security department has 
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emerged to be a powerful player. This becomes interesting when we consider the 
acknowledgement among members of the security department that the security policy is 
indeed flawed and need to be reviewed some time in future. As such, one may infer that 
security policy was actually used as an instrument to further the political interests of the 
security department. Fields are considered to be the arenas of struggle for cultural 
resources, which would include artifacts such as the security policy, the security 
standard, and the security program. The question then arises as to why players would 
struggle or fight over such resources. Players fight for cultural resources as these would 
indirectly support in creating a position of dominance for them. That is, the cultural 
resources obscure quest for power and dominance.  
 For habitus, actors are adapting to external constraints and establish distinction 
from other competing actors. It is based upon the likelihood of success of a given action 
in a particular situation. The pursuance of security policy, although mutually 
acknowledged among the ITA security department as having flaws, is the result of a 
practical evaluation of the likelihood of its success in the environment of Wonderland. 
The emphasis of the security department as to establish a base security practice among 
all organizations was served by the security policy even though the policy needed to be 
reviewed in near future. With the current CISO at helm, the nature and role of the IT 
security department at ITA has also evolved to that of governance function. Such 
direction may be attributed to the dispositions of the management of security 
department whom had significant experience in auditing discipline. These managing 
officers saw the audit approach of pursuing compliance and governance as more likely 
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to succeed given the constraints of the operating environment at Wonderland. Slowly 
and subtly, the security department evolved to play the role of governance rather than 
be a technical security help desk.  
 The fields and habiuts interact in a dialectical relationship to generate practices 
where capital also plays a significant part. The opportunities and constraints of the 
situation interact with the expectations of success, and abundance of specific capital 
influences generated practice. At the ITA security department, the development of an 
information assurance program, the formation of a security council, and an extension of 
the compliance deadline may be considered as major actions undertaken recently. The 
development of an information assurance program may be seen as an interaction 
between opportunity offered by the current state of knowledge in IT security field and 
audit dispositions of the security department management. The understanding that the 
security group is strong on cultural, social and symbolic capital helped in legitimizing 
such initiatives.  
 Actors are strategists where strategy is the tacit calculation of interest and pursuit 
of distinction. All behavior is strategic and not norm conforming or rule following. The 
actors follow conservation, succession or subversion strategy at any given moment to 
achieve a certain interest through practice. The security group at ITA is interested in 
establishing a particular view of the world. They want to achieve dominance in the 
social space through projecting their image as that of governance group. The security 
group was restructured by the CISO to put emphasis on establishing an information 
assurance component in the department. The department previously was structured 
    199 
 
around the major components of the security policy that were advocated by a committee 
external to the department. The tacit rule is to act as per the direction provided by the 
committee. In the government field, it is a norm not to fight against the system or 
change things. One may pursue additional objectives but not on the expense of changing 
the current view. However, the CISO was not interested in following rules or 
conforming by the norms but was rather strategizing to achieve her interest.  
 As the security group was in a dominated position within the ITA, the CISO 
pursued a subversion strategy of developing an information assurance program. 
Information assurance challenges the traditional view of IT security and has broader 
implications involving formal aspects of security as well. Further, information 
assurance in essence implies compliance with a security policy and standard. Such a 
view is also consistent with the nature of auditing discipline. This would also be 
germane to the later evolution of the CISO position to that of CISAO. This new position 
as a result of pursuance of successive strategy led to an increased power and dominance 
within the ITA. The development of a Security Council as part of conservation strategy 
pursued by the security group within IT security field would indeed support future 
legitimizing of components of the security program as deemed necessary in pursuit of 
dominance. The initiative as directive from the Security Council would be seen as 
collective effort rather than as an act of domination.  
 The cultural resources and practices attain symbolic value and aim to establish 
unequal social relations. This in fact is emphasizing underlying social classification. 
The legislation enacted by Wonderland to establish security practices may be 
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considered as a form of symbolic power. The legislation and security policy as a 
cultural resource legitimizes a particular vision of the social world as propagated by the 
ITA security department. The compliance with the security policy by customer agencies 
does in fact amount to perpetuating symbolic violence. The tacit acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the hierarchical relations of power is also evident in the practice of 
exposing newly appointed ISOs to ITA’s doctrine of IT security. Such practice helps in 
establishing social distinctions in the form of binary oppositions like secure and non-
secure, and compliant and non-compliant. These oppositions do point to a fundamental 
distinction of dominant and dominated where the ITA security department is the 
dominant player while customer agencies are dominated who are expected to accept the 
view of the world as recommended by the ITA security. The establishment of social 
distinctions is indeed synonymous of achieving power. The principle of power is the 
struggle between a group with cultural capital and another group with economic capital. 
Power formally acknowledges the dominance of a certain view of the social world. In 
this case, it is the dominance of the view of the world as a secure one rather than an 
effective world.  
 The cultural analysis indicates that practices lead to cultural continuity rather than 
change as the social structures are reproduced through the inter-relationship between 
field and habitus. The dialectical relation between habitus and field suggests occurrence 
of three kinds of situations in terms of the opportunities and constraints of the field in 
comparison to the situation in which the dispositions of habitus were first internalized 
(Swartz, 1997). In case where the opportunities and constraints of the situation are 
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similar to when dispositions were internalized, habitus will produce practices that 
correspond to existing structures. When field changes gradually, habitus tends to adapt 
as it addresses present situation in terms of past experiences. The practices so generated 
lead to gradual modification of structures. In situations where there are considerable 
discrepancies, rapid transformation can take place. The quick change in opportunity 
structures of the field would frustrate the expectations of habitus. This would result in 
possible social crisis amounting to resignation or revolt. 
 For Bourdieu, the last situation brings about change albeit an extreme one. This is 
the only form of real change as the change associated with the other two situations are 
more of cultural continuity rather than cultural change. The former two situations in fact 
reproduces the existing social structures. The source of change may be attributed to the 
lack of perfect fit between habitus and field. In order to introduce an initiative 
effectively, we should focus on structural lag or imperfect synchronization rather than 
be concerned with structural contradictions that would generate change.  
 In the extant literature, an organizational culture is generally perceived as an end 
in itself. That is, it has been proposed that one would be able to achieve certain goals 
like secure organization, or excellence in quality if there was indeed a culture 
sympathetic towards such an aim. This line of argument is fine so long as we are 
sensitive to understand that the true colors of culture are in fact those of power. The 
main tenet of Bourdieu’s cultural theory is that culture is a tool for distinction and 
gaining dominance. It has emerged to be a softer form of coercion. One may very well 
agree to the view that culture is the glue that binds everyone in an organization. 
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However, the real objective of culture is to establish social distinction and hierarchy, 
and dominance of powerful class in a social space. This is why it can be the most 
effective tool for the management as a dominant class in an organization. The 
management also needs to understand the importance of education as establishing social 
classification through cultural distinctions. Formal education may impart socialization 
in a particular cultural tradition, reproduce social class relations and perform 
legitimating function (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Bourieu’s cultural analysis implies 
that the practices actually signify cultural continuity. When we talk about cultural 
change we should rather consider continuity, as we do not want to cutoff the linkage 
with rich historical context. Change may amount to social crisis which is generally 
difficult to manage. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has described information systems security initiative from a 
cultural perspective. Such an approach was argued to be helpful in formulating the 
content of the initiative with respect to its context. The analysis in this chapter has 
evidently shown the effectiveness of Bourdieu’s cultural theory to explain the intricate 
relationship between content, context and process in an organizational setting. A 
security initiative would be successfully instituted in an organization if it indeed were 
harmonious with the cultural continuity of an organization rather than significantly 
changing the existing opportunity and constraint structures leading to frustrating the 
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expectations of actors. Organizational culture may be used as a tool for coercion to 
establish dominance that would allow propagating a secure view of the social world.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Implementation of Strategic Information Systems  
Security Initiatives at Department of Transportation 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The case study described in this chapter concerns the institutionalization of 
information systems security program at the Department of Transportation (DOT). At 
the time of study, the management of DOT was involved with a new statewide 
legislative requirement to get compliant with the state information systems security 
policy. The ongoing information systems security related changes were the prime 
motivator for this study. In this chapter, the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) is used 
to understand the efforts to institute the security program at DOT. Once the content of 
the security program such as the security objectives, policy, and standard is decided, it 
becomes generally clear as to what needs to be done to achieve the specified objectives. 
These objectives might entail embarking on a particular set of actions. The correct 
implementation of such actions necessitates appropriate understanding of organizational 
environment or context. For implementation purposes, the relationship between process 
and context of an organization needs to be properly studied. The structuration theory is 
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employed in this chapter to particularly analyze the link between process and context 
dimensions as well as the content and process linkage. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The next section describes Giddens’ 
structuration theory and its main theoretical components. This is followed by 
structurational analysis of information systems security initiatives at DOT. Section 6.4 
analyzes the empirical data from the perspective of Giddens theoretical perspective on 
modernity. Section 6.5 identifies the key findings for discussion. Finally, section 6.6 
concludes the interpretation of information systems security initiative in an organization 
from a structurational perspective. 
 
6.2 Giddens’ Structuration Theory 
The structuration theory provides an interesting view on the relationship 
between agency and structure. The emphasis of the theory is on the interaction of 
human actors and structure resulting in a duality of structure.  
By the duality of structure I mean that social structures are both constituted by human 
agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution (Giddens, 
1976). 
 
Blaikie (1993) explains the social structures as perceived by Giddens to be both the 
conditions and consequences of social interaction. These structures are the rules and 
resources social actors draw on as they engage each other in interaction. These are not 
patterns of relationships. For Giddens, the social structures are not external to the social 
actor but rather they exist in memory traces and are embodied in social practices.  
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 The structuration theory is specifically employed here because of its explicit 
focus on the social practices and their transformations. For Giddens (1984), the domain 
of study as per structuration theory 
…is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of 
societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time (pp. 2). 
 
The structuration theory has been extremely used in the management field to study 
organizational change. Walsham (1993) was among the early information system 
researchers to recognize the usefulness of structuration theory as a means to understand 
the link between context and process. Researchers have successfully demonstrated the 
use of this theory as a subtle and intricate approach to the interpretation of social 
systems. As stated previously, the main purpose of this research is to understand how to 
institute strategic information system security initiatives in an organization. The 
structuration theory lends itself to study this research problem. Another factor to 
employ structuration theory as a theoretical basis has been the philosophical position 
assumed by the theory. This theory embodies the argument to go beyond agent or 
structure (micro or macro) position and provides an alternative solution through the 
interaction between the two. As a result, the agents are considered as capable and 
knowledgeable and not merely “cultural dopes…of stunning mediocrity” (Giddens, 
1979). In addition, the structure is to be viewed as rules and resources which are 
implemented in interaction. It should be used in a manner similar to “as an individual 
draws on the rules of grammar” and not “as a kind of framework, like girders of a 
building or the skeleton of a body” (Held and Thompson, 1989).  
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For the purposes of this chapter, we would employ the structuration theory in the 
tradition of its use by Walsham (1993) to conceptualize the link between context and 
process. The explanation of the analytical dimensions of duality of structure is based 
primarily on Walsham’s (1993) explication of the theory.  Walsham (1993) provides a 
schematic chart (figure 6.1) to understand the analytical dimensions of structuration 
theory. In this model, the social structure interacts with human actions through three 
modalities of interpretative scheme, facility and norm. The social structure is perceived 
to be comprised of three dimensions of signification, domination and legitimation. 
These dimensions interact with the three dimensions of human interaction namely 
communication, power and sanction. Interpretative schemes are stocks of knowledge 
that are used during communication and drawn upon by human agents to make sense of 
actions. This results in production (and reproduction) of meaning structures, which are 
essentially structures of signification. The structures of domination are impacted as 
agents employ power in interaction through various facilities available such as ability to 
allocate resources. Finally, “human agents sanction their actions by drawing on norms 
or standards of morality, and thus maintain or modify social structures of legitimation” 
(Walsham, 1993).  
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Figure 6.1: Structuration theory by Giddens (reproduced from Walsham 1993) 
 
The structuration theory also lays emphasis on social interaction as occurring in 
time and space. The social actors are able to reflexively monitor their interaction 
through discursive consciousness. They rationalize their actions and provide reasons for 
any action. Blaikie (1993) explains that such accounts may depend upon “practical 
consciousness (which may be tacit and cannot be readily articulated); and, unconscious 
motivation (repressed semiotic impulses of which the social actor is usually not aware.” 
All action is nevertheless constrained by unacknowledged conditions and unintended 
consequences. Thus, every act that has the potential to reproduce any ordered form of 
social life carries with it the seeds of change (Giddens, 1993).  
 For empirical analysis, the modalities of interpretative schemes, facilities, and 
norms provide a means to link action and structure. Information systems may be seen as 
involved in these modalities that link social context and process in organizations. 
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Walsham (1993) argues that computer-based information systems embody interpretative 
schemes, provide co-ordination and control facilities, and encapsulate norms. Further, 
these systems are able to impact the existing structures as they are drawn on in the 
social processes.  
 
6.3 Shaping Information Systems Security Initiatives at the Department of 
Transportation 
 The Department of Transportation (DOT) is a government agency falling under 
the Executive branch of the state. A new legislation was enacted in 2003 to address the 
growing concerns about information security in the state. The Governor and the state 
legislature sanctioned the statewide information security initiative. The legitimation of 
this initiative was sought by appealing to the norm of secure environment for the state 
citizens. This new legislation required all government agencies in the state to ensure 
good information security practices. The norms of viability and effectiveness were also 
utilized for the operations of government organizations. The aim was to achieve shared 
structures of signification. A secure environment would be conducive for effective 
operations for the state constituents involving citizens, businesses, and government 
agencies. The enacted legislation also held the Head of each agency as responsible for 
any adverse security incident in their respective organizations. The emphasis was to 
signify the concern for information protection by way of having consistent secure 
procedures and practices in various state agencies. A common interpretative scheme 
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was sought to be obtained through centralized or uniform security program with 
minimum set of objectives as benchmark for all organizations.  
 
6.3.1 Designing information systems security initiative 
In this case, the emphasis on information systems security emerged from the 
state legislature and office of the Governor. We can see the use of power to act arising 
from the structures of domination inherent in governing the state, and in lawmaker 
position. The state government wants to have a centralized security program for the 
entire state to enable change in structures of domination and exert closer control on 
compliance from various state agencies. However, the government agencies have 
protested against a blanket program by appealing to the norms of desirable levels of 
autonomy. The government believes that power inherent in the legislation would force 
the state agencies to use their facility of resource allocation to commit significant 
resources for the achievement of good security practices. At the minimum, the threat of 
legal statute and auditing would push the agencies to use the facility of coordination and 
control to get compliant with the state security policy. Subsequent legislation required 
all agencies to be in compliance with the state security policy by a specific deadline. As 
a result, the information security operations came under greater scrutiny by the DOT 
management. 
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Restructuring the organization for effective information systems security 
The information security program has traditionally been responsibility of the 
Division of Operations Security (DOS), which had evolved from the Emergency 
Management Department (EMD). The DOS was essentially responsible for the security 
of the DOT operations. This responsibility included protection of critical infrastructures 
like bridges and tunnels, protecting building blueprints and related material, and 
protecting information (both financial and other) pertaining to construction projects. 
The DOS was established out of three and a half million dollars assigned by the 
Secretary of Transportation to the DOT as an emergency fund when a suspicious pipe 
was found beneath one of the bridges. “When there is an incident, there is fear and 
dollars get allocated,” says ex-CSO Karl Davis “That’s a big problem – educating 
people.”  
 By July 2006, the DOT was required to be in compliance with the revised IT 
security policy of the state within a year. To meet the compliance deadline, the top 
management at DOT used their position of authority to make information security the 
responsibility of the CIO Adam Martin and appointed him the CISO as well. 
Subsequently, information security operations were formally moved from the DOS over 
to the Division of Information Technology (DIT). Further, management used the facility 
of control to reduce the cyber security aspects of the organization from information 
security to IT security. As the CIO, Adam employed his authoritative position’s facility 
of appointment to place IT security operations under the supervision of the IT 
Governance manager, Camila Green. As Kevin Simmons (Deputy CISO) recalls, 
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The governance group was formed to maintain quality control and red tape compliance. 
When Adam got the responsibility, I guess he could have made a separate manager to 
deal with security but he didn’t do it. Camila told Adam that only place for security to 
go in Adam’s organization was to put it in Governance, as he was trying to change 
organization. 
 
Camila depended on the norm of efficiency to justify her suggestion to Adam as “things 
were not happening fast enough.” For her, the best organizational structure in terms of 
information systems security would be “to have one separate organization where 
security has all components like physical, COOP, BIA under one umbrella.” Given the 
limited time frame, Adam then decided to approach the security policy compliance as 
another project. This reflects his belief in the norm of effectiveness in sanctioning such 
an approach. Utilizing his facility of allocating personnel, Adam brought in one of his 
trusted manager, Kevin, to achieve the security policy compliance by the required 
deadline. “I took security as just another project,” says Kevin. Essentially, from July 
2006 onwards, the security initiatives at DOT were shaped by the CIO as a practical 
response to the constraints of external context in the form of state legislation. It is also 
interesting to observe that the CIO did not appoint Alex Simmons, the former IT 
security manager at DOS, as in charge of the new information systems security 
initiative. Needless to say, Alex was bit bitter with this development. Kevin justifies the 
CIO’s move as “Adam deals with known quantity only and he didn’t know Alex.” 
 The restructuring of IT security operations from the DOS to the DIT evoked 
mixed reactions among the stakeholders at DOT. Alex considered the restructuring as a 
complete violation of best practices. As per Alex,  
The CIO decided to move IT Security to the IT division as bridge security is actually 
with the bridges division. Fundamentally this may be true but you don’t put any 
pavement with security. 
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Kevin contends that such sentiments can be attributed to the fact that the CISO 
position was created at DOS with Alex. However, pointing to norms of effectiveness, 
Kevin thinks that not much progress was made in terms of IT security with Alex at the 
helm. As a result, the top management decided to use their authority to appoint Adam 
as the new CISO. “We were floundering before, now we are focused and disciplined,” 
says Adam. However, Alex did not agree with the view and argues that several conflicts 
of interest emerged between the IT department and security function even in terms of 
allocation of resources. He contends, “Resources were taken away from IT security and 
given to IT.”  
Similar concerns were also aired by ex-CSO, Karl Davis who asserts that 
organizational structure was changed to move IT security operations to the DIT as it 
was not able to control security earlier. “It was a political decision,” says Karl. The DIT 
wanted to be in control of the security program and policies being developed at DOT. 
This was because the security policy would have direct implications on the way of 
developing applications and systems. Essentially, the DIT feared that a security policy 
that would be adverse to their interest could impact the interpretative schemes of IT 
development. In effect, it would have a direct impact on the day-to-day operations of 
the department. “IT thought they can’t abide by policies that we hadn’t written,” 
contends Karl. So, the DIT used the structures of domination and legitimation to move 
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IT security under their control. The department also used structures of signification to 
make a case for the DIT as the rightful home for IT security.  
From the CIO’s perspective, the change in organizational structure made sense 
for the DOT. As Adam observed, 
 Did we have competent people? Did we have IT people? What about technical 
structures? … In the DOT, because of people, resources, dependency on IT, security 
wasn’t working.  
 
We can see Adam depending upon the norms of effectiveness to justify the current 
organizational structure. Although agreeing with the effectiveness of such structure, 
Kevin did see potential conflict of interest by having IT security under governance. The 
IT auditor for DOT, Craig Ernst, was more assertive in talking about such concerns. For 
Craig,  
Security folks try to influence developers. Push comes to shove who will win, of course 
developers. 
 
This again highlights the threat of change in interpretative schemes of IT development at 
DIT. Lamenting upon political aspects of the decisions, Karl attributes the 
disassembling of the DOS to the feud between the Director of the department and the 
CEO of the agency. As per Karl, “swords are drawn all the time” at DOT. The then 
Director of DOS had a military background and built a robust security program division 
through his power to use facilities of coordination and control. The Director was amply 
supported by the Secretary of Transportation because of personal reasons. This did not 
go well with the CEO of the agency. Subsequently, the CEO used his influence of 
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power to hire a new director to run the department. “DOT brought the new director to 
break it up,” asserts Karl. Such statement exhibits the acknowledgment of underlying 
structures of domination as emanating from the CEO position.  
Generally agreeing with such assertions, Alex reformulated the problem as a case 
of different personalities. “The earlier Security Chief had a strong personality, but the 
next Chief did not,” said Alex. The issue of personalities was indeed a concern grasped 
by Kevin as well, who went to the extent of emphasizing the dependence of strategic 
initiatives upon the personalities of people in charge. For Kevin, 
Why people get or join a position? What brought them here - the whole background is 
important. The strong or weak personalities of people play a lot important. 
 
It seems that security best serves the needs of the organization if it is structured as an 
independent department reporting directly to the CEO. Some might consider such 
structuring to be essentially serving a governance function. In sum, we may say that the 
events unfolding at DOT, influenced by the circumstances of both internal and external 
context led to restructuring of the organization. The aftermath of an internal power feud 
between the Director of DOS and the CEO and the necessity to abide by the norm of 
compliance in the case of state security policy created a favorable situation for the DIT 
to get IT security operations under its control. The top management was indeed looking 
favorably upon disassembling the DOS, while the DIT wanted to control the IT 
security policy development to maintain the signification structures of IT development. 
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And, the limited time frame for the security policy compliance gave both the interested 
parties a perfect justification for such an excursion.  
 
Developing organizational information systems security program 
Around September 2006, top management of the DOT decided to approach IT 
security as a project. The aim was to get compliant with the state security policy by the 
prescribed deadline. Based on the belief in norm of effectiveness, it was decided to 
simply adopt the state security policy and standard so as to share same structures of 
signification as inherent in the state policy. The CISO Adam Martin justified such a 
move by stating, “Either create one or adopt from somewhere.” The DOT had an 
existing security manual of about thirty pages based upon an old security policy of 
2001. For internal use purposes, the CISO decided to reconfigure the security manual as 
per the organizational requirements of the DOT but aligned it with the state security 
policy and standard. That is, the manual was given the same look and feel as the state IT 
security policy in terms of the structure, thus avoiding any confusion. This indicates an 
emphasis on proper communication to obtain same interpretative scheme.  
The security group reviewed the policy and standard along with the industry best 
practices. “We embellished the state program to fit DOT organization,” states Adam. 
Here, the norm of appropriateness and effectiveness is used to sanction the actions of 
the security group. The security manual was developed with same chapters as those of 
the state security policy.  The task of the group was to develop each chapter of the 
security manual as per the DOT requirements. The facility of control was employed by 
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the group to decide not to go beyond the state standard. As Kevin recalls, “if standard 
says a, b, c we won’t go and say do a, b, c, d, e, f.” The emphasis was to simply 
document the security program at DOT as a manual. Such an approach would allow 
effective communication of the program as sharing same structures of signification as 
are imbibed in state security policy.  
The IT security group comprising of seven members were assigned individual 
areas of responsibility to develop the manual. The facility of coordination was utilized 
to review the developing document as a team. The reviewed document was then passed 
onto various committees for approval. It went through an organizational review process 
so as to abide by the norm of participation and obedience to evoke structures of 
legitimation and domination. The security group established and documented 
procedures for those areas that were covered by the manual. The group utilized the 
facility of coordination to conduct risk assessment even though it was system owners’ 
responsibility. For Kevin, “we are doing it to train them and help them in doing it.” The 
intent here seems to be in advocating the correct interpretation of a program component 
so as to share similar structures of signification. In case of disaster recovery, the group 
had to start from scratch and document all procedures as they found that these were not 
even documented properly. In addition, these procedures were also not being tested 
adequately. The aim was to put the building blocks in place for various components. 
The group decided to reconduct the BIA as business needs keep on changing even 
though it was not up for review. The data classification was done as per the new criteria 
and all systems were reassessed for sensitivity. This exhibition of the norm of help is 
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indeed designed to legitimize the move of IT security group to the DIT. Additionally, 
the DIT also wants to utilize the norm of progress to justify the organizational 
restructuring.  
The problem faced by Kevin was to determine how far to go in terms of 
assisting others in their job functions. “The challenge is in getting people to be 
responsible for what was part of their jobs,” states Kevin. There were certain instances 
where things were not done as necessary in direct neglect of norms of responsibility. 
For instance, the awareness and training program was not functional. The security group 
approached such issues as per the established procedures. They would follow the 
procedure and get the specific component to be operational. Once it was operating they 
would hand it over to appropriate employees to take charge. Such an approach was in 
fact pushed down by the CISO. As Kevin recalls, “Adam would say that lets get it done 
and then we will sort out the responsibility mess.” The facility of coordination was used 
by the CISO to promote the above approach of getting things done. The aim was to 
signify for others that things were getting done in terms of security. The norm of 
responsibility was respected. In doing so, the actions of IT security group were further 
legitimized and also communicated a good image of the DIT. The security manual was 
completely developed by January 2007. It detailed the security program in seventy-five 
pages.  
 Although the security group seems to have adopted the inherent security 
objectives of the state security policy, the members themselves were trying to formalize 
their perceptions on the objective and the role of IT security. Some, like Wade Green in 
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the IT governance group, even discern between information security and IT security 
emphasizing that “T does not matter.” However, the group members seem to follow and 
articulate the views of Adam who considers the role of security to be about governance 
and technical issues. The articulation of similar views by the group members indicates 
their preference to abide by the views of authority. In doing so, these members are in 
fact acknowledging the structures of domination at work. Adam believes that IT 
security need to address what the policy is and how to implement it with technology. 
For Adam, 
It’s a holistic issue. We can’t say it belongs to left or right. It is about day-to-day 
activities coming from system engineering issues, and is not an audit issue.  
 
Slightly deviating from such views, Camila Green, the manager of the governance 
group, considers the role of IT security to be addressing more of procedures and process 
than technical or audit aspects. She fundamentally agrees with the CISO on the role of 
security being more governance rather than that of audit. This again indicates alignment 
with the authority views. For Camila,  
It is more procedures and process than technical or audit. Implement it as process that’s 
more important. I don’t like the concept of audit as security. It gives negative 
connotations.  
 
She asserts that security should actually portray “someone watching not after but 
proactive.” Adam prides himself in the approach taken to develop the security program 
whereby the focus has been on the practical issues of security and using technology to 
make security transparent. Such approach exemplifies his belief in the norm of 
effectiveness to evoke the structure of legitimation. “I do not want to create security so 
that it is burdensome work for employees,” states Adam. The emphasis has been on 
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getting organizational members abide by the security requirements minimally. The logic 
pursued by the CISO can be summed up as the need to keep all members aware of 
security, to force them to make it absolutely necessary, however, do not make it 
bureaucratic.  
 
6.3.2 Instituting information systems security initiatives 
The information systems security program at DOT was approached in two 
phases. Once the security program was developed, the program need to be instituted 
across the organization. The efforts of security group to institutionalize information 
systems security program at DOT are described and analyzed in this section.  
 
Evoking obedience through management leadership 
The IT security program manual developed by the security group was presented 
to the CEO who approved it. The CEO sent out a memorandum addressed to various 
division heads of the DOT emphasizing his commitment to enforce the security 
program manual so as to meet the state security policy compliance deadline. Here, the 
CEO used the power inherent in his position through a memorandum, which represents 
a facility of control, to evoke structures of domination exhibited in his commitment to 
enforce a specific manual. He also used the norm of compliance with a state law to 
legitimize his action. The CEO also informed the divisions of his decision to adopt the 
state security policy and standard while creating the IT security program that reflected 
the adoption of the state policy. The memo essentially directed the divisional heads to 
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understand, acknowledge and agree to enforce and practice the tenets of the IT security 
program. The memo was used as a communication between the CEO and the divisional 
heads to achieve a shared structure of signification. This directive essentially implies 
the use of power on behalf of the CEO to force agreement from divisional heads using 
the facility of control and coordination to enforce the security program. Further, the 
memorandum invoked the inherent structures of domination to hold each division head 
as responsible for implementing the security program in their respective divisions and 
be also subject to routine audits. Kevin considered the memo to be a forceful one 
indicating that there would be no exceptions.  
The strong leadership was a desired factor for the security group to achieve 
compliance with the security program manual. The leadership as constitutive of power 
held by an agent was seen necessary to sanction abidance with the security objectives as 
being communicated through the security manual. As Camila asserts, “That gives you 
stick to get people to do it.” Another group member, Alex emphasized the role of 
management as the force behind the rules. Such leadership would entail a lot less 
resistance to security efforts across the organization. The underlying assumption is that 
actors perceive management as the rightful party to tap structures of domination to 
enforce a particular action. Kevin also voiced similar sentiments. 
The CEO had written a forceful memo. There was no question for anyone whether to do 
it or not. Most were aware they had to do it so they didn’t fight us. 
 
Remindful of the strong traits for the CISO as well, Brenda Simmons (security analyst 
at the department) considers it to be critical “that he is out there and bold so that 
everyone can see.” For Kevin, the security program was sold as a top-down approach 
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with directives coming from the state, in the form of security policy, to the DOT. Such 
an approach clearly laid down the authority. The communication of security objectives 
through the security policy and the program manual was to provide a common 
interpretative scheme so as to achieve the shared structures of signification across the 
organization. The use of state security policy for the DOT was morally sanctioned 
through the norm of compliance with law that drew upon the structures of legitimation 
possessed by the law forming body of the land. The relationship between the state 
government and other state organizations assumes the domination of former over latter 
respectively. This relationship along with the corporate position of the CEO was used 
effectively through the facility of control to enforce IT security program upon all 
divisions at DOT.  
 
Creating user awareness by employing training as a compliance stick 
The next step was to create an awareness of the security program among all 
employees at DOT. Adam recalls, “We developed security manuals and officially 
promulgated it so that every executive is aware of it.” The aim was to communicate the 
security policy across the organization so as to provide a common interpretative scheme 
for all employees. Such proliferation would also help in achieving a shared structure of 
signification, which in this case would be to achieve a secure mode of operations. Such 
a task created another challenge for the security group members since they had to deal 
with the realities of a functionally and geographically distributed organization. “It 
would be unrealistic for me to talk to everyone as folks are located remotely,” says 
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Brenda. To overcome such challenges, the security group resorted to conducting 
workshops for the officers of responsibility from each division. The scheduling of 
workshops illustrates the use of facility of coordination by the security group members 
and the workshops itself are being employed as a medium of communication. It is 
interesting to note that the security group decided to concentrate on only powerful 
agents. This selective behavior could be understood if we look at these officers of 
responsibility as the ones who would be able to evoke the structures of domination. 
These officers would be able to use power inherent in their positions to implement the 
IT security program in their respective domains. During the period from February to 
July 2007, the group conducted four awareness workshops although not on a regular 
interval.  
 The security group created a website and developed a prominent position on the 
organizational portal for incident reporting, awareness training, the security program 
manual, the security policy, and cyber tips. In other words, the group used the available 
resources and the facility of coordination to develop a website which served as a 
medium of communication for different components of the security program. As Kevin 
notes, 
Lot of awareness went into it. For instance, in case of data protection, for retiring hard 
disk we went and spoke with people in charge, understood their process. They report it 
back to us, that’s compliance component or factor for us.  
 
From the structuration point of view, Kevin is legitimizing the work done by his group 
to develop the security manual, which is expected to provide a common interpretative 
scheme to understand the security objectives as applicable to the DOT work 
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requirements. In evaluating the efforts of the security group, Camila acknowledges that 
the awareness section is good and “keeps people informed plus it is constant.” 
However, she dwells on the importance of good educational communication tool. “We 
are not there yet in that sense,” acknowledges Camila.  
 To achieve compliance with the security policy, the IT security program manual 
required each employee of the DOT to undergo an online security training and obtain a 
certification of compliance each year. In this case, the norm of obedience is invoked 
through the facility of control. Through training, the management tends to impose upon 
each employee a common interpretative scheme to understand the security objectives as 
applicable to the operational environment of their work. Essentially, each employee had 
to read the IT security policy and answer a few multiple-choice type questions 
pertaining to the security policy. At the end of successfully answering these questions, 
each user was awarded a certificate that recorded the date of completion of online 
training.  
The certificate was in essence a communication medium to signify that all users 
abide by the security policy and their subsequent actions would be legitimate if they are 
based upon the understanding of this policy. Although commonly considered as trivial, 
the online certification tool was used effectively by the security group in promulgating 
the security program across the organization. The security group decided to use security 
training to turnoff access of employees who had not achieved the online certification. 
Wade explains this as management viewpoint where “you can’t manage it that you can’t 
measure.” For Adam,  
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Out of 7000 user accounts, 25% of the accounts had to be terminated across the DOT. 
This kind of result was unheard of at DOT. It convinced everyone about the importance 
of security. 
 
Such statements indicate a common interpretative scheme being employed to assess the 
situation and also willingness to understand what IT security meant for the DOT. The 
security program manual detailed that accounts of such individuals (without 
certification) should be disabled. However, the security group worked with various 
divisions to get the number down to thirty-four by June 2007. The access to the 
accounts of these thirty-four employees was subsequently terminated.  
 As indicative in the above discussion, training was used as a control tool so that 
the intent of various employees could be known by way of abiding to the proposed 
security objectives. The failure to attain an online certification was perceived as a 
message from a user that she does not share similar signification structures. For such 
users, the CISO had to exhibit the use of power provided by the security program 
manual, to turn off access until the user demonstrated obedience to authority. To 
reinstate their respective user accounts, these employees had to follow procedures, 
which in the words of the security manager were unfriendly. As per Wade, 
If you don’t have performance evaluation, people don’t care. Such employees with 
delinquent certifications got notices as annual performance review.  
 
The security group employed the certification facility as a tool for domination and the 
performance evaluation reviews as control mechanism to signify user non-compliance 
with shared meaning of security as adopted by the DOT. “This was done to put a 
message across,” justifies Kevin. The CISO was strongly supporting such actions. 
According to Adam,  
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I was ready to terminate the Deputy Commissioner’s account if he didn’t take 
certification. Two Assistant Commissioners didn’t take it. We gave them two weeks 
notice. One of them did it and one didn’t. I told him you got until midnight to comply. 
He did it.  
 
However, Adam warns that such actions cannot be taken everyday but need to be 
asserted when necessary. “Don’t keep sending security changes everyday,” states 
Adam. In actual, the human resources division was responsible for the security training 
program. As the training program was not operational, the security group decided to 
take it as an extra responsibility, improved it and handed it back to the human resources 
division upon making the program effective.   
 
Transforming culture by sowing positions of support in organizational silos  
Given the nature and size of the DOT as an organization, it was not easy to 
manage the security program. For Adam, 
Security has major holes in adaptation since the DOT is large and diverse both 
organizationally and geographically. It is not easy to manage the security program in 
DOT because of size.  
 
He realized that although major responsibility for IT security was still with the Division 
Heads, there was no one to take care of it. To address this issue, Adam decided to create 
a position, fund it, and assign responsibility for IT security to that position. In this case, 
the CISO is employing his facility of resource allocation to create a position. In this 
regard, Adam had two meetings with the divisional heads to present the security 
program manual and also discuss the possibility of creating a new position of IT 
security coordinator. Out of thirty division heads, ten decided to be in charge of 
security. Kevin explains such decision as,  
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It is fine whether they delegate or not. The division and district heads are ultimately 
responsible.  
 
As a result, each division now has one IT security coordinator. The coordinator position 
was created to minimize tendency to influence security by divisions like audit. For 
Kevin, the problem of getting IT security coordinator positions was “overcome with 
negotiation and perseverance.”  
 The position of IT security coordinator was seen as essential to transform an 
organizational culture whereby security was considered to be the last thing, although 
individually it might be considered as significant. Such action signifies that security is 
generally considered to be unimportant by the organizational members and as such do 
not share the signification structures of the security group. “Everyone is so busy doing 
other things, their work, that security is the last thing,” states Paul Simmons, security 
analyst. The new position of security coordinator was created to sanction the security 
aspects and be used as a communication source for the respective divisions. The 
security group wanted to communicate the norms of secure environment as legitimized 
by the DOT management along with sanctioning specific actions as deemed significant 
to achieve secure operations. As such, the new position of security coordinator in each 
division would help in developing a shared vision on how to achieve security. It would 
be a collective action on part of the division to ensure good security practices, and in the 
process also helps the security group to ensure a secure environment for the DOT 
operations. Camila captures the work culture of organizational members at DOT in the 
following statement: 
We are very comfortable with what we are doing, what we always do. Its DOT. 
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Such lax attitude at work makes Paul to believe that it is critical “to ingrain a corporate 
mentality that security is important.” This indicates the need to establish the norm of a 
secure environment for the benefit of the organization. Similar concerns were also 
brought up by Wade Green who mentioned that it was not uncommon to find computer 
terminals open while members left desk unattended. Such cases are an indication of a 
level of awareness and also a level of trust. However, Wade believes that the “level of 
awareness needs to be higher while level of trust should be justifiable.” The norm of 
secure environment could be established through the facility of awareness.  
 Another interesting situation involved the security group to deal with one of the 
divisions that had trouble as it was out of scope with the security policy on few issues. 
Citing the problem Camila purports, 
There’s a cultural issue here as they never had to deal with central office and security. 
However, Kevin did not make much of the problem. For him, adoption of the security 
policy was considered more like a law at the DOT. This indicates that the policy had 
been legitimized and was to be accepted by the organizational members. As Camila 
argues, 
They might balk at two points but at higher level they are fine and would get along with 
it. We have new security policy that is law. They would grumble but would get it done. 
Culture didn’t stop security here. It did effect and stop my last project.  
 
Both Kevin and Camila suggest that the problems related to organizational culture were 
successfully overcome by invoking structures of legitimation and domination. The 
power inherent in authority was effectively used to accomplish the objectives of the 
security initiatives at DOT.  
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Attaining security goodwill by paying homage to fiefdom lords 
Given the nature of DOT and the fact that it is one of the largest transportation 
organizations in the country, it would not come as a surprise that the political 
environment at DOT is generally intense. Brenda humbly put it as “mighty political.” 
Taking into account the ground reality, the CISO decided to pursue a strategy of making 
incremental changes rather than one of drastic changes. For a large organization, “it 
takes time to get people on board,” says Adam. The hierarchy at DOT is such that there 
is the CEO, the deputy CEO, the District Division Heads and then the Functional 
Division Heads. The District Division Heads are collectively more powerful than the 
Functional Division Heads and there is also an informal network among them. They 
would collectively decide to go in a certain direction or do certain things. The division 
heads seem to have a good understanding of the structures of domination. The 
establishment of an informal network indicates successful employment of the facility of 
coordination among them. By channeling their efforts towards an end they are able to 
effect control over uncertain situations. For Kevin, 
The district heads are little kings. They have autonomous power and can really get in 
your way.  
 
“You have to understand that there would be conflict of anything that needs to go 
through across organization,” cautions Camila. As such, it became essential to convince 
these powerful agents and also to build relationships and network.  
 The security group faced an uphill task in getting different divisions working 
together. “Getting everyone to work together at strategic agency level is a challenge,” 
said Camila. It was problematic for the group to get everybody to agree on a particular 
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issue and follow the same process. “There’s resistance on any thing that is pushed out 
from central office,” reminds Kent Davis, the COOP manager. The fact that the CEO 
had sent a strongly worded memo carried a lot of weight. The security efforts at DOT 
were laid out as coming directly from the state. For Kevin, 
It left no debate. This was a key thing. It took away real case if some District head 
could take away. For instance, if we had a, b, c, d, e, f, g then e, f, g if not required by 
DOT would be open for debate.  
 
This understanding of political realities at DOT helped the security group to “take away 
real case” from the division heads to argue. Essentially, the security group was able to 
effectively employ the structure of authority to legitimize institution of the security 
program across the organization. The group was careful to properly communicate the 
security objectives in the program manual exactly as captured in the state security 
policy. This allowed the group to further legitimize their endeavors and prevented 
groups to avoid dominance battles with division heads.  
In case of IT security coordinator positions, being a CISO Adam decided to use 
his control over resources and their allocation to fund positions and assign security 
responsibility in the division. This was also to help the division heads who were 
essentially responsible to implement the security program manual in their respective 
divisions. The CISO gave up the facility of control over these positions to the division 
heads to avoid any untoward power conflicts. Actually, these positions were charged 
with the responsibility of dispersing security requirements as communicated by the 
security group. However, the divisions got sidetracked and started to hire folks with 
background such as finance rather than IT. When the security responsibility started 
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trickling down from the security group, the incumbents of the security coordinator 
position complained that they have lot of work. “Adam and Camila told them that we 
provided money and you picked the wrong people so it is your problem,” recalls Kevin. 
From Camila’s perspective, “it is very significant to get things done.” She suggests to 
give and take favors, and build relationships to deal with the political dynamics at work. 
“Key factor is, one can’t tell anyone to do anything,” said Camila.  
 
Surviving through security sustenance 
The security group took implementation of the security program at DOT as a big 
challenge. Under Adam’s leadership, the group translated the security objectives into 
actionable items. Besides costs and risks, culture and resistance to change were 
evaluated. The group communicated with each other on security objectives so as to 
arrive at a common interpretative scheme. Further, the need for well-trained employees 
to maintain the program was also realized. For Adam, 
We need strong trained employees to maintain the program whether we are achieving 
our objectives or not…Daily care and feed for security is critical. Without this, the 
security program is dead. 
 
The group concentrated on developing skilled process, people and managers at 
the helm of the security initiatives. Adam guided the security group to approach 
security efforts at DOT in two phases. In phase one, the efforts were focused 
on consistent adaptation of the security program. In phase two, the emphasis of 
the group was on the maintenance and upkeep of the security program. “Most 
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important thing is security sustenance,” notes Adam. The CISO used the facility 
of coordination to promote the norm of sustenance that he believed in. The belief 
in sustenance was communicated to the security group members who focused on 
achieving similar understanding of the norm.  
 Given that DOT is a big and dispersed organization with around eight thousand 
and eight hundred employees, the very size posed a few challenges. The management of 
technology, policy and practices was complex and also required adequate resources to 
be allocated by the executive officers through the facility available to their position, as 
IT security is neither easy nor cheap. For Adam, “if you go skimpy in budget allocation 
or staffing, you are gonna pay for it.” Despite such a belief, Camila felt she was not 
provided with adequate resources and time by the CISO. According to her, “things 
would not be given no matter how many times I go and ask.” Another security group 
member, Brenda also felt the need for dedicating “more resources to ensure that all bases 
are covered.” The security efforts involve implementing nine component programs and 
seven members to make it happen across the organization. However, Kevin disagrees 
with such views as resources were made available to him as and when needed. Another 
dimension of interest from sustenance viewpoint is self-enforcement. “You can’t leave 
it upto someone’s good intentions,” reminds Wade. It is essential to have procedural 
and automated measures in place that operate to enforce core security practices. The 
emphasis needs to be on compliance with practice rather than intent of the people. For 
him, “there should be a mechanism that can’t be bypassed.” 
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6.3.3 Discussion and summary 
The information systems security initiatives were embarked upon with vigor at 
DOT primarily to abide by the state legislation requiring compliance with the state 
security policy. This is not to imply that security efforts were non-existent at DOT but 
they did not involve the seriousness required for such a critical issue. To effectively 
design the security initiatives, the organization was restructured so as to move the 
security operations under the control of DIT. Such a move could be attributed to the 
events unfolding at DOT influenced by the circumstances of both internal and external 
context. However, it would be prudent for an organization to structure information 
systems security as a separate department reporting directly to the CEO.  
The security program was developed around the structure of state security 
policy for consistency and efficiency reasons. To address the organizational 
requirements specific to the DOT, a security manual was developed along the lines of 
the state security policy but the procedures outlined in the document were configured as 
per the internal requirements. The aim was to design a comprehensive program which 
would necessitate all members to observe secure practices without making the program 
bureaucratic. It is essential to base the information systems security program of an 
organization on an internationally recognized standard or as evidenced in the case, on a 
state security policy as required by the law. That is, the policy should address the 
components advocated in the standard. However, such components maybe fleshed out 
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as per the business requirements of an organization. Such endeavor would be more 
reliable and beneficial for an organization rather than blindly adopting a state security 
policy that might not even be based upon the industry best practices.  
 Once the security program was developed, the program had to be instituted 
across the organization. To do so, strong management support was seen by the security 
group as quintessential for the success of the program. In fact, the CEO wrote a strong 
memorandum to various division heads emphasizing his commitment to enforce the 
security program. The effect of such support was seen throughout the implementation 
phase. There were numerous instances where the security group was able to overcome 
hindrances or doubts by virtue of the management leadership. The important point to 
note is strong leadership, which is the critical factor, and not merely management 
support as has been proposed by prevalent academic literature. A strong leadership 
displayed by the CEO would invariably entail support across the organization. Perhaps 
it is a definitional issue in terms of different views, however, there is a difference 
between leadership and support that makes all the difference.  
The security group created awareness of the security program among 
organizational members. Training was used as a control tool whereby the failure to 
attain an online certification of compliance was seen as a message that user does not 
agree to abide by the security policy. Such disobedience with authority was dealt by 
suspending accounts and bad performance reviews. Although using training, as a 
compliance stick seems to be an effective mechanism, it should be pointed that the 
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quality of user training and their resulting understanding about security issues was 
dismal. It is imperative to educate users on different issues and facets of security and 
not merely provide them with automated training. An effective information systems 
security requires education of organizational members where training might be one of 
the components, and awareness yet another component.  
 For any initiative to be successful, it is imperative to understand and address the 
cultural as well as political realities of the organization. Education of organizational 
members may be seen as one of the ways to transform an organizational culture. At 
DOT, the security management employed a novel approach to overcome organizational 
silos by creating and funding the information security coordinator position in each 
division and district. Such an action may be seen as an excellent demonstration of 
understanding of the cultural and political context of the DOT by the CISO. This 
position would not only garner support for the security group but may also be used as an 
effective informal communication mouthpiece for the group. The availability of an 
additional employee by virtue of the creation of this position was also a gesture to help 
the division heads bear the security responsibility. The CISO was effectively able to 
outflank the organizational politics by initiating a maneuver that restored full control 
over newly created positions of the information security coordinators squarely in the 
hands of division heads. In addition, it would also be prudent for an organization to 
promote participation of powerful agents in instituting security program across the 
organization. This may be achieved by formally creating a security council with 
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powerful agents as council members. Such a council would function as an advisory 
group to the security team.  
  
6.4 Social Transformation at the Department of Transportation 
 In this section, we employ the theory of social transformation, as advocated by 
Giddens, to further understand the case study. Barrett and Walsham (1999) note that 
Giddens’ later work actually builds upon the core structuration theory and provides a 
complete picture of the phenomenon. Giddens later work also had an emphasis on the 
importance of time and space in structuring of social relations (Barrett and Walsham, 
1999). This conception is used to understand the modernity and its transformations. 
Broadly, the transformation is addressed at two levels – global tendencies and self-
identity. Barrett and Walsham (1999) have applied the theory of social transformation 
to IT domain. The theory has been successful in explaining the link between IT and 
transformation, as it relates changes in modern institutions to shifts in self-identity.  
Although Barrett & Walsham (1999) endeavor to bring in IT as an explicit 
dimension, we restrict ourselves to the general theory as provided by Giddens. The 
application and use of the theory of social transformation as an extension of the 
structuration theory or auxiliary to the structuration theory is consistent in 
understanding the main research question which deals with how security initiatives get 
instituted in organizations. In other words, there is a link between an IS security 
initiative and organizational change or transformation that needs to be explored. The 
theory of social transformation purports to explore this very link. In essence, we are 
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viewing this theory as an extension of the structuration theory and following the 
intellectual work of Barrett and Walsham (1999) in its application in modern 
organizations.  
 For Giddens, the globalizing tendencies in modern times derive from three 
sources: the separation of time and space; the development of disembedding 
mechanisms; and institutional reflexivity. It is necessary to consider both social 
relations between people present in time and space, and between those who are absent 
in time and space. The underlying assumption in modern organizations is the precise 
coordination of the actions of various stakeholders who may not be physically present at 
a given place but are nevertheless connected to time of action. The disembedding 
mechanisms imply the stretching of social relations which allow for the separation of 
interaction from the particularities of locales. This term is linked to the separation of 
time and space. In modern organizations, due to separation of time and space, the social 
relations have been lifted out of local contexts of interaction and reenacted through trust 
across indefinite spans of time-space. As explained by Barrett and Walsham (1999),  
Giddens distinguishes between trust relations that are “sustained by or expressed in 
social connections established in circumstances of copresence (same time and place),” 
and the development of trust in conditions of absence as a consequence of expert 
systems (pp. 4). 
 
Institutional reflexivity implies that there is ongoing questioning and revising of 
existing knowledge and practices that may also lead to the reordering of existing social 
relations.  
For self-identity, there are three key concepts: concern for deskilling, for 
existential anxiety, and the opportunity for reskilling and empowerment. In modern 
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organizations, there is a potential concern for deskilling with the utilization of new 
knowledge. Further, such utilization would also have an impact on existential anxiety of 
organizational members. These activities may also result in development of new skills 
by these members. Giddens suggests reappropriation and empowerment as two 
alternative possibilities to reskilling. The former is associated with the reappropriation 
of knowledge and control.  
…while people may lose skills and forms of knowledge, they remain skillful and 
knowledgeable in the contexts of action in which their activities take place (Barrett and 
Walsham, 1999: pp. 5). 
 
In terms of empowerment, the new knowledge provides organizational members the 
power to alter the material world and transform the conditions of their actions. As such, 
the organizational members always have an option between local way of doing things 
and procedures offered by the expert knowledge (Barrett and Walsham, 1999).  
 
6.4.1 Evaluating globalizing tendencies at DOT 
The globalizing tendencies are the result of separation of time and space 
between entities, the development of disembedding mechanisms and institutional 
reflexivity. These sources are evaluated in the context of DOT in the following sub-
sections.  
 
Separation of time and space 
As mentioned in earlier sections, the DOT has to abide by or comply with the 
information systems security policy and standard developed by the state technology 
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agency - ITA. This policy does not necessarily take into account the context of DOT 
operations. “They shouldn’t go with the approach that one shoe fits all,” argues Adam 
Martin. The policy had been written by the ITA for all government organizations in the 
state of Wonderland irrespective of the organizations being either geographically 
dispersed or their operations heavily dependent upon information.  
 The social relations are enacted between the ITA and the DOT security teams as 
the latter have to understand the underlying beliefs of the ITA security team as captured 
in the clauses of the policy. For Adam, 
We could either adopt what they have done or do it on our own. The ITA didn’t do it on 
their own. They took input. Lot of my folks worked on it. 
 
Further, the policy has to be interpreted and implemented at the DOT. “Because its real 
world, you do have to tamper policy and standard as per our culture and politics,” 
explains Kevin Simmons. In a similar manner, social relations also exist between the 
headquarter security group and various divisions and districts of the DOT who have to 
abide by the security program. 
 In addition, IT aspects of security (IT infrastructure) have been consolidated 
with the ITA and further outsourced to the Outsourcing Firm. The ITA is generally 
looked upon by government agencies as two organizations, one dealing with 
governance and policy development and second that support agencies (IT infrastructure 
via the Outsourcing Firm). As per Kevin Simmons, “that’s a problem for agencies” as 
they are required by the policy to be responsible for the service provider, “which is ITA 
who have outsourced it to Outsourcing Firm.” Alex Simmons expressed similar 
sentiments as well. 
    240 
 
Another issue with the ITA is that it is asking the agencies to ensure the service 
provider [ITA] to protect the systems with proper security. It is frustrating. 
 
Now, the state security policy stipulates the DOT to ensure that the ITA - Outsourcing 
Firm partnership actually observes good security practices for the DOT related 
transactions. Here, the social relations are now seen to be extending beyond the ITA and 
also bringing the Outsourcing Firm into picture.  
 
Development of disembedding mechanisms 
The CISO of DOT has to trust that security policy developers at ITA are indeed 
knowledgeable and working to develop best possible security policy for the state and 
the DOT. As per Adam Martin, 
I like them to look for the practicality of implementation of proposals they are making. 
… The ITA should look at operation point of view for security rather than governance 
and policy only. I think their role needs to evolve to more operational and practical. 
 
Also, the CISO has to trust that the ITA security group is indeed helping them rather 
than looking for ways to force the DOT to buy services to boost revenues. In fact, Kevin 
lamented on the “half-baked services” offered by the ITA and how he was “paying a 
fortune for those services.” 
 Trust in the ITA got diminished when it extended compliance deadline at the 
last minute. Kevin was upset with this act of generosity from the ITA. He recalls, 
I had to deal with angry district security coordinators. They felt they had gone out of 
way to get things done. They bugged the District Administrator who thought it 
(security) was not that critical in first place. My response was that the ITA has extended 
the compliance deadline but not our Commissioner.  
 
Members of the security group at DOT accuse that significant resources were wasted as 
they could have achieved the compliance within an extended deadline with greater 
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efficiency. Then there was an instance of mistrust where members of security team at 
DOT felt that they were being asked to do the work, which the ITA was expected to do 
in the first place. Camila Green contends,  
It is a very complicated scene. Josh at the ITA was just running us around. They were 
telling us that DOT you do the work and we take credit for it. Be honest. 
 
Despite such instances, the DOT had to trust the ITA - Outsourcing Firm partnership 
that they are doing what is required to protect the IT infrastructure. The security team 
members consider this aspect of the ITA as infrastructure providing organization 
particularly challenging. Adam attributes the difficulties arising from the ITA’s role of 
IT infrastructure provider as an issue of “struggling with deciding on roles and 
responsibilities” between itself and other agencies.  
 The DOT can only rely upon email communication and assurances provided to 
them by the ITA, as they are not allowed to physically verify the operations at the data 
center. This lands the DOT as an agency in another predicament as highlighted by 
Kevin in the following excerpt,  
In case of intrusion detection, policy says agency would do monitoring and log. Since 
we don’t own that stuff, it doesn’t belong to us and second, we are not dealing with 
operational side. We have to go and talk with the ITA and the Outsourcing Firm’s 
operations. They said that we don’t have IDS therefore there are no logs.  
 
The above statement indicates a lack of control by the security group at DOT over its 
service provider the ITA and the Outsourcing Firm to get them to do what is expected 
as per the security policy and the contract. The intrusion detection system should be in 
place in accordance with the service contract with the ITA. However, this was not the 
case. The DOT has been exposed to unexpected risk as a result of ITA’s ‘half-baked 
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service.’ The irony is that the DOT cannot do much about the situation and has to pay 
for such incompetence. At the most, the DOT can rely on the summary reports and 
outputs generated by IT systems that indicate breaches and incident reports. The actual 
reports per server or subsequent actions taken on incident are not shared with the DOT 
by the ITA - Outsourcing Firm partnership. 
 The DOT has to implement the ITA security policy and standard within a given 
timeframe, as decided by the ITA on behalf of the state. In addition, the technical 
aspects of IT security (infrastructure and technical employees) have already been 
consolidated by the ITA although the DOT is still responsible for any untoward 
incidents. As such, this case is rather interesting and different from a situation where an 
organization might adopt IT security standard within a timeframe deemed necessary by 
that organization itself. Generally, organizations would be in control of technical IT 
security operations, although in some cases security operations might have been 
outsourced to a third party for resource efficiency. However, in the case of DOT 
compliance with the security policy and standard was involuntary and forced. The DOT 
did not have control on the timeframe and technical expertise had already been lost to 
the ITA as a result of statewide consolidation.  
 
Engaging in institutional reflexivity 
At DOT, there is an ongoing questioning and revising of existing knowledge 
among security members. For the CISO Adam Martin, 
Most important thing is security sustenance. We need strong trained employees to 
maintain program whether we are achieving objective. … We need dedicated 
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maintenance organization that would support and keep up with your program. Teams 
working together are essential. You need a holistic approach otherwise it would be in 
difficulty. 
 
The security policy requires employees with knowledge on different components of 
organizational security. At the least, organizational members have to understand 
components of the IT security policy. These would include risk management, disaster 
recovery, access controls, and contingency planning among others. Also, the sustenance 
of security program entails the security group members to be knowledgeable about IT 
auditing.  
The existing practices were scrutinized in the light of the new policy and 
necessary changes were made to become security effective. To get access to IT systems, 
there were a number of different ways by which an employee could request access to 
required IT systems for job related work. The security team worked to consolidate these 
different access methods into a standard form. For Kevin, 
It is a three part deal. One, we need to have standard process for access. Second, 
standard request forms should be available. Then, automate it for web-based access. All 
these are ongoing. 
 
To get compliant with the state security policy, the DOT security group requires all 
employees to have read the information systems security policy. Delinquent employees 
have been punished by way of suspending their computer access accounts. Adam recalls 
his tough stance to change the old practices,  
I was ready to terminate the Deputy Commissioner’s account if he didn’t take 
certification… In one district, there were 12 employees who didn’t do it. I called the 
District Administrator. He told me to terminate their accounts if that’s what required to 
get their attention. I can’t do this everyday. But has to do it when necessary. 
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Few other practices have been revised because of the security policy such as evaluating 
and classifying data sensitivity; and, formalizing incident reporting. In addition, IT 
project teams are required to formally think about and inculcate security considerations 
in their projects. Towards this effect, project teams have to demonstrate to the CIO 
during presentations that security aspects were indeed considered.  
 
6.4.2 Understanding self-identity at DOT 
Self-identity involves the concern for deskilling, for existential anxiety, and the 
opportunity for reskilling and empowerment. Such concerns need to be understood from 
the standpoint of DOT organizational members.   
 
Concern for deskilling 
The implementation of the security policy requires adequate skill set in IT 
security. It would require formal training or certification, like CISSP. The successful 
implementation necessitates both technical and non-technical (organizational) skills. 
“Have skilled people, skilled process and skilled manager,” asserts Adam Martin. 
Further, the legislation and security policy requires positions of responsibility to be 
staffed with people having required degree or certification and proper experience. For 
Adam, 
Other agencies don’t like the ITA since they don’t have competent technical staff. The 
DOT has. We have been through this before. 
 
Such confidence of Adam about the competency of his security staff is especially 
interesting, as half of the security team had mentioned about their handicap in not 
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possessing proper experience or undergone training in IT security. This observation on 
deskilling forces us to think about how these members were actually able to conduct 
their job responsibilities. Such concerns lead us to the concept of reappropriation, which 
would be discussed after the following section.  
 
Existential anxiety 
As has been mentioned earlier, there has been consolidation of the IT 
infrastructure by the ITA. Subsequently, the network or system administrators were no 
longer required at the DOT and had to either lose their jobs or move to the ITA - 
Outsourcing Firm partnership. Alex Simmons is critical about the anxious moments 
experienced during the uncertain consolidation period. He recalls, 
People were basically told that this is what’s going to happen, do it or walk away. 
People moved from the DOT to the ITA to the Otusourcing Firm. The alliance or 
allegiance was slow to move from the DOT to the ITA to the Otusourcing Firm. There 
was backward thinking. The ITA didn’t have real progressive view. If we consider 
technology as the main thing for roads and the lack of latest tools, we could say that for 
every penny spent on technology, not a mile of road has been built. 
 
All this amounts to existential anxiety. At the same time, there were employees who had 
to upgrade their skills in security or risk losing their jobs.  
 The employees in security responsible positions (like security coordinators or 
division heads) at the Divisions and Districts had to take on an additional role of 
security. This was beyond their main job functions for which they were hired. As per 
Alex Simmons,  
There is a security coordinator in each division and district to help in reviews of 
compliance. It is extra duty for all. Security is not their full-time responsibility. 
Generally, the Heads of district and division appoint individual people. For security, 
there is no rule. 
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The additional responsibility indeed amounts to existential anxiety. These individuals 
might have to educate themselves or keep themselves informed about security aspects 
even though security might not be their primary job function. In addition, employees 
responsible with security aspects have to comply with the requirement of certification 
during specific period of time like last three to five years, along with appropriate 
experience in certain cases. 
 
Reappropriation  
The security manager at DOT did not have any experience or background in IT 
security. According to Kevin, 
I am an IT project manager. Adam never intended for me to do the security manager 
role. I go from idea stage to get it running and then move on. 
 
However, he became knowledgeable about security while trying to implement it at the 
DOT. Only deputy security manager and one of the security analysts, Paris Simmons, 
were knowledgeable about security to an extent, the former because of his experience 
while the latter by virtue of her education. Alex attributed this problem of lack of 
appropriate human resources to the consolidation by the ITA. For him, 
With formation of the ITA, it took security people away from us. The ITA has job and 
people but agencies have the responsibility. We had to do it without people and 
resources. 
 
In fact, few members of the security group initially avoided the interviews conducted 
during data collection for this research and tried to avoid specific security questions. 
They would appreciate job related or more general questions. Despite the handicap, the 
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team members remained skillful and knowledgeable in the context of their job 
requirement to develop and implement a particular component of the security policy. In 
fact, the security manager approached security initiative as a project.  
 
Empowerment  
The security members altered the operational environment at DOT by 
introducing new practices for the organizational members. By observing such practices, 
the organization members would in fact lead to secure operational environment. A 
classification system for information is generally recommended by various industry best 
practices. However, such a practice has not been adopted at the DOT. This particular 
concern was vigorously pointed out by Wade Green during a meeting. In his words, 
There’s no policy or document that defines marking of documents as classified, 
officials only, etc. Once you have those rules, implementing and ensuring them in 
automated system is trivial. There’s no system in place for information security 
classification and handling. How do we know which information is hazardous to 
agency? That’s the biggest gap. 
 
In fact, Wade is more concerned with the general consent among the group as not to go 
“beyond statutory requirements.” Such an approach for him has resulted in a situation 
where there is “no documented set of procedures that would allow anyone to handle an 
item of information.” However, such practice is followed because of the nature of the 
organization. Since the DOT does not deal with a lot of sensitive information it does not 
make sense for the organization to classify all information as per some classification 
system. The sensitive information that the DOT does possess may be requisitioned 
through the Freedom of Information Act. The security group adopted and reconfigured 
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the advocated security policy and standard, and best practices as per the requirement at 
DOT. This can be seen as selection between local way of doing things and procedures 
offered by best practices.  
 
6.4.3 Discussion and Summary 
The CISO guided the security group to initially focus the efforts on consistent 
adaptation of the security program, and later support it with strong maintenance and 
upkeep of the security program. To take the security program to a level of maturity, the 
emphasis has to be upon developing skilled process, having skilled people and skilled 
manager at the helm of the security efforts. Skilled process and people requires 
understanding the nature of modern organizations that are influenced by globalizing 
tendencies and concerns of organizational members at the individual level. At the 
institutional level, there is a separation of time and space among different agents and 
projects which necessitates adequate attention to the social relations between such 
parties. In the case of DOT, the security group had to understand the underlying beliefs 
of the ITA security team as captured in the clauses of the policy document as it was not 
written specifically for context of the DOT. Further, the social relations were seen to be 
extending beyond the ITA and also bringing the Outsourcing Firm into picture. Such 
might be the case for other organizations as well where various teams involved in 
different facets of the security program might not have the opportunity to interact 
directly with one another. One team might be involved in configuring the standard 
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based upon the policy developed by a standard developing body. In such cases, it is 
essential to maintain the social relations through trust across the dimensions of time and 
space.  
 At DOT, the CISO had to trust the security policy developers at ITA that they 
are indeed working to develop best possible security policy for the state. There is a 
chance that this might not be the case in reality. Also, the DOT had to trust the ITA - 
Outsourcing Firm partnership that they are doing what is required to protect the IT 
infrastructure. In some instances, such trust relations were in fact suspended especially 
in the case of extending the policy compliance deadline. In yet another instance, an 
apparent lack of control was evidenced by the security group in its inability to hold their 
service provider, the ITA - Outsourcing Firm, to the agreed upon commitments. These 
instances indicate the importance of developing trust relations as disembedding 
mechanisms in the organizational practices. At the same time, the existing practices 
need to be questioned and revised at regular periods of time. At DOT, the existing 
practices were scrutinized in light of the new policy and necessary changes were made 
to become security effective. In fact, few of the practices changed involved developing 
standard practice to get access to IT systems, evaluating and classifying data 
sensitivity, inculcating security considerations in IT projects, and formalizing incident 
reporting.  
At the individual level, the security management needs to be sensitive to the self-
identity issues of organizational members to institute the security program in an 
organization. The effective implementation of the security program requires adequate 
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skill set in IT security, which might trigger concerns for deskilling. In addition, the new 
requirements might place additional responsibility on specific positions or might as well 
render them unnecessary. As in the case, an organization perhaps might decide to 
consolidate or outsource IT infrastructure. Such instances would inadvertently create an 
existential anxiety among organizational members. It would be prudent to address such 
concerns ahead of the curve and take appropriate actions to minimize potential 
discontent among employees. Such discontent is widely considered in the prevalent 
literature to be a major factor for computer crimes or weakening of security defenses.  
In case where a team lacks significant human resources, it might be helpful for 
the management to tap and emphasize the inherent learning capability of organizational 
members. This was adequately demonstrated in the case of DOT whereby the security 
manager and security team remained skillful and knowledgeable in context of their job 
requirement to develop and implement the security program. The security members 
altered the material world at DOT by introducing new practices for the organizational 
members. In fact, they consciously selected between local way of doing things and 
procedures offered by best practices. An organization would be adequately served by 
nurturing and grooming the employees with particular value set that imbibes 
responsibility in effecting changes, learning capability to re-skill, and intelligence to 
understand the changing organizational context.  
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6.5 Discussion 
The analysis of empirical evidence from the Department of Transportation case 
indicates certain factors that seem to play an important role in instituting an information 
systems security program in an organization. The implications for information systems 
security from these factors are summarized in table 6.1. These implications may be 
significant in varying degrees, dependent upon context, in strategically transforming an 
organization to a higher level of maturity in terms of information systems security.  
At the strategic level, the learning from the empirical analysis may be 
summarized visually as a model, which is a based on Sarason’s (1995) model of 
strategic transformation. Sarason’s model, however, did not include components of the 
theory of social transformation as advocated by Giddens. We argue that incorporating 
globalizing tendencies and self-identity is necessary to provide a deep and thorough 
understanding of the phenomenon of transformation in terms of strategic information 
systems security in modern organizations. Sarason (1995) argues that the structuration 
theory offers strategic management a theoretical framework to understand strategic 
transformation. The author integrates the concept of organizational identity with the 
structuration theory to yield insight as to why a firm adopts a particular strategic path.  
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Table 6.1: IS security implications from structurational analysis 
Emergent issues IS security implication from case study 
Organizational 
structure bias 
Structure IS security as separate department reporting directly to 
CEO. 
Developing 
security program 
content 
Security policy based on national or international standard or law. 
Need for security 
conformity Strong management leadership, not only management support. 
Education of organizational members, not only training. Creating security 
awareness Online certification as compliance stick. 
Creating and funding positions of support to overcome organizational 
silos. 
Culture conducive 
to security 
practices Respecting and involving powerful positions of authority.  
Effective security 
processes 
Sustenance of IS security program through strong maintenance and 
upkeep. 
Maintain social relations between security teams at all time and over 
space. 
Develop trust relations as disembedding mechanisms between 
different security agents. 
Security related 
globalizing 
institutional 
concerns Institutional reflexivity revising existing practices and knowledge to 
develop security effective practices. 
Need for organizational members skilled in security. 
Reduce existential anxiety due to security through manageable 
responsibility structures. 
Reappropriation by providing members with opportunity for 
continuous security education to remain skillful and knowledgeable 
on job. 
Identity concerns 
at individual level 
Security agents be empowered to effect change. 
 
The integrated model (figure 6.2) offered by Sarason provides alternative 
explanation to debates such as strategy and structure, and determinism and choice in 
strategic management field. For the former, the theory provides  
    253 
 
an elaboration of how strategy influences structure in intentional and unintentional 
direction as well as a recognition of the enabling and constraining influences of 
structure on strategy. To the determinism/choice debate the framework recognizes the 
role of intentional action within constraints and without assuming managers have 
unconstrained choice (Sarason, 1995). 
 
As per Sarason (1995), the understanding of the recursive nature of structure and 
agents would help focus managers' attention on the translation of intention to structural 
change. 
 
Figure 6.2: Model of strategic transformation (reproduced from Sarason, 1995) 
 
Sarason’s (1995) model of strategic transformation is a theoretical endeavor at 
employing the structuration theory to explain organizational change. Based on the 
empirical evidence presented in this chapter, the updated model of strategic 
organizational transformation is presented in figure 6.3. This model helps explain the 
phenomenon of organizational change to inculcate strategic information systems 
security concerns in modern organizations as it integrates the concepts of modernity as 
proposed by Giddens. In the rest of this section, we explain the conceptualization of 
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different components of the model of strategic security organizational transformation 
(MSSOT) in the context of information systems security initiatives.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Model of strategic security organizational transformation 
 
Security Agent. As evidenced in the case study, security members were 
purposeful, knowledgeable, reflexive and active. These members were aware of the 
organizational rules and understood the conditions and consequences of their actions. 
They used their knowledge in developing and subsequently instituting the security 
program. Knowledgeability has been demonstrated in the many skills displayed by the 
security members as part of day-to-day encounters and activities to overcome the 
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cultural and political realities at DOT. The manager of the security group consistently 
monitored group’s behavior to understand the actions that were being taken and 
situating them in the organizational context. Such reflexive monitoring was also 
exhibited by the CISO as he modified actions of the security group to overcome 
hurdles. This also indicates that a security action is in a way dependent upon the 
security related knowledgeability of the agents. An action would be monitored by the 
agent thus affecting her knowledgeability. Hence, a dependency exists between the 
agent and structure. The security group is situated within the structure and is part of the 
social system of the specific organization.  
Organizational security structure. Security structures are the organizational 
security rules and resources that agents draw upon and reestablish in everyday 
activities. These structures are only present virtually as mental traces, that is, they do 
not have material existence per se. Hence, structures do not exist independent of the 
agent. These security rules are present in the mind of the organizational members and 
exhibited through various organizational practices. Inadvertently, the organizational 
security rules are further confirmed through practices. Such a dynamic approach to 
structure is consistent with the socially constructed view of an organization.  
 Unacknowledged conditions and unanticipated security consequences. A 
security action is bounded by existing conditions, both acknowledged and 
unacknowledged, and results in outcomes that were intended as well as unintended by a 
security agent. The unintended consequences from a security action give rise to 
conditions that might go unacknowledged since such an outcome was not expected in 
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the first place. Unacknowledged conditions might inhibit future security goals from 
being achieved, as management would not be able to take these into account. Sarason 
(1995) provides explanation for such discrepancies, 
placing the strategic change process on a time continuum, managers can be seen as setting 
intentional events into motion. However, because there are multiple agents and unanticipated 
consequences, change in the social system will appear to have non-rational elements, which 
influence managers to set into motion a new set of events (pp. 49).  
 
The impact of consequences from security actions on conditions would explain the gap 
between the desired strategic security outcomes and the real outcomes. 
 Knowledgeability about security. Sarason used the concept of self-identity for 
the inclusion of organizational identity in the strategic transformation theoretical 
framework. However, self-identity was not exclusively included in the model. The 
discussion on the concept of modernity by Giddens emphasizes the importance of 
understanding self-identity. It is indeed created and sustained through reflexive 
activities. The concerns for security related deskilling, existential anxiety and 
reappropriation are indeed legitimate concerns for members of modern organizations. 
The demands of information systems security discipline require skilled members who 
are also able to update their security skills on a continuous basis with the changing IT 
environment. These do have significant impact on the strategic path undertaken by an 
organization.  
 Organizational identity involves a set of shared beliefs that organizational 
members hold about their organizations (Sarason, 1995). It involves shared values and 
assumptions about the organizational security posture which would guide the agents to 
adopt certain actions over others. Sarason (1995) argues that organizational identity 
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have a dramatic impact on strategic actions of the organization as agents shared belief 
of her organization (image) as conservative and risk averse would encourage avoidance 
of risky action. It might be the case that such an aggressive security action might be the 
need for the hour. However, shared assumption of an organization might keep the 
security agent from acting in a manner conducive to achieve security goals.  
 Global security catalyst. Globalizing tendencies influences the modern 
organizations and it becomes necessary to address such concerns. The management of 
an organization has to address the separation of time and space in security operations. It 
necessitates the development of trust relations as disembedding mechanisms between 
security agents and engage in institutional reflexivity to develop security effective 
practices. The globalizing tendencies have an impact on how security agents perceive 
the social organizational world. Their subsequent actions would be based upon such 
perception of organizational context. At the same time, the security related globalizing 
institutional concerns would lead to new rules of competition and renewed 
understanding of organizational security rules by the members.  
 Link between security identity-structure and security action. A security action is 
the result of interaction between organizational members. The security related 
knowledgeability possessed by an agent interacts recursively with the constraining 
security structures to produce the desired action. The appreciation of self-identity and 
an understanding of organizational security identity provide constraining guidance to 
any security action. Such strategic security action impacts the identity through the 
conditions formed as a result of consequences. In the context of security, an action 
    258 
 
might amount to development and implementation of the information systems security 
objectives, policy, standards, guidelines or procedures. It may also involve 
implementing security controls and measures to check adverse information related 
behavior. Essentially, any and all actions required to institute a security program in an 
organization would become the focus of security action component.  
 Link between security consequences and organizational security structure. The 
consequences of security action as part of a desired strategy would have an impact on 
the security structure. An action reflects the security rules and these are either 
reaffirmed in an action or new security rules are enacted by way of practice. A security 
action is brought about through the utilization of resources. At the same time, such a 
security action might generate more resources for an organization. In either case, 
resources are changed through an actions of the security team.  
 The model of strategic security organizational transformation effectively 
explains the strategic information systems change adopted by an organization. The 
global catalysts and concept of self and organizational identity renders power to the 
model to be applicable in modern organizations.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described how information systems security initiatives were 
developed and subsequently instituted within the Department of Transportation from a 
structurational perspective. Such an approach is argued to be conducive in developing 
appropriate processes to support information systems security initiatives in a given 
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context. The analysis in this chapter has evidently shown the effectiveness of Giddens 
structuration theory, as well as, the theory of social transformation to explain the 
intricate links between content, process and context of an organizational security 
change. Based on the emergent issues, a model of strategic security organizational 
transformation has been developed. The management of an organization needs to pay 
careful attention to various theoretical components explicated in the model before 
embarking on information systems security initiatives. This model would assist the 
interested parties in effecting a successful security change in modern organizations. 
 
 
 260 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Interpreting Strategic Information Systems 
Security Initiatives in Organizational Setting 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, empirical data from the ITA and the DOT is analyzed to 
understand inherent issues that have an impact on the success or failure of an 
information system security initiative in an organization. The ITA has been developing 
a security program for a statewide implementation at Wonderland. The organization has 
witnessed quite few changes since the time such an idea was conceived. The DOT had 
relatively more success with development and subsequent implementation of the 
security initiatives. Once the content of a program has been developed, organizational 
processes need to be set in place so as to achieve the desired results. The problem is to 
enact the content through various practices within a specific context. As a result, 
appropriate strategies of action need to be formulated to achieve security objectives of 
an organization. An action analysis would help explore the inter-relationship between 
content and processes, while giving due attention to the context. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The next section describes the concept 
of first-level constructs and second-level constructs. Section 7.3 provides an analysis of 
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information systems security initiatives at ITA and the subsequent section discusses the 
security initiatives at DOT. Section 7.5 identifies the emergent issues for discussion. 
Finally, section 7.6 concludes the interpretation of strategic information systems 
security initiatives in an organization. 
 
7.2 Understanding Schutz’s Concept of First-level Constructs and Second-level 
Constructs for Social Theory Formation 
Lee (2004) considers Schutz’s concepts of first-level constructs and second-
level constructs as an ingenious device to account for the social dimension of social 
theory. For Schutz (1954), the individuals in a social setting employ common-sense 
constructs to interpret the world that surrounds them and “experience as the reality of 
their daily lives.” This common-sense knowledge of everyday life influences an 
individual’s motive behind an action. “The constructs involved in common-sense 
experience of the inter-subjective world in daily life are the first-level constructs” 
(Schutz, 1954). It is pertinent that any explanation about the organization should 
consider the subjective meaning of the actions of members who collectively are 
considered to form that organization.  These subjective meanings are the objective 
reality that a social scientist intends to study (Lee, 2004). In order to understand the 
social reality of organizational members, the social scientist would have to develop 
constructs that are based upon the common-sense constructs held by the members of 
that organization. These constructs formed by the social scientist are referred to as 
second-level constructs since they are essentially, as explained by Schutz (1954), 
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“constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene.” The second-level 
constructs may be considered as a social theory since these are based upon first-level 
constructs that “exist in the empirical subject matter of social science” (Lee, 2004).  
 Van Maanen (1979) uses a similar notion in discussing organizational 
ethnography although the terminology used is slightly different. For Van Maanen, the 
facts of an investigation are the first order concepts (similar to Schutz’s first-level 
constructs). These involve descriptive properties of the studied scene and the 
interpretations used by organizational members to account for those properties. The 
second-order concepts are the theories used by the fieldworker to explain the first order 
data (Van Maanen, 1979). The explanation of the second-order concept is similar to 
Schutz’s (1954) explication of second-level constructs as the “theoretical systems 
embodying testable general hypotheses.”  
 In subsequent sections, Schutz’s concept of first-level and second-level 
constructs is used to present findings from the ITA and the DOT. Such 
conceptualization would enable making sense of the inherent complexity of the social 
organizational setting. This would allow us to account for the “social dimension of 
social theory,” borrowing Lee’s (2004) terminology, pertaining to information systems 
security change.  
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7.3 Strategic Information Systems Security Initiatives at ITA 
The following discussion is based on the empirical evidence presented in 
chapter 5. The information systems security initiatives at ITA were the focus of 
analysis. 
 
7.3.1 First-level findings 
The security initiatives were developed at ITA to address the need of a common 
information systems security program in order to establish base security practices in 
state government organizations across the state.  
 
A common information systems security program  
The security department at ITA decided to have a common information systems 
security program for all state government organizations. Such a decision was based 
upon the requirement of legislation to ensure secure operations for the state citizens. 
The state government enacted a legislation to introduce information systems security 
program across the state. The security department at ITA was empowered to develop 
the information systems security policy to be complied by all state government 
agencies. The department was also allocated responsibility to develop supporting 
information systems security standard and guidelines. Essentially, the security 
department was expected to direct the state in its security initiative, as the Governor and 
inadvertently the CIO of the ITA were made responsible for any adverse IT incident.  
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 The management team of security department formed a committee to develop 
various policy, standard or guideline documents. The guideline documents were initially 
developed by the departmental subject area in-charge and subsequently reviewed by 
other committee members, which included the Deputy CISO, the security manager, 
external consultants, and an internal policy expert. In these meetings, committee 
members were encouraged to freely express their opinion. The security departmental 
members would openly acknowledge apparent problems in the security policy. The 
members would also lament upon their adverse relationship with other agencies by 
making statements such as ‘they hate us,’ and expressions of frustration with the 
government process. The members were able to express their views in presence of the 
Deputy CISO, which shows a strong environment of free expression for individuals. 
The management team was able to effectively channel any negative feelings among 
members towards developing guideline documents by making them initial owners of 
such guidelines.  
 
Establish base security practices  
The security program was aimed at achieving base security practices in all state 
organizations. To do so, the government agencies were required to get compliant with 
the state security policy within a specific timeframe. This would allow establishing a 
basic level of security practices across the state and help build a platform for secure 
operations. Future efforts to create secure information related environment in the state 
could be built upon such a platform.  
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 The ITA has claimed ownership of developing the information systems security 
program that includes the security policy, standards and guidelines. Any modifications 
to the security program or policy documents can only be made by the ITA security 
department. The stakeholders at various government agencies can provide suggestions 
and comments. However, the final decision on those suggestions is the authority of the 
ITA. In essence, the security program is developed and monitored by the ITA security 
department. All agencies are mandated to implement the security program and get 
compliant with the security policy requirements by a particular deadline. This is 
essentially the governance role that the current CISO aspired for.  
 
Emergence of governance role  
To be effective, the current CISO changed the existing reporting structure such 
that she would be able to directly report to the CIO. Next, the compliance and 
governance functions were made prominent. Such emphasis resulted in the merger of 
security and audit divisions of the ITA. The role of ITA security department emerged to 
be concerned with governance rather than technical security aspects. The security 
department developed an information assurance program to portray its emerging role of 
governance function. In this endeavor, the ITA decided to help agencies by providing 
expertise for clarifications on implementing different components of the program. 
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Emphasis on user education and training 
The CISO became familiar with the ground realities of state government 
agencies. In most agencies, the individual in-charge of security did not have much 
understanding or knowledge about information systems security related aspects. Also, 
security responsibility for them was in addition to their main job function. To address 
these issues, the CISO emphasized user education at every opportunity possible. She 
required explanatory paragraphs in the security policy, standard and guidelines so that 
non-security personnel could make sense of the requirements. Such efforts were 
primarily taken to protect individuals from hurting themselves by making bad decisions 
in terms of information systems security. Ignorance of users was not to be accepted as 
an excuse for circumventing the state security policy compliance.  
 To achieve a common understanding of security across organizations, the ITA 
security department decided to develop a training program for newly appointed CISOs 
at different agencies. In actual, the security-training component of employee training 
was taken over from the Human Resources department. The security department then 
revamped the program so as to expose the CISOs to the department’s approach to 
security.  
 
Tactful engagement of agencies to attain security interests  
The organizational members at ITA security department have been very cautious 
about expressing negative feelings. Although frustrated with the efforts to increase 
government agency participation, the security department did not express the concerns 
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directly to various agencies. In private, however, security executives seem to be 
skeptical about the success of the program with the agencies. Nevertheless, these 
executives were generally upbeat and confident about the security program with the 
government agencies.  
 The SAG meetings were developed as a forum to initiate dialogue between 
security officers and members of the security department. The aim was to receive 
feedback on security initiatives developed and also to serve as communication tool for 
sounding future developments. The CISO pushed members of the security department 
to help government organizations that were small in business operations. The aim was 
to help these small agencies because many of them did not even have any dedicated IT 
staff. To protect self, the CISO of the ITA interacted with the management of bigger 
agencies (big in terms of size of operations). Such a step was necessary to protect 
against the political power of big agencies. To win over the support of political 
heavyweight agencies, the CISO decided to form a Security Council that would serve as 
an advisory board to the ITA security department. The newly formed council was 
indeed comprised of representatives from the heavyweight agencies.  
 
Extension of the state security compliance deadline  
The ITA security department required government agencies to be compliant 
with the information systems security policy by a particular deadline. A substantial 
period of time, about a year, was provided to the agencies to ensure compliance. It must 
be noted that the ITA required compliance with the security policy only and not security 
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standard or guidelines. The security department anticipated difficulties with smaller 
agencies in implementing the state security policy. Various agencies had already 
protested about the constrained timeframe. 
 It was not difficult to anticipate that many agencies would have trouble getting 
compliant by the deadline. The CISO held private meetings with the heads of different 
agencies to assess the situation. Finally, the deadline was extended on the last day to 
help agencies not default on the state legislation. However, the CISO withheld 
information on compliance extension till the last minute. Such a position was justified 
since the intent was to protect individuals and agencies. The logic followed by the CISO 
was that agencies would try hard to get compliant with the state security policy. 
Whatever is achieved in terms of implementing the security policy would be good for 
protecting an agency to an extent.  
 
7.3.2. Second-level findings  
In this section, the second-level findings pertaining to the information systems 
security efforts at ITA are presented and explained.  
 
Security program as constitution of the meanings and intentions of actors 
An action is to achieve certain consequences. Actions undertaken at the ITA 
were to develop a common information systems security program in order to establish 
base security practices in the state. Argyris and Schon (1974) argue that an action may 
be assumed to be designed by an actor. It flows from this assumption that action is 
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constituted by the meanings and intentions of actors. The security initiatives at ITA can 
be understood through the theory of action. For Argyris and Schon (1974), there are two 
kinds of theories of action - espoused theory and theory-in-use. The former is theory 
that an actor claims to follow. The theory-in-use is the theory that actors actually use 
and can be inferred from their actions. “Theories-in-use are the often tacit cognitive 
maps by which human beings design action” (Argyris Putnam, and Smith, 1985). The 
aim is to assist actors in developing more sympathetic world to their desired intentions.  
 The model of theory-in-use is presented in figure 7.1. There are three main 
components in the model – governing variables, action strategies, and consequences. 
Governing variables are the values that actors seek to satisfy (Argyris Putnam, and 
Smith, 1985). There are four governing variables, which can be perceived as having 
preferred range.  
 
Figure 7.1: Theory-in-use model  
(reproduced from Argyris, Putnam and Smith, 1985) 
 
For the ITA, the governing variables for security development include 
developing a common information systems security program, establishing base security 
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practices, all government agencies to get compliant, exhibiting confidence in the 
security program, and providing substantial period of time for compliance with the 
security policy. Action strategies are considered to be a sequence of moves used by 
actors in particular situations to satisfy governing variables (Argyris Putnam, and 
Smith, 1985). These are designed to achieve desired results that will satisfy governing 
variables. Previous section provided actions followed by the security group at ITA to 
support the four governing variables. These strategies of action are also summarized in 
table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: Unilateral control model for security development at ITA 
Governing 
variables 
Governing variables  
for security 
development 
Security development 
 strategies of action 
Define goals and 
try to achieve 
them 
Common information 
system security program 
 
Enacted a legislation; develop the security policy, 
standard and guidelines; CISO changed the reporting 
structure for direct access to CEO; compliance and 
governance function made prominent. 
Maximize 
winning and 
minimizing 
losing 
Establish base security 
practices; all agencies to 
get compliant. 
Ownership of developing the security program; 
agencies to implement security program; establish 
governance role; developed information assurance 
program; training program for newly appointed 
CISOs. 
Minimize 
generating or 
expressing 
negative feelings 
Exhibiting confidence in 
the security program.   
SAG meetings; help small agencies; CISO interacts 
with big agencies; formation of security council; 
channel any negative feelings by making members 
initial owners of guidelines.  
Be rational Substantial period of 
time for compliance with 
security policy only.  
CISO emphasized user education; Compliance 
deadline extended; CISO withheld information on 
compliance extension till last minute. 
 
Interpreting intended and unintended consequences for single-loop learning  
An action would have consequences that may be intended or unintended. 
Argyris Putnam, and Smith (1985) explain that unintended consequences may very well 
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be counter-productive to the desired consequence. In case of unintended results, the 
actor develops new action strategies to achieve the desired outcome. That is, the actor is 
still working to satisfy the existing governing variables (Argyris Putnam, and Smith, 
1985). This case is referred to as single loop learning as changes have been made only 
to the action strategies. Since all consequences eventually feed back into action 
strategies and governing variables, it becomes important to understand the 
consequences of actions at ITA in order to effect single loop learning.  
 
Manipulative tendencies of the ITA security management 
The consequences of actions developed for the state pushed the security 
department on defensive whereby it was seen as cajoling agencies to participate and 
provide comments on the security program. ITA was recognized to be competitive by 
developing a security program that encompasses best security practices from the 
industry and the National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST). The new 
security program was better than the pre-existing security programs at various agencies. 
At the same time, the intent of the security department at ITA was to have control over 
agency operations through compliance and auditing. However, inconsistency lies in the 
promised goal of program based on ‘best practices’ and the manner in which it is 
actually developed. Although the program is based on NIST guidelines, the process of 
adapting these standards to the requirements and needs of the state is done in an ad hoc 
manner. A review of the policies and guidelines indicate considerable misrepresentation 
of best practices. 
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  The security department members were afraid of criticism about job not being 
done appropriately. The group has positioned itself strongly as experts, bringing in a 
few academics and consultants to represent or portray an image of expertise. The CISO 
manipulatively used politics to win over and increase participation of agencies in the 
process. However, the security department withheld relevant information and did not 
directly inform agencies that their programs are inadequate. It proceeded cautiously and 
was slowly influencing agencies to support the common security program. 
 
Defensive interactions of the ITA security group 
The state government agencies are dependent on the ITA security department to 
understand their contextually driven requirements. The problem is that agencies, 
especially the smaller ones, do not have individuals with appropriate experience or 
knowledge about security aspects. Now, all agencies are mandated by law to get 
complaint with state security policy. The defensive positioning of ITA security 
department is evident in the decision that it has the say in selecting the organization that 
would audit the agencies. Further, only the ITA security department would approve an 
exempt status for any exceptions with policy compliance.  
 To complicate the matters, the auditing agency might not audit agencies based 
on the security standard developed by the ITA. An independent audit is generally done 
for the state. In such a case, agencies are left on their own to figure out how to set up 
adequate security processes and get compliant with the policy. There seems to be little 
real help extended to agencies although the ITA security department claims to the 
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contrary. There is a lack of team of experts who might be available to an agency and 
help them in instituting the required security changes. The ITA security leadership is 
defensive about such an action and certainly do not want to do agencies’ work. The ITA 
security department has lately emerged to don the role of auditors or the ones policing 
the state security environment.  
 
Defensive norms influencing the security initiative 
The state government agencies feel that the ITA does not have their best 
interests in mind. There is a general mistrust between the agencies and the ITA, as the 
former believes that the security initiatives are a way to generate more revenue for the 
latter. Agencies also complain that the ITA took away control on security decisions 
while agencies were left to provide for the financial support. Further, the security 
department of the ITA displayed conformity with a formal method of developing 
policies and guidelines. The departmental members were simply doing things to 
appease the CISO and not necessarily the right thing. There are acknowledged issues 
with the security policy that have not been rectified. In addition, external commitment 
was sought from the state government, consultant teams, and heads of prominent 
heavyweight agencies. The CISO has been employing diplomacy to consistently chat up 
with officers of these agencies during monthly SAG meetings, while her staff engages 
with officers of smaller agencies. Even formation of the Security Council with members 
from few heavyweight agencies has an underlying motive to empower the CISO.  
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Risk averse attitude for security initiative  
The agencies have little freedom of choice as they have to abide by the state 
security policy and live with the decisions made by the ITA security department. In 
addition, the department itself does not want to take risks. Any changes made to the 
policy by the security team needs to be commented upon by agencies through an online 
document system. This might be a mean to provide evidence of participation or hearing 
their voice. Further, the security team was evasive of adopting prominent international 
standards. The CISO was also defensive about sending teams to get the perspective of 
an agency. She was fearful of creating misunderstanding or give more power to 
agencies. At this stage, the CISO would not allow anything that might stifle support 
from agencies.  
 The policy compliance deadline was extended to help the agencies. Although 
relieved, agencies were upset about the manner in which the CISO extended deadline at 
the last minute. There were few agencies such as the Department of Transportation that 
felt betrayed with the compliance extension. In such a case, the ITA faces the danger of 
being mistaken as an entity with little commitment to see its decision through. At the 
same time, ITA may be seen as not taking any risk because non-compliance of agencies 
would end up looking bad for itself as well.  
 The underlying behavioral strategy for the theory-in-use is unilateral control 
over others. Such behavior was evident at the ITA security department. There was little 
public testing of ideas and as such effective learning did not take place. The hypothesis 
that people generate tends to become self-sealing (Argyris Putnam, and Smith, 1985). 
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This leads to escalation of error while ineffective problem solving and execution of 
action persists. The development of effective security initiatives was crucial for the 
security department and consequently members were most oriented to protect interests 
of the ITA.  
 
Explicating the espoused theory of security initiative developers 
Argyris Putnam, and Smith (1985) emphasize that the theory-in-use and 
espoused theory is not about making distinction between theory and action. But rather 
the distinction is being made between two theories of action, one that actors espouse 
and other that they use. Such a perception is tied back to the assumption that all actions 
are a result of actor’s design. When the espoused theory and theory-in-use are consistent 
it leads to intended consequences. However, a gap or mismatch between the espoused 
theory and the theory-in-use would not provide desired results. An actor is generally 
only aware of the espoused theory, as this is the one she claims to follow.   
 The espoused theory involves four governing variables. These values that 
members seek to satisfy include participation of everyone in defining purposes, 
everyone wins and no one loses, express feelings, and suppress the cognitive intellective 
aspects of action. At ITA, the CIO and the CISO encouraged participation of all 
stakeholders for defining the information systems security program including the 
security policy, standard and guidelines. Once the security department developed the 
policy, standard or guideline document it was made available to the stakeholders across 
the state through an online document system. The users from all agencies would read 
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the documents and provide their respective feedback pertaining to issues, concerns or 
further improvement. In addition, the SAG was created to promote participation of all 
security officers of government agencies in security program of the state.  
 At ITA, the emphasis was to establish base information systems security 
practice in all agencies so as to achieve a secure environment for the state. Such a goal 
seems to emanate from the second governing variable of the espoused theory, which is 
to ensure that everyone wins and no one loses. All state government organizations were 
to get compliant with the information systems security policy developed by the ITA. 
There were to be no exceptions. This is to ensure establishment of a minimum set of 
secure practices in the state.  
 The CISO was interested in creating an environment where stakeholders of the 
security program would be able to freely express themselves and have a dialogue. The 
SAG as a forum emerged to attain such a goal. Within the security department, the 
management aspired to have free expression of opinions by the department members. 
The value of suppressing the cognitive intellective aspects of action had implications for 
the security policy. The CISO pushed the security department members not to focus on 
the best possible security policy but rather to develop a quick and workable security 
policy. Such a policy should help establish a base security practice in all organizations 
irrespective of the nature or size of its operations. 
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Understanding double loop implications 
An agent performs an action to achieve desired consequence. If the result of 
such an action is what an actor intended or there is a match, the theory-in-use of the 
actor is confirmed. However, if the results are unintended there is said to be a mismatch 
or error (Argyris and Schon, 1974). Generally, the actor would try to develop new 
action strategies to correct the mismatch. In case the actor changes the existing 
governing variables we would refer to it as double-loop learning.  
The deliberative process appropriate to double-loop learning is concerned not with choosing 
among competing chains of means-ends reasoning within a given set of standards, but with 
choosing among competing sets of standards (“frames” or “paradigms”) (Argyris and Schon, 
1974). 
 
The problems that cannot be discussed are the source for double loop issues. If 
problems persist despite efforts to address them, the situation would require double-loop 
learning so as to solve the issues. The incongruence between espoused theory and 
theory-in-use results in a gap that exists in organizational practices. Basically, the 
intentions of agent are not effectively transformed into action to achieve desired 
outcomes. This was certainly the case at ITA.  
 The espoused theory of security management team is to imbibe participation by 
stakeholders in defining the security policy, standard and guidelines. The security 
policy was based on the security standards of NIST. However, the NIST security 
standards do not address information systems security management issues completely. 
As a result, the security policy developed by the ITA is riddled with issues. Interesting 
point to note is that the external consultant for security group did suggest the 
management team to base the security policy on the international security standard 
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ISO/IEC 17799 Code of Practice for Information Security Management. However, 
management did not agree with his recommendation. This may be due to the fact that 
majority of the security departmental members do not have significant security 
experience. This is especially true with the senior officers of the security department. 
Most of the departmental members had prior experience in fields other than security 
such as auditing and emergency management. Few odd departmental members with 
security experience seem to only appease the CISO although privately they do 
acknowledge problems with the policy. These members argue that the real need for the 
state is to establish base security practice in all organizations while the security policy 
can be improved during the second phase in the following year.  
 The implication of such incongruence is that error keeps on escalating through 
all these mismatch generating actions. However, the gap due to incongruence has gone 
unnoticed by the ITA security members. All subsequent efforts to institute the security 
program in government agencies are based on a faulty or an incomplete security policy. 
In case the security policy is indeed revisited, any significant changes made to the 
policy would seem to waste resources utilized during the current efforts. Further, 
actions by the ITA security department are simply being taken as situations emerge 
rather than developed in a cohesive manner or following certain logic. For instance, a 
query was raised by an agency about how to deal with folks using their own computers 
to get the job done as part of telecommuting. The security group realized that they did 
not take this situation into consideration earlier and simply decided to develop a 
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guideline that could be followed by interested agencies. Overall, there is no real 
participation of stakeholders in defining the security program.  
 The approach so far for the ITA has been to adjust action strategies when 
intended consequences were not achieved. Such an approach can be problematic as only 
single loop learning takes place. In order to address root problem of the issue we would 
have to reconsider the governing variables. A re-evaluation of governing variables with 
adequate consideration to the espoused theory would effectively address double loop 
issues. At ITA, implementing the information systems security policy in all government 
agencies across the state was part of the espoused theory. In observing ITA’s actions to 
implement the espoused theory, it was revealed that the governing variables include 
developing a common security program for the state, establish base practices in all 
agencies, and blanket compliance with the state security policy. The action strategies 
formed to satisfy the governing variables indicate a clear bifurcation of roles in terms of 
development and implementation between the ITA and agencies. The security 
department at ITA took on the responsibility of developing the security policy, standard 
and guidelines. However, it was the responsibility of agencies to implement the security 
program in their respective organizations. This has inherent implication that the ITA 
does not have responsibility to assist agencies in implementing the program. Such a 
strategy does make sense but we have to understand the underlying contextual changes 
in the state.  
 The reality was that most of the agencies had lost their technical expertise to the 
ITA as part of a statewide consolidation of information technology. The ITA was made 
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in charge of the IT infrastructure for the state and provided reasonable argument that the 
supporting technical human resources should move to the ITA as well. With the security 
initiative, the expectation was that the ITA would be helping agencies to implement 
required security initiatives. However, this did not happen. Agencies got frustrated with 
the ITA as it had procured all the technical human expertise from agencies and now 
expected agencies to somehow implement the program on their own. To worsen the 
situation, agencies were in fact paying the ITA an exorbitant sum of money for IT 
resources and services. Few of these services, like intrusion detection and prevention, 
were non-existent for long period. The situation was so bad that even security 
department members would openly acknowledge that all agencies hated them. It would 
be fair to say that the security group was not able to achieve the intended outcome. In 
light of negative consequences, which included widespread frustration and 
discontentment, the security department decided to change the action strategy.  
 A new CISO was appointed to lead security operations at the ITA. As part of the 
new action strategy, the role of security department was changed to that of governance. 
The group slowly moved away from technical security responsibilities. As a result, two 
in-house technical security experts were let go off. The CISO placed emphasis on 
development of an information assurance program. At the same time, all agencies were 
required to get compliant with the state security policy within a year. Subsequently, the 
audit department was merged with the security group. The current CISO was in fact the 
head of audit department before taking on additional responsibility of the security 
officer. As a result of merger, the title of CISO was changed to Chief Information 
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Security and Audit Officer. The role of compliance and governance were made 
prominent at the security department as part of the new action strategy. However, 
agencies remained skeptical with the new efforts. In fact, agencies perceived new action 
strategies on part of the ITA as an emergence of policing role. The merger of the 
security department with the audit department was seen as a message that security was 
considered to be an audit function by the ITA. Agencies resented the fact that the ITA 
security department had evolved to don the mantle of state police with respect to 
security operations. It is important to emphasize that agencies had issues with the 
merger of auditing and security functions. Based on interviews at DOT, it seems that 
agencies might have been receptive and understanding about the governance role for the 
ITA. Towards the end of the research period, agencies had even more reasons to hate 
the ITA security department.  
 The problem remained that agencies were not getting any effective help to 
implement the security policy. In particular, agencies of medium and small scope felt 
they have been left on their own. The security department does claim that they are 
indeed helping agencies as much as possible. However, observations by the researcher 
indicate that the approach has been more hands-off. The help extended is more in terms 
of providing high-level guidance as to what documents or things are required for 
compliance purposes. There are no expert teams available. There is absolute lack of 
skilled members whom are proficient in the discipline of information systems security 
by virtue of education or work experience.  
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 Employees have been hired depending upon convenience of availability rather 
than possessing necessary skills. The security management team argues that skilled 
people are not available. As a result, the approach has been to appoint people who are 
willing and then train them on the job. Many security department members have 
actually taken their security certifications after they had started working on the new 
position. Even management team of the security department does not have significant 
understanding about information systems security issues. The management team has 
mostly audit background and therefore seen to approach security function from the 
perspective of audit mindset. The criticism is not about the intelligence or capability of 
these members but the apparent lack of security skills. It comes rather surprising that 
such significant managerial positions are not occupied by individuals with reasonable 
skill sets in the field of information systems security. This may also be considered as the 
reality of government functioning and a criticism of the same.  
The reality is that because of various reasons or failings on part of the ITA 
security department, numerous agencies have been left stranded to implement the 
security policy without adequate resources at their disposal. Needless to say, there is a 
general mistrust and frustration when it comes to deal with the ITA in general and its 
security department in particular. This problem would continue to persist even if 
alternative action strategies are developed to satisfy the existing governing variables. At 
this stage, it becomes imperative for the security group at ITA to address the prevalent 
double loop issues. The appropriate solution would be to re-evaluate existent governing 
variables and bring them into alignment with the espoused theory. Once the espoused 
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theory and the governing variables of theory-in-use are congruent, action strategies may 
be developed to satisfy the newly developed governing variables. Such actions would 
help achieve outcomes as intended by the security group. Nevertheless, there would be 
few unintended consequences associated with any action that would have to be taken 
into account. Such is the nature of the business world.  
 
7.4 Strategic Information Systems Security Initiatives at DOT 
The following discussion is based on the empirical evidence presented in 
chapter 6. In this section, the information systems security initiatives at DOT are the 
focus of analysis. At DOT, the responsibility to develop and subsequently implement 
information systems security program was given to the Information Technology 
Division. 
 
7.4.1 First-level findings  
The security initiatives at DOT were formulated in response to the need to abide 
by the state legislation on information systems security while satisfying business 
objectives. 
 
Organizational restructuring 
The events unfolding at DOT influenced by circumstances of both internal and 
external context led to restructuring of the organization. Aftermath of internal power 
feud and the necessity to comply with security related state legislation created a 
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favorable situation for the IT division to get information systems security operations 
under its control. Once the information security operations were moved, the CIO took 
on the additional responsibility of the CISO as well. This enabled adequate allocation of 
resources for the development and subsequent implementation of security initiatives 
within the DOT. The CIO deputed his trusted project manager to head the security 
operations as the Deputy CISO. Such a move was to ensure that required compliance 
with state legislation is met by the specified deadline. This would also help in 
legitimizing the move of security operations under the IT division.  
 
Adopt the state security policy  
The IT division took on the responsibility to develop the security program as 
specific to context of the DOT. The security group within the IT division decided to 
adopt the state security policy and standard in its entirety. To address organizational 
requirements, a security manual was developed along the lines of the state security 
policy but the procedures outlined in the document were configured as per internal 
business requirements. The security manual detailed various security procedures 
required to ensure secure information related operations within the DOT.  
 The security group was careful to properly communicate security objectives in 
the program manual exactly as captured in the adopted security policy. This helped in 
selling the authority as coming directly from the state government. It also protected 
security group. In case of any untoward security incident, the security team can argue 
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that they did not write the security policy but rather were simply adopting and 
implementing the state recommended policy. As such, the group may not be held 
directly responsible for the weak policy. Since the security policy was actually 
developed by the state technology agency, it is expected that the state would indeed 
protect the DOT from any stringent punitive actions in case of an untoward security 
event.     
 
Executive leadership 
 In order to control organizational environment, strong management support was 
considered to be critical by the security group for success with the program. To 
emphasize support, the CEO sent out a memorandum addressed to all heads of 
divisions and districts at DOT emphasizing his commitment to enforce the security 
program. Strong leadership was necessary for the security group to overcome 
organizational hurdles while promulgating the security program within the DOT.  
 
Ensure compliance with policy 
Another goal defined by the security group was to ensure that all organizational 
members had read the adopted information systems security policy. In order to 
demonstrate compliance, all members had to complete an online security training 
program at the end of which each individual was issued a certificate of completion. This 
certification of compliance was to be obtained each year by all organizational members. 
The attainment of ninety percent compliance in terms of online certification from users 
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by June 2007 was considered to be an effort to show figures as proof towards success 
with security initiatives within the DOT.  
 The failure to attain an online certification was perceived as a message from a 
user that she does not agree to abide by the security policy. For such users, the CISO 
decided to turn off account access until user demonstrated obedience to authority. Such 
an action may also be seen as protecting oneself as the certificate of compliance 
essentially indicates that a specific user has read and agrees to abide by the tenets of the 
security policy. Hence, each user may be held accountable for her information related 
actions.  
 
Implement some form of the security program  
 The state required all agencies to get compliant with the state security policy 
within a year. To abide by this directive, emphasis of the security group was to 
implement some form of the security program in all divisions and districts of the DOT. 
This would allow the DOT security group to argue that the intent of getting compliant 
with the state security policy is there even though they might not have been able to get 
cent percent compliant. The group in fact decided to develop formal records depicting 
proposed implementation plans of the security program across the organization. In 
terms of executing the security program, it became essential to convince and build 
relationships with the heads of various divisions and districts at DOT. Towards this end, 
a position of information security coordinator (ISC) was created in each division and 
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district. This was done to support the heads of divisions and districts in handling their 
responsibility for implementing the security program in their respective domains.  
 The new ISC position was used to sanction security aspects and also as a 
communication source for the respective division or district. This position was funded 
by the IT division to help in developing a shared vision about security related goals. 
Further, the CISO gave up the facility of control over these positions to the division and 
district heads in order to avoid any untoward power conflicts. At the same time, the 
security group also focused on the maintenance and upkeep of the security program. To 
take the security program to a level of maturity, the group concentrated on developing 
skilled process, having skilled people and skilled manager at the helm of security efforts.  
 
Pressure to overcome skepticism about security program 
Although skeptical about the effectiveness of state information systems security 
policy, the security group members at DOT seem to consider it as one that would get 
the job done. The security group realized that state legislation requires them to get 
compliant with the state security policy at the minimum. For expediency purposes, the 
CISO had decided to adopt the state policy in its entirety and directed the group not to 
question the policy but first implement it across the organization in some form.  
 The security group created awareness of the security program among 
organizational members. Security related workshops were conducted for the officers of 
responsibility from each division. A website was created for incident reporting, 
awareness training, cyber tips, and making available the security policy and manual. 
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This website was allotted a prominent position on the main organizational portal. In 
addition, each employee was required to undergo the online security training and obtain 
certification of compliance each year.  
 
Approach the security program as just another project 
The CISO decided to approach establishment of information system security 
program as just another project. The first phase was directed towards development of 
the security program, while second phase was focused to implement the security 
program within the DOT. The CISO decided to adopt the state security policy in its 
entirety thus scaling down the time component of the project significantly.  
 The emphasis of security group has been to implement the security program as 
much as possible by the compliance deadline. For areas where security program could 
not be implemented by the deadline, the group was directed to develop a concrete 
direction plan for implementation. It was hoped that in case of an audit the group might 
be able to make the case that plans are in fact in-place to address uncovered areas. The 
subtle implication is to convey the impression that efforts are underway to ensure that 
the security program is instituted within organization as required by the policy.  
 
 
7.4.2. Second-level findings  
In this section, the second-level findings pertaining to the information systems 
security efforts at DOT are presented and explained.  
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Security program as constitution of the meanings and intentions of actors 
An action is to achieve certain consequences. The actions undertaken at DOT 
were to make the organization more secure and also comply with state information 
security requirements. Any action may be considered as designed by an actor (Argyris 
and Schon, 1974). As such, we may assume that an action is constituted by the 
meanings and intentions of actors. In this manner, the security initiatives at DOT can be 
understood through theory of action. As mentioned in section 7.3, the theory that an 
actor claims to follow is referred to as espoused theory, while the theory-in-use is the 
theory that actors actually use and can be inferred from their actions.  
 Let us first identify the theory-in-use for information systems security initiatives 
at DOT. The theory-in-use involves three main components in the model – governing 
variables, action strategies, and consequences. Governing variables are the values that 
actors seek to satisfy (Argyris Putnam, and Smith, 1985). For the DOT, the governing 
variables for security implementation was to adopt the state security policy in entirety, 
implement some form of security program across the organization, ensure compliance 
with security policy, exhibit confidence in the security program, and approach security 
program as a project to make sense of the complex subject. Previous section discussed 
the actions that were followed by the security group at DOT to support the four 
governing variables. Action strategies are sequence of moves used by actors to achieve 
desired results that will satisfy governing variables (Argyris, Putnam, and Smith, 1985). 
The strategies of action at DOT are summarized in table 7.2.  
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Table 7.2: Unilateral control model for security implementation at DOT 
Governing 
variables 
Governing variables 
for security implementation 
Security implementation 
strategies of action 
Define goals 
and try to 
achieve them 
Adopt the state security policy 
in its entirety; develop the 
security manual for internal 
operations. 
Restructure the organization; allocate adequate 
resources; depute skilled manager to head the 
security operations; develop the security 
program; ensure strong management leadership. 
Maximize 
winning and 
minimizing 
losing 
Ensure compliance with 
security policy; implement 
some form of security program 
in all divisions and districts.  
 
All organizational members to read the security 
policy; create information security coordinator 
position in all divisions and districts; emphasize 
maintenance and upkeep of the security program; 
focus on skilled manager, people and process. 
Minimize 
generating or 
expressing 
negative 
feelings 
Exhibit confidence in the 
effectiveness of the security 
program.  
 
Create awareness of the security program; 
conduct security workshops; attain a prominent 
position for security website; impart online 
security training and certification of compliance; 
properly communicate the security objectives; 
sell the authority as coming directly from the 
state legislation. 
Be rational Approach security program as 
just another project.  
Implement the security program as much as 
possible by the compliance deadline; convey the 
impression that efforts are underway.  
 
Interpreting intended and unintended consequences for single-loop learning  
An action leading to unintended results may be undesirable for actors. In such a 
case, an actor would generally develop a new action strategy in order to achieve the 
desired result. Such an action enables single loop learning as the new action has been 
developed within the confines of existing governing variables. Since all consequences 
eventually feed back into action strategies and governing variables, it becomes 
important to understand the consequences of actions at DOT in order to effect single 
loop learning.  
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Concern for self and manipulative tendencies of the management  
The executive officers at DOT were defensive about empowering the existent 
Operations Security division or restructuring it as an independent department reporting 
directly to the CEO. After security operations were reallocated to the IT division, 
security was still not given an independent status and was placed under the governance 
group. Such restructuring was undertaken despite questions raised by stakeholders, like 
IT auditors, about conflict of interest. The IT division wanted to control security policy 
development in order to continue its current practices of systems development. The 
restructuring may also be attributed to the department’s apparent fear of being 
vulnerable to the requirements of security policy in terms of secure IT development. 
The CIO seemed confident in his department members ability to do a good job on self-
policing. That is, department members were considered to be competitive enough to 
develop required security policies so as to ensure secure development of information 
systems at DOT.   
 In order not to fail with state compliance, the IT division developed an efficient 
strategy to adopt the state security policy. Such an action, void of any consideration to 
the context and business requirements of DOT, indicates inconsistency with the known 
security practices. However, such a superficial compliance with the state policy 
demonstrates competitive nature of the department management team indicated by their 
concern to show the results. The IT division got control of security operations despite 
some resistive concerns and, in case compliance is not achieved by the deadline, such 
voices would be redeemed. As such, the management seems to be interested in 
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achieving a superficial compliance rather than developing an appropriate security 
program based upon business needs of the DOT.  
 
Defensive interactions of the security group 
In order to minimize the chances of failure during implementation phase, the 
security group created ISC positions in each division and district. These positions were 
also funded by the IT division, which further implicitly established the dependence of 
divisions and districts upon the security group. The control of the newly formed ISC 
positions was given over to the respective division and district heads. This actually led 
to unintended consequences for the security group. In some instances, the ISCs were 
hired without any security background or qualification to perform non-security related 
tasks, such as financial reporting. During the implementation phase, ISCs were pushed 
by the security group to take responsibility for implementing security program at their 
respective positions. The security group was surprised to learn that individuals at ISC 
positions were not hired to perform security tasks and such tasks were actually creating 
additional work for the position holders. 
 
Defensive norms 
The security group has a general mistrust with other departments both in terms 
of intent and capability. This impacts subsequent dealings with divisions and districts 
within the organization. Rather than expect voluntary compliance, the organizational 
members were forced to read the security policy else face the threat of terminating 
293 
 
account access. The online certification was simply a mean to protect oneself in case of 
any adverse incident with suspected employee involvement. Further, a number like ten 
percent of the accounts terminated due to non-compliance indicates that efforts are 
underway and some positive results have actually been achieved. This is a 
demonstration of the defensive norm of rivalry whereby the IT division wants to show 
that they can do a better job than the Operations Security division, previous guardians 
of information security within the DOT.  
 The management of IT group decided not to take risk by exposure to new 
weaknesses as a result of developing a new security policy. Hence, management ended 
up simply adopting the expected minimum compliance requirements. The external 
commitment is considered to be another defensive norm. The commitment of security 
group to adopt the security policy developed by an external state authority as better 
policy is indicative of such a norm. The decision to implement what is outlined in the 
security policy shows emphasis of the CISO on diplomacy. The underlying aim was to 
shift the responsibility for any prospective security weakness to the sponsors of state 
security policy.  
 
Lack of internal commitment for best security practices 
There is little freedom of choice in developing security controls and procedures 
as these are bound by the state security policy. These controls have to be within the 
range of advocated policy. That is, the security controls and procedures are restricted to 
the tenets of the adopted policy. As a result, there is little commitment to institute best 
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security practices. The process of implementing the security program becomes merely 
an exercise to check few boxes for compliance purposes. The security group members 
end up not taking any risks and play a safe game. Subsequently, users are also not 
committed towards cumbersome security practices.  
 For theory-in-use model, all consequences have an impact on action strategy and 
overall governing variables. The underlying behavioral strategy for this model (theory-
in-use) is unilateral control over others. This was evident at DOT. The establishing of 
security initiatives was potentially critical situation for the DOT and organizational 
members were most oriented to control others and protect themselves. 
 
Explicating the espoused theory of information systems security caretakers  
In this section, we would discuss the espoused theory of the security group at 
DOT. An actor is generally only aware of the espoused theory, as this is the one she 
claims to follow.  The espoused theory gains significance as any mismatch with the 
theory-in-use would lead to undesired results.  
 At DOT, the CISO encouraged participation of all organizational members for 
the development of information systems security program. During interviews, the 
management team for security efforts, including the CISO, the Deputy CISO, and the 
manager of governance group emphasized how they have listened to various 
stakeholders and sought their feedback for developing an effective security program. 
Managers from different departments of the IT division participated during 
developmental meetings. The versions of security manual documents would be passed 
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onto these managers for their comments. Participation of stakeholders in defining the 
security program was one of the goals articulated by the security team.  
 The second governing variable for espoused theory is that everyone wins and no 
one loses. At DOT, the push by state legislation to get all organizations compliant with 
the state security policy was indeed seen from such point of view. The management at 
DOT considered that getting compliant with a security policy by successfully 
implementing it would in fact help the entire organization by rendering its business 
operations more secure. A secure information environment was seen as beneficial. At 
the same time, the DOT would also be able to observe the requirement as necessitated 
by the legislation. In the process, it would be able to generate goodwill among 
legislators by presenting a positive secure image.  
 At various stages of development and implementation of the security program, 
organizational members working on the security team or as users were requested to 
freely express their concerns regarding the program. Members were asked to provide 
comments and feedback on various components and aspects of the security program 
including the security manual and the training program. Free and proper expression of 
feeling is the third governing variable for an espoused theory. In fact, user feedback was 
considered critical for success with the program. These users were actually at different 
levels of organizational structure. Initial emphasis of security team was to focus on the 
executives that would be considered as responsible for information system security in 
their specific domains.  
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 The final value generally sought to be satisfied is to suppress the cognitive 
intellective aspects of action. The security group at DOT decided to adopt the state 
security policy as required by legislation. The group decided not to change any element 
of the security policy. But rather, a security manual was developed that were to 
reconfigure the policy requirements as applicable to DOT’s operational environment. 
Such a move prevented stakeholders from questioning the legitimacy of specific action 
or suggestion by the security group.  
 
Double loop learning  
An action is performed in order to attain desired consequence. However, in 
certain cases actions undertaken fail to provide the necessary outcome. In such a case, 
we would generally pursue a new action in order to address the apparent error. This 
enables single-loop learning. Argyris Putnam, and Smith (1985) explain that double 
loop learning would require an actor to change the existing governing variables in order 
to get the desired outcome. The actor would have to bring the new theory-in-use in 
congruence with the espoused theory for effective results. Any mismatch between the 
espoused theory and theory-in-use essentially has double loop implications for the 
situation (Argyris Putnam, and Smith, 1985).  
 As per the espoused theory, the DOT has adopted the state security policy and 
considers its implementation as actually a good thing for the agency. However, the 
theory-in-use indicates development of a security manual for security operations at 
DOT. The apparent incongruence between the espoused theory and theory-in-use 
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creates a gap that could be problematic for the DOT as an organization. As discussed 
previously, the state security policy has potential faults. If security manual were based 
upon the state security policy, inherent faults in the policy would creep in and impact IT 
operations. The interviews with departmental members indicate that the DOT already 
had an existent security program. With the advent of the state security policy, 
department decided to convert the existing security policy into a security manual and 
made structural changes to the manual so as to give an appearance that manual is indeed 
based on the state security policy. This creates a serious problem as inherent argument 
or logic of the state policy is nullified by actually adopting pre-existing security policy 
that was converted to security manual. The inherent logic of the policy is different than 
that of the manual and as such poses problems for coherence in the security posture. 
This in fact is camouflaging of the potential issues.  
 In terms of implementation, the espoused theory at DOT was to ensure 
compliance by all organizational members. However, a careful look at the theory-in-use 
indicates superficial compliance by all members. The security department emphasized 
the need for security training for all employees. As part of the online training, each 
organizational member was expected to read the security policy and answer few 
questions to earn completion certificate. The security management team used online 
certification as a stick to ensure that all members had read the policy so as to be able to 
measure compliance. Such a number was touted to be around ninety percent 
compliance. In actual, the online training program was considered a joke by technical 
(IT) members of the organization.  
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 For organizational members, the training was informative in beginning but soon 
lost appeal and appeared to be redundant with stale information. Further, members 
could simply go back and forth to answer the questions. Almost all members 
interviewed informed that they did not even had to read the security policy and could 
simply complete questionnaire in five to ten minutes as answers could generally be 
known with few tricks. As such, what has happened here is superficial belief or comfort 
in compliance numbers. In fact, user education about information systems security did 
not really happen. The high compliance number would create a false sense of 
confidence in the security program so established. This issue certainly raises further 
questions about the real state of security at DOT. It might be the case that effective 
security controls are very well in place. This might raise a question as to why then 
management wants to lull itself into false pretence. The answer might be the relative 
comfort in numbers and the need to measure every task so as to judge it as successful or 
not. This poses an interesting question whether security can really be measured and 
quantified.  
 
7.5 Discussion 
The theory of action, as proposed by Argyris & Schon (1974), aims to help 
organizational members initiate actions to change the business environment in 
congruence with the values imbibed in their espoused theories. In order to attain the 
normative perspective of an espoused theory, we may design actions consistent with the 
Normative Model II as proposed by Argyris and Schon (1974). The use of such a model 
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would most likely enhance the likelihood of double loop learning and increase the 
effectiveness over time (Argyris Putnam, and Smith, 1985). For the normative model, 
the governing variables include valid information, free and informed choice, and 
internal commitment. Based on the two case studies, the normative model II as 
interpreted for information systems security is presented in table 7.3.  
 
Table 7.3: Normative model for information systems security 
Governing 
variable 
Information Systems Security strategy Expected consequences for 
security initiative 
Valid 
information 
Design an organizational environment conducive 
to collaboration among stakeholders. Facilitate 
stakeholders to create a contextually driven 
security initiative. 
Consistent application of 
organizational security values 
attaining contextually authentic 
security initiative. 
Free and 
informed 
choice 
Security initiative jointly controlled by interested 
parties. 
Effective security related group 
dynamics enabling double loop 
implications. 
Internal 
commitment 
Sustenance of security initiative through constant 
monitoring of its implementation. Minimize 
inconsistency between security requirements and 
security controls and procedures. Joint 
cooperation across different levels of 
organizational structure. Bridge gaps in 
departmental interests for a secure business 
environment.  
Establishment of trust in 
security operations leading to 
security conformity. 
 
The implication of ‘valid information’ as a first governing variable is to ensure 
that information is in congruence with the context of an organization. This would allow 
correct assessment of the operating environment in terms of information system security 
needs of the organization. Contextually driven information would assist organizational 
members in making appropriate decisions conducive to secure business operations. The 
strategy to design an associated action would require sharing control with members 
having competence and stakeholders involved in the development, as well as, 
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implementation phases. The information systems security strategy would involve 
designing an organizational environment conducive or sympathetic to collaboration 
among stakeholders. The emphasis is on facilitating situation such that members of the 
security group are able to create a contextually driven security initiative. This would 
allow consistent application of organizational security values attaining contextually 
authentic security program.  
 The next governing variable in the model is free and informed choice. In terms 
of information systems security, this governing variable necessitates an appropriate 
selection of the security program as necessary to achieve secure organizational 
environment. It is imperative to understand the requirements of an organization and 
then make judicious decision on an appropriate security framework or standard to be 
adopted. At the same time, an organization should not impose restrictions on its 
stakeholders to make a selection among specified set of standards. The security group 
should be provided flexibility to identify a security framework that is appropriate given 
the contextual environment. The security policy may then be based on the identified 
framework and would inherit the latter’s inherent logic. The security program can then 
flow from the structure of the policy. The information systems security strategy to be 
followed should allow conflicting viewpoints to be externalized such that underlying 
theories can be tested openly. Such a strategy would require all tasks formed towards 
the security initiative to be jointly controlled by interested parties. The pursuance of this 
security strategy would allow effective security related group dynamics enabling double 
loop learning.  
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 The final governing variable of internal commitment emphasizes the need for 
processual commitment to the security initiative. An internal commitment to the choice 
indicates that appropriate action need to be taken by the management team to ensure 
that the security initiative is successfully adhered to. This essentially means that 
necessary processes need to be established within an organization in order to implement 
the security initiative. At the same time, establishment of such procedures and controls 
necessitate strong management leadership in the first place. In addition, the sustenance 
of security initiative through constant monitoring of the implementation of security 
program is imperative in order to attain the desired results.  
 The information systems security strategy to be followed should allow 
interruption of self-sealing processes. This would also lead to discussions on 
problematic issues and underlying assumptions might be re-evaluated. Any 
inconsistencies between security requirements and advocated security controls and 
procedures during implementation process have to be minimized through joint efforts of 
stakeholders. In essence, the need is for joint cooperation across different levels of 
organizational structure that is oriented towards a secure vision for everyone’s benefit. 
It is imperative to design strategy that helps bridge gaps over departmental interests so 
as to create a secure environment for the organization. The security actions outlined as 
part of the security strategy would establish trust in security operations of the 
organization thereby enhancing security conformity.  
 Bringing theories-in-use in coherence with the espoused theory of the security 
group would indeed help effecting security change in an organization. The dissertation 
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began with an observation in chapter 1 that there have been problems in industry with 
lack of success with security initiatives. The reason we have security failures in 
organizations is because there is too much emphasis on deliberate rational planning 
leading to rigidity rather than striving to ensure flexibility as exhibited in strategic 
initiatives of emergent nature. Mintzberg (1987) considers the fundamental dilemma of 
strategy formation to be the need to reconcile the forces for stability and for change. 
The author proposes quantum theory of strategic change. As argued by Mintzberg 
(1987), organizations adopt two distinctly different modes of behavior at different 
times. Generally, organizations pursue a given strategic orientation. Incremental 
changes keep occurring within the confines of that orientation. However, the 
organization’s strategic orientation moves out of sync with its environment as the 
business world keeps changing.  
Long period of evolutionary change is suddenly punctuated by a brief bout of 
revolutionary turmoil in which organization quickly alters many of its established 
patterns (Mintzberg, 1987). 
 
The organization tries to leap to a new stability quickly to reestablish an integrated 
posture. That is, strategic reorientation happens in brief, quantum leaps.  
 Based on the quantum theory of strategic change, we may infer that any strategic 
information systems security initiative needs to happen in brief, quantum leap. During 
such reorientation, theory-in-use is brought in alignment with the espoused theory. For 
quantum security change to happen, an initiative should imbibe strategies outlined in 
table 7.3. This adapted theory does seem to hold for the two case studies discussed in 
this research, the ITA and the DOT. In case of the DOT, the security related change 
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indeed occurred in brief yet quantum leap. The organizational restructuring, 
development of the security program and its subsequent implementation took place in 
less than a year. The security change process has been considerably smooth relative to 
other change efforts in the organization. The security group was able to achieve its 
objective of getting compliant with the state security policy before the state specified 
deadline.  
 The case of ITA is in direct contrast to security efforts at DOT. For the ITA, the 
security related change initiatives have been going on since 2003 with the passage of 
state legislation. The initial effort to achieve information systems security goals for the 
state has been abysmal. The efforts of security group ended up creating a confused and 
frustrating situation for agencies in the state. The appointment of a new CISO in 2005 
and subsequent renewed emphasis gave security initiative a new push. However, the 
new security related changes were not without problems as has been discussed earlier. 
By end of 2007, the security initiatives undertaken by the security group at ITA could 
be deemed unsuccessful in attaining its main objective of establishing a common 
information system security program in the state. The CISO had to extend the deadline 
for compliance with the state security policy in the wake of predominant failure of 
number of government agencies to respect the deadline. The security change has been 
going on far too long.  
 Based on this research, a theory to help explain the information systems security 
related change in an organization is put forward. The theory of quantum strategic 
security change (QSS) states that strategic information systems security initiatives 
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would be successful in an organization if developed and implemented in a brief yet 
quantum leap adopting an emergent security strategy in congruence with organizational 
security values, adhering with security cultural continuity, establishing effective 
security governance structure, ensuring security related knowledgeability, and 
commitment to security processes. To develop the strategic security initiative 
effectively, we need to ensure that the initiative is harmonious with the continuity of 
organizational culture. The security culture needs to ensure continuity of existing 
opportunity structures and not frustrate the expectations of organizational members. The 
development of security cultural resources like security policy and standards would 
obscure the quest for power and establish dominance that would allow propagating the 
secure view of the social world.  
 The successful implementation of the security initiative is dependent upon the 
organizational security structure and knowledgeability of agents in terms of security 
related self-identity and organizational identity. At the same time, adequate attention 
need also be paid to global security catalysts establishing trust relations between 
security agents, and institutional reflexivity for security effective practices. The 
strategic security initiative would be effective in bringing about security related change 
in an organization when the actual action strategies developed to secure the information 
environment are in congruence with the espoused security values of an organization. 
Such actions to institute security initiative need to be based on valid information, 
selected by informed choice, and supported by internal commitment of an organization.  
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described information systems security initiatives at the ITA 
and the DOT from an action perspective. Such an approach was argued to be conducive 
in understanding different strategies of action needed to support an information systems 
security initiative in an organizational context. The analysis in this chapter has evidently 
shown the effectiveness of Argyris and Schon’s (1974) theory of action to explain the 
intricate relationship between content and process, along with context of an 
organizational security change. Based on the emergent issues from the two case studies, 
the theory of quantum strategic security change has been developed to help explain the 
success or failure of a strategic information system security initiative. The proposed 
theory is intended to help the executive officers of an organization in effecting a 
successful information systems security change in modern organizations.   
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
8.1 Recapitulating the Doctrine 
 This dissertation has explored issues surrounding strategic information systems 
security initiatives. Strategic information systems security has been defined as a plan or 
pattern of actions to attain viability and effectiveness of an organization by securing 
information handling activities in the light of changing critical environment. The 
purpose of this section is to summarize key ideas and identify the contributions of this 
dissertation. In this section, we first present the nature of strategic information systems 
security, followed by shaping such security initiatives in organizations. Finally, the 
issue of technology governance is discussed.  
 
8.1.1 The nature of strategic information systems security  
Information systems security researchers and practitioners have tried to 
minimize the security gap in organizations through technical solutions and changes to 
organizational practices and structures. There have been efforts to consolidate different 
security functions. Also, prescriptive rationalistic planning has been imbibed by 
organizations to develop the security program. Although good in intention, the explicit 
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dependence upon technical solutions and rationalistic planning only takes into account 
the anticipated changes in the business environment. In contrast, this research has 
considered strategic information systems security to be emergent in nature 
conceptualized as a plan or pattern of actions. It has related the development and 
institutionalization of strategic information systems security to the contextual aspects of 
an organization. The implicit argument is concerned with aligning the interconnections 
between the security content and processual security with the contextual conditions of 
an organization.  
The argument of this dissertation has broadened the scope of information 
systems security discipline. The need for strategic approach to security efforts has been 
emphasized in order to overcome the security failures. It has been argued that a plan or 
pattern of security actions needs to be undertaken with a proper understanding of the 
content, processes and context of an organization. The key concern has been 
considering the impact of interaction between content, processes and context of an 
organization. It is important to align the linkages between these key components of a 
strategic security initiative. 
In developing the security program, the content of such a program should be 
considered with respect to contextual intricacies. A security initiative would be 
successfully instituted in an organization if it indeed were harmonious with the cultural 
continuity of an organization rather than significantly changing the existing opportunity 
and constraint structures leading to frustrating the expectations of actors. The security 
culture may also be used as a tool for propagating the secure view of the social world. 
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At the same time, we cannot divorce such development from the interactions between 
processes and context. For organizational transformation, we need to address the 
organizational structure and knowledgeability of agents in perceiving organizational 
identity in terms of security. At the same time, it is pertinent for organizations to 
consider the modernity concepts of self-identity and global security catalysts such as 
disembedding mechanisms and institutional reflexivity.  
 The reason for failures with security initiatives has been argued to be rigidity 
arising from emphasis on deliberate rational planning. The problem is to enact the 
content through various practices within a specific context. It has been suggested that 
strategic information systems security initiatives would be successful in an organization 
if developed and implemented in a brief yet quantum leap adopting an emergent 
security strategy in congruence with organizational security values, adhering with 
security cultural continuity, establishing effective security governance structure, 
ensuring security related knowledgeability, and commitment to security processes. 
 
8.1.2 Shaping the strategic information systems security initiatives 
Information systems security research needs to mature from formistic and 
mechanistic tendencies and ground itself in contextualist paradigm. The complexity of 
information systems security has been traced by defining the set of beliefs and 
assumptions about the nature of social reality. We need to critically address 
philosophical questions in the context of information systems security. Different 
ontological and epistemological assumptions would lead to different approaches to 
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security. The critique of current approaches lays foundation for contextualist 
perspective in dealing with the security issues. 
The dominant security research theme has been to find the factors or 
components that would impact overall organizational security. The mechanistic 
tendencies in information systems security research have also been noted which informs 
us about the casual connections in the nature of information systems security. The 
universal structure of information systems security is analytically investigated to 
identify the components in order to explain its true nature.  
 The increasing complexity of business environment in which organizational 
security has to be operationalized necessitates the need to understand the context in a 
dynamic manner. In order to improve the security posture of an organization it is 
imperative to realize, intuit, and get the quality of an event of interest, which involves 
an act in and with its setting (Pepper, 1970). At the same time, it is also important to 
understand the constituent, as well as, processual models for implementation of a 
successful information systems security program. However, it is imperative to be 
eclectic rather than study the security problem in a static manner. 
 
8.1.3. The issue of technology governance 
This research has emphasized the importance of contextualist perspective while 
strategizing about information systems security posture of an organization. This leads to 
an important issue that of technology governance. There has been an increasing concern 
for information privacy amid prevalent problem of security incidents. The government’s 
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response to such concerns of the citizens has been to simply fall back on the tested 
doctrine of standardization. That is, the solution has been conceived as to establish 
standard security practices within an industry. For instance, organizations operating in 
the medical industry have to deal with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPPA). Both federal and state governments have introduced various 
regulatory artifacts to ensure secure IT environment.  
Organizations now have to operate in an increasingly federated environment. 
Quite a few organizations are basically reacting to the compliance requirements set 
forth by the government. The organizations are expected to abide by the tenets of these 
regulatory artifacts. The legislations that provide generic guidance or stipulations, such 
as mandatory security policy in all organizations, can actually be helpful. However, the 
problem arises when legislation provides directive to a government entity to develop a 
security policy that need to be complied by all organizations in an industry. The concern 
is with the prescriptive nature of the security artifact and assumption that one shoe fits 
all. In order to have sweeping coverage, such policies generally ignore the contextual 
aspects of an organization 
In reality, many organizations find themselves under purvey of more than one 
set of regulations. For instance, publicly traded financial institutions have to comply 
with the requirements of both Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and Sarbanes-Oxley 
of 2002 (SOX). This indeed can be a very daunting task. In order to check for 
compliance, government then have to rely upon auditors for evaluating the state of 
security in organizations in regulated industry sectors. The government, however, is not 
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to be blamed especially in the wake of corporate scandals and increased interest in 
corporate ethics. The march of the auditors is generally perceived negatively by 
organizational members and is often reminiscent of policing. This has nevertheless 
contributed positively to the economy with an ever-growing cottage industry of IT 
auditing.  
 In view of growing federated requirements, organizations might be lulled into 
lethargic behavior where they may consider complying with mandated regulations only. 
This would create false sense of security as the very regulatory artifact may be based 
upon (and in fact preaching) limited view of security. Such an approach might be an 
effective way to deal with bureaucrats but results can be endemic. These situations call 
for effective technology governance, specifically with respect to security issues. IT 
management faces the dilemma of trying to comply with all government requirements 
and yet remain effective from a security point of view. The senior executives have to 
plow through plethora of standards and frameworks and decide upon an appropriate 
direction. However, only so much can be done. The main objective of an organization is 
to either maximize profits (for a corporate firm) or maximize service provided to 
customers (for a government agency). The organization does not exist simply to 
implement all the standards or regulations prescribed by the world.  
 Organizations need to focus on strategic information systems security initiatives 
in this fast paced business environment with continuous regulatory compliance 
requirements. The need is for prudent technology governance. Such leadership should 
not be distracted by technology fads but rather focus upon sound security principles. It 
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is imperative for technology leaders to realize the enabling role of information systems 
security. Strategic information systems security would allow organizations to be 
proactive and prepared for unanticipated business changes. The intent is to develop 
security content and subsequent security processes in coherence with contextual aspects 
of the organization.  
 
8.1.4. Summary of contributions of this research 
 This section summarizes the main contributions of this research.  
 
Broadening information systems security approach: The emphasis of 
information systems security literature has been on deliberate rational planning for 
security endeavors. Such prescriptive efforts are problematic because the attention is 
given only to the anticipated conditions of future. It is essential to also account for the 
unanticipated conditions, which render further complexity to business environment. 
This research has in fact broadened the approach to information systems security 
problem by tackling it from a proactive or an emergent perspective. This research views 
strategic information systems security as a plan or pattern of actions to attain viability 
and effectiveness of an organization by securing information handling activities in the 
light of changing critical environment. 
 Theory building: One of the main contributions of this research is building 
theory in information systems security discipline. It has provided a thorough description 
of the issues and concerns in transforming an organization for strategic security change 
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to avoid the possibility of security failure. The contribution of this dissertation is to 
bring together research in strategic management, information systems and information 
systems security, and also introduce a contextualist approach to development and 
institutionalization of strategic information systems security initiatives.  
 Contextualist strategic security: This research has argued that to solve the 
problem of information systems security failures, we need to understand the contextual 
perspective of an organization. The theory of contextualist strategic change has been 
used to identify the areas of concern that would have an implication for security posture 
of an organization. This research also identified an oversight in the application of this 
theory in information systems literature. Consequently, the need to focus on inter-
connections between content, context and processes has been emphasized.  
 Understanding security culture: This research has used cultural perspective to 
study information systems security initiatives. The concept of security culture has been 
of intrigue to security discipline and yet limited research has been undertaken to unravel 
this concept. This research has introduced a sociological approach (Pierre Bourdieu’s 
cultural theory to study practices) to understand the role of security culture in shaping 
the strategic security initiatives. The cultural approach provides a rich interpretation of 
security practices and helps create opportune organizational environment sympathetic to 
instituting strategic security initiatives.    
 Organizational security transformation: In order to effect a successful 
security change, this research has developed a model incorporating the security 
governance structure, knowledgeability of agents in terms of security and global 
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security catalysts. This model is grounded in the structuration theory and the theory of 
social transformation. The application of this model helps in an effective transformation 
of an organization embarking upon strategic security initiatives. The components of the 
model would help a practitioner in identifying specific security implications as 
applicable to modern organization. Although comprehensive, the model does not claim 
to address every granular element of organizational life.  
 Principles for shaping the strategic information systems security initiatives: 
Based on the empirical evidence from two case studies, this research has established a 
set of principles for shaping the strategic information systems security initiatives in an 
organization. These principles are intended to attain the normative perspective of 
initiating strategic security change. A proper consideration of these principles would 
help develop effective practices in creating a secure organizational environment. It has 
been argued that the reason for security failures has been lack of flexibility (of emergent 
nature) in security efforts. Such failure may be overcome by initiating strategic 
information systems security initiatives in a brief, quantum leap to achieve the desired 
security posture. The organization need to adopt an emergent security strategy in 
congruence with organizational security values, adhere with security cultural continuity, 
establish effective security governance structure, ensure security related 
knowledgeability, and commit to security processes. 
 The findings from this research are intended to be valuable to the community of 
researchers and practitioners engaged in the study of confluence between information 
systems security and organizations. It provides insight to the phenomenon of security 
315 
 
change and helps us understand some of the critical issues in preventing security 
failures. This research is mere beginnings and provides a basis on which further work 
can be built upon. 
 
8.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 This section identifies few limitations of this dissertation and outlines future 
research related to the development and institutionalization of strategic information 
systems security initiatives. These are discussed in terms of theoretical concerns and 
methodological issues.  
 
8.2.1. Theoretical concerns 
 Dhillon (1995) presents a model for classifying theories and uses it to provide 
future research directions (figure 8.1). The classification model has micro-macro 
distinction concerned with level of analysis as one dimension. Here, micro refers to the 
local form of social organization, while macro refers to large-scale social system. The 
second dimension of model is the substantive-formal distinction concerned with 
generality of categories with respect to cases. The formal categories are restrictive as 
compared to substantive ones. This model provides a four-fold classification of theories.  
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Figure 8.1: Future research directions (Adapted from Dhillon, 1995) 
 
Macro-formal theories are concerned with the structure, functioning and 
development of societies. On the other hand, macro-substantive theories involve studies 
pertaining to a particular industry. For micro level of analysis, the theories concerned 
with local forms of social organization are categorized as micro-formal theories. On 
contrary, the focus of micro-substantive theories is on particular types of organizations 
or situations.  
Based on the model, this research falls in the micro-substantive category. This is 
because the approach of this dissertation has been to consider contextualist aspects of 
organizations for instituting strategic information systems security initiatives. This 
research has focused on a particular type of organizations – government organizations 
operating in a federated environment. This may be considered as a limitation of this 
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dissertation. As such, future research stream should validate the findings in different 
organizational and industry settings. Such directions could focus on rest of the 
theoretical categories. For instance, research findings from this dissertation can be used 
in other public sector organizations to develop a macro-substantive theory. 
Alternatively, we may be ambitious to develop a macro-formal theory. Such a research 
project would involve studying organizations operating in different industries across the 
economy.  
 Another limitation of this research may be attributed to the use of theory of 
contexualist strategic change in addressing the research problem. The use of this 
particular theory has indeed provided a rich understanding of the phenomenon of 
information systems security change in organizations. Alternatively, we may employ 
other equally promising theories to understand the problem. One such possible future 
research direction might be the use of institutional theory in studying security failures in 
organizations.  
 
8.2.2. Methodological issues 
 This research was conducted in an interpretive tradition. The tenets of 
interpretivism were firmly adhered with. The evaluation of this dissertation based upon 
the set of interpretive principles advanced by Klein and Myers (1999) is detailed in 
Table 8.1. However, advocates of other research approaches such as positivism might 
not necessarily agree with the underlying principles of interpretivism. As such, the use 
of interpretive approach in this research may be considered to be a limitation by certain 
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research community. However, we must opt for eclecticism with systematic inquiry 
rather than restrict ourselves to a singular view of world. The aim should be to resolve 
the research problem. The interpretive approach has been used in this research because 
it is sympathetic to the exploratory nature of the research study. Further research studies 
may be conducted that follow positivist or realist approach to confirm the findings of 
this dissertation. These confirmatory research studies may alternatively employ research 
methods other than the case study.  
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Table 8.1: Evaluation of dissertation 
Klein and Myers 
(1999) criteria Dissertation Research 
The Hermeneutic 
Circle 
It is difficult to provide explicit evidence for this criterion as it is 
implicit to the process. The evidence provided for rest of the criteria 
may be used to satisfy this criterion. The focus of this study has been 
on the details of an act that form an event and the intuited wholeness 
of that event.     
Contextualization 
This criterion is the very core of this research. The study has operated 
within the paradigm of contextualism. The theory used to investigate 
the research problem has also been developed from contextualism. 
Documents were collected that provided information about the 
historical context. Former stakeholders (ex-employees) were identified 
and interviewed to provide historical details. For instance, former 
CISO of both ITA and DOT were interviewed. Interviewees were 
asked to recollect the facts and the context surrounding an event of 
interest. 
Interaction 
Between the 
Researchers and 
the Subjects 
Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions were used to 
elicit individual interpretations of subjects. The emerging themes and 
key findings were discussed with an informant in each organization.  
Abstraction and 
Generalization 
Data has been interpreted using the theoretical framework. General 
themes were developed based upon data interpretation and related to 
social action in terms of security. Frameworks, models and principles 
for effecting security change have been provided. An overall theory 
for successful organizational security transformation has been 
developed.  
Dialogical 
Reasoning 
Initial conceptions about the Theory of Contextualist Strategic Change 
were revised to use the theory as a meta-theory. Bourdieu’s cultural 
theory, structurational theory and action theory were used to 
understand the inter-relationship between the main theoretical 
components of the original theory. Generation of themes and 
subsequent discussion involved careful revision with respect to the 
theoretical assumptions.  
Multiple 
Interpretations 
Different stakeholder groups were identified and members 
interviewed. Members belonging to a particular group emphasized 
interpretations to enhance the interests of their group. For instance, 
there was prominent difference in expectations of security group, non-
security IT group, and non-IT group. 
Suspicion 
Data was collected using both primary and secondary sources to 
reduce potential distortion of facts. In addition, multiple members 
within different stakeholder groups were interviewed. This was done 
to check for any potential bias and distortions in accounts of a 
particular event of interest. Emergent themes and findings were also 
discussed with an informant in each organization. 
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APPENDIX A 
Information Technology Agency  
Case Study: Interviews conducted 
 
 
Time period spent at the field site: November 2006 to September 2007 
Number of organizational members formally interviewed: 33 
Additional sources of observation for organizational operations: Staff meetings, 
committee meetings, advisory council meetings, informal meetings. 
Organizational structure: 
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Formal in-depth meetings conducted with the organizational members from the IT 
Security directorate:  
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Formal in-depth meetings conducted with the organizational members from other 
directorates: 
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Appendix B 
Department of Transportation  
Case Study: Interviews conducted 
 
 
Time period spent at the field site: April 2007 to September 2007 
Number of organizational members formally interviewed: 28 
Additional sources of observation for organizational operations: Group meetings, 
informal meetings. 
Organizational structure: 
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Formal in-depth meetings conducted with the organizational members from the 
Information Technology Division:   
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Formal in-depth meetings conducted with the organizational members from other 
divisions: 
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APPENDIX C 
Topic Guide 
 
 
 
Questions inquiring about the context  
1. What is your perception about information system security at the organization? 
2. What do you consider to be the issues or concerns with security efforts at the 
organization? 
3. What is the security governance structure? 
4. What governance structure would you like to see to deal with your 
organization’s complexity? 
5. Why is the security council being developed? 
6. What are the challenges in dealing with political dynamics both internally and 
externally? 
7. How has your organization adapted to previous technology related changes? 
8. What is your perception about security culture at your organization? 
9. What are the roles and responsibilities of various security members? 
10. What are the resources with agencies to implement the security program? 
11. Do the agencies have control over the resources required for successful 
implementation of the security program? 
12. Identify alternative strategy (or action plan) for an organization where there is a 
so-to-speak merger of 92 organizations (in terms of IT infrastructure) and also, 
outsourcing arrangement. 
13. What do you consider to be the success measures for the security efforts.  
14. Do you think security group is meeting the expectations of organizational 
members?  
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15. Were you convinced by the argument provided by the security group for making 
security prominent? 
16. What are the important factors to give a program or policy a strategic thrust? 
17. What is the financial model followed by this organization when it comes to 
services provided? Does the organization have budget allocation from the state?  
18. What would you consider to be the key traits for a CSO in order to navigate the 
complex environment? 
19. What is the logic for current security approach? Basically, why this approach? 
20. Is the security program being adopted based upon their success in other existing 
organizations? 
21. Who do you think are the powerful people when it comes to information 
security? 
22. What are the factors that did favor or impede introduction of security program? 
23. What are the possible points of strain within organization? 
24. What are the future aims of the security efforts? 
 
Questions inquiring about the content  
1. Have you read information security policy?  
2. What is your opinion about the security policy adopted by the security group? 
3. What is your understanding about information security program?  
4. What is your understanding about the security initiatives introduced? 
5. What are the various components of the security program? 
6. Have you undergone security training? 
7. Are you aware about information security at your organization? 
8. Have you seen any security (awareness) initiatives at your organization? 
9. What is your opinion on the significance of information security? 
10. What do you consider to be the role of security? 
11. From your point of view, what is the most significant security issue? 
12. How can we improve security program? 
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13. What would you like to change in security efforts at your organization? Are you 
happy with the strategy adopted by security group? 
14. What is the role and focus of the security department? 
15. What are the goals and objectives for your organization’s security? 
16. Why the particular areas of need have been identified? 
17. What constitutes the compliance program? 
18. How is the security awareness training provided to organizational members? 
 
Questions inquiring about the process 
1. In your opinion, has security role been used in exercise of control? 
2. Did security impact institutional order? 
3. How do you ensure information security while doing your regular work? 
4. Are we on right track in terms of information security approach at your 
organization? 
5. If I were to ask you to institute information security at your organization what 
would be your response? How would you do it? 
6. What would be your approach to institute security at your organization? 
7. What are the important factors to achieve success? 
8. What would make you abide by the security program and make it successful? 
9. What would you like to change in the security approach adopted at your 
organization? 
10. What would be your top two issues or concerns associated with security 
endeavor at your organization? 
11. Have you faced any changes in your work with introduction of information 
security controls? 
12. Have you noticed any changes in the way things used to be done with 
introduction of security at your organization? 
13. What do you believe to be the drivers of information security at your 
organization? 
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14. How did employees react to security initiatives? Any resistance? 
15. How has information security been received at your organization? Has it been 
adopted wholly? 
16. Did security create adverse situation at your organization? 
17. What are the issues that need to be dealt with while instituting a program in an 
organization like your organization? 
18. How has information security been received at your organization? 
19. How is the security program being formulated? 
20. How is the security program being implemented? 
21. What are the actions that have been taken to develop the program? 
22. How has your organization adapted to previous IS security attempts? 
23. How is the security group acting on the employee reactions? 
24. Have any initiatives been undertaken to interact with organizational members? 
25. What are the negotiations or maneuvers that accompanied formulation and 
implementation of security program? 
26. What new alliances were required for implementing security program? 
27. What is the management process for decision-making? 
28. What are the mechanisms of control exerted over the organizational members 
when they perform their activities? 
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